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Abstract 
Governance in the European Union is being transformed through the increased 
use of agencies to perform a range of functions in a variety of policy areas. The 
European Commission believes that agencies can add value but admits that 
their establishment has not been accompanied wLWKD³FRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´
of their roles and purposes. In this thesis, I take the approach that such an 
understanding is best reached through examination of existing agencies. 
Focusing on the most common type of agency in the EU, i.e. Community 
Agencies, this thesis provides a four-level analysis. At the conceptual level, the 
thesis deals with WKHµDJHQF\¶FRQFHSW. Drawing on public management 
literature, the empirical level involves classification of these diverse bodies. 
The contribution of the thesis at the theoretical level is to identify the key 
driving factors behind agency establishment; following a theoretical framework 
devised from new institutionalist theories I trace and analyse the establishment 
process of four case study agencies. The research reveals that to fully 
understand the establishment of agencies we need to draw on more than one 
strand of new institutionalism, as they can explain different aspects of agency 
creation. As a wider outlook the thesis reflects on the role of agencies, relating 
it to the wider academic debates on WKHµregulatory state¶ and its implications 
for legitimacy.   
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Introduction  
1.1 Searching for a common understanding of agencies 
Governance in the European Union (EU) is being transformed through the 
increased use of agencies to perform a range of functions in a wide spectrum of 
policy areas. In 2008, the European Commission issued a communication 
LQYLWLQJWKH&RXQFLODQGWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW(3WRDQ³LQWHU-institutional 
GLVFXVVLRQ´RQWKHUROHRIDJHQFLHVLQ(8JRYHUQDQFH,QWKLVFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
ZKLFKZDVJLYHQWKHRSWLPLVWLFWLWOH³(XURSHDQDJHQFLHV± 7KHZD\IRUZDUG´
the Commission (2008a) argued that agencies can add important value to 
European governance. At the same time, the Commission (2008a: 2) remarked 
WKDWD³FRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´RIWKHSXUSRVHVDQGUROHVRIDJHQFLHVLV
lacking, and this makes it difficult for the agencies to fulfil their potential. 
Moreover, if there is no common agreement on what the roles of these agencies 
are, it is exceedingly difficult control their activities. As more resources are 
allocated to agencies than ever before, the need to develop common ideas of 
their roles and purposes has never been greater. To date, agencies have been 
HVWDEOLVKHGRQDFDVHE\FDVHEDVLVDQGWKHUHKDVEHHQQR³RYHUDOOYLVLRQ´RI
their role (see Commission 2008a: 2). A logical starting point for developing a 
common understanding of the role of agencies is to examine existing agencies. 
By uncovering the motives behind the establishment of previous agencies, we 
gain an understanding of their desired role, on the basis of which a more 
coherent plan for the future can be developed. In this thesis I will be examining 
the most common type of agency in the EU, i.e. Community Agencies, and 
explain their establishment.  
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This thesis seeks to contribute to discussions and debates on agencies at 
four different levels. At the conceptual level, the project deals with the 
µDJHQF\¶FRQFHSW:KDWDUH&RPPXQLW\$JHQFLHV":KDWDUHWKH\QRW"+RZ
does the definition of a Community Agency compare with definitions of other 
types of agencies and agencies in other political settings? The empirical level 
of the thesis involves mapping and comparing of Community Agencies. What 
are their tasks and functions? What resources do they have? When were they 
set up and where? The contribution of the research at the theoretical level is to 
identify the key driving factors behind agency establishment. Are there 
different rationales behind the establishment of agencies with different 
functions? Can we distinguish any changes over time? Based on the findings of 
the mapping of agencies, I selected four case study agencies: European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), European Medicines 
Agency (EMEA), European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders (FRONTEX). Using documentary research and semi-structured elite 
interviews, I trace the process leading up to their establishment. Finally, as a 
wider outlook, the project reflects on the role of agencies in the transformation 
of governance in Europe, relating it to the wider academic discourse on 
µUHJXODWRU\VWDWHV¶LQJHQHUDODQGWKH(8DVDUHJXODWRU\VWDWHLQSDUWLFXODU 
 
1.2 Agencification and its implications 
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, the use of agencies has 
become an increasingly common feature of public management in a wide range 
of political settings, and the establishment of agencies is seen as an important 
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DVSHFWRIµWKHUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶7KHILUVWDJHQFLHVDWWKH(XURSHDQOHYHOZHUH
established in 1975, when European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (Cedefop) and European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND) were set up. In the 1980s, no 
European level agencies were established. The first large wave of 
agencification came in the 1990s when nine agencies were established, and 
another eleven agencies were established in the second wave between 2000 and 
2006. This must be considered a rapid development towards more agencies. 
The establishment of Community Agencies follows established decision-
making procedures; the Commission presents a proposal, and a decision is 
made either jointly by the Council and the EP or by the Council following 
consultation of the EP. The level of EP involvement depends on whether the 
codecision of consultation procedure is used. The European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) is also consulted. As the case study agencies have 
been established at different times, the study of the processes leading up to 
their establishment also sheds light on how the behaviour of the institutions has 
changed over time. In particular, it is noticeable how the level of influence and 
confidence of the EP has increased. 
Whilst the establishment of agencies has not been part of a wider 
vision, it is apparent that the Commission puts great faith in agencies. For 
instance, in the White Paper on European Governance from 2001, the 
Commission (2001a: 24) ZURWHWKDWWKH³>W@he creation of further autonomous 
EU regulatory agencies in clearly defined areas will improve the way rules 
DUHDSSOLHGDQGHQIRUFHG´,QWKH&RPPLVVLRQWULHGWRLQLWLDWHD
discussion leading to the establishment of a common operating framework for 
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regulatory agencies (see Commission 2005). 7RDQH[WHQW³(XURSHDQDJHQFLHV
± 7KHZD\IRUZDUG´FDQEHVHHQan attempt to rekindle this discussion, but this 
time the goal is also to move beyond discussions on procedural frameworks 
and to contemplate the broader question of the role of agencies in governance. 
This demonstrates that questions on the role of agencies in governance are not 
only of interest to academics. It is very much an ongoing discussion amongst 
practitioners at the European institutions. 
Of course there are benefits and risks associated with any organisational 
choice in public management. Commonly cited advantages of delegation to 
agencies are concentration of technical expertise, facilitation of credible 
commitment and efficiency gains. Risks include bureaucratic drift in its various 
forms. Rational choice institutionalism captures well how decisions to delegate 
functions to agencies are informed by these concerns (see chapter 2). Starting 
from the assumption that institutions matter (see Przeworski 2004), I also argue 
that agencies may play a significant role in the institutionalisation and 
legitimisation of norms, values and working practices (see Kelemen 2002). 
Sociological institutionalist theory emphasises this aspect of institutional 
choice. These implications of governance by agencies are relevant to any 
political setting where agencies are used, and will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 2. Historical institutionalist theory broadens the picture further by 
considering how the wider historical context influences agency creation and 
development. This makes this theory particularly useful for our understanding 
of the timing of agency establishment. A contribution of my research project is 
to carry these existing theories about agency establishment to a new field, i.e. 
agencies at the European level.  
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The establishment of agencies can be seen as a move towards an 
increasingly technocratic society where the influence of unelected technocrats 
expands on behalf of the influence of elected politicians. This influence may be 
direct, as in the case of agencies with regulatory powers, or it could be indirect 
in the sense that the agencies themselves may not hold mandates to make 
binding decisions but their opinions are nevertheless incorporated into policy. 
Either way, this raises a series of issues related to bureaucratic control, 
accountability and legitimacy. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that 
unelected technocrats employed by agencies, who are more anonymous to the 
general public than elected politicians, are less open to public scrutiny, which 
would make them easier targets for corruption. The use of specialist agencies 
may allow for more stakeholder involvement in policy development. Whilst 
this is often positive, there is also a real risk of agency capture by stakeholders, 
which means that the agencies become controlled by the interests they were set 
up to control. How are unelected officials held accountable for their actions? 
How could citizens influence policy when they have no, or very limited, 
influence over who the policy-makers are? Who should be allowed to influence 
policy, how, when and why? To what extent a political system is deemed 
legitimate very much depends on the answers to these types of questions about 
control and accountability. 
Whilst these are important considerations for any decision to establish 
agencies, I argue that they are even more so in the EU setting compared to 
national settings. It could be argued that the EU, in contrast to its Member 
States, has evolved into a predominantly technocratic system without first 
going through the phase of securing widespread support, rather than mere 
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passive acceptance, for the system itself. There is a widespread concern that the 
(8LVVXIIHULQJIURPDµGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLW¶VHHIRUH[DPSOHKarlsson 2001; 
Schmidt 2006). As Schmidt (2006: ZULWHV(8GHPRFUDF\LV³IUDJPHQWHG´
DQG³>P@RVWVHHWKHDQVZHUWRWKHSUREOHPRIWKHGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLWDVWKH
development of EU-level institutions that are more participatory and 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´*LYHQWKHVHZLGH-spread views, why has the EU moved away 
from the Community method and decided to establish more and more specialist 
agencies? If the EU wishes to address the alleged democratic deficit by making 
OLQHVRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\FOHDUHUDQGE\IDFLOLWDWLQJFLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH
policy-making process, is it not counterintuitive to set up these specialist 
agencies? If, on the other hand, the aim is to make the system more legitimate 
in the eyes of the wider public by increasing efficiency in terms of what the 
political system can deliver, then specialised agencies may be advantageous. 
Advocates of the regulatory state and governance by specialist agencies tend to 
emphasise this aspect. The implications of viewing the EU as a regulatory state 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, and I will return to these 
questions in the conclusion.  
'LVFXVVLRQVDERXWµUHJXODWRU\VWDWHV¶IRFXVRQWKHXVHRIUHJXODWRU\
agencies, but, as will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there are also other 
types of agencies. Not all agencies have regulatory powers, and, amongst those 
that do, the extent of their powers varies. Moreover, agencies vary in other 
dimensions, such as size, governance structures and financial arrangements. In 
this thesis, I seek to broaden the understanding of agency establishment by 
investigating if there are different rationales behind the establishment of 
different types of agencies, and if there are different rationales behind the 
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establishment of agencies at different times. Furthermore, I will investigate if 
different theories can explain different aspects of agency establishment. 
 
1.3 Overview of Research Design and Methodology 
The methodology of this project draws on qualitative methods developed in 
comparative politics (see Gerring 2001). As the number of agencies is not large 
enough to lend itself to large N research, the chosen research design has a 
focus on small and medium N research. The first empirical step of this research 
is to map and classify all 22 Community Agencies established between 1975 
and 2006.1 As the time frame available for this project would not allow for in-
depth study of the establishment of all individual agencies, a case study 
approach was chosen for the second empirical step of the research. Cedefop, 
EMEA, EASA and FRONTEX were selected as case studies based on the 
findings of the mapping exercise of the first empirical step of the research. The 
selection of case study agencies was primarily guided by the functions that the 
agencies are set up to perform, but size, governance structures and financial 
arrangements were also taken into account. The rationale behind the selection 
of these agencies is covered in more detail in chapter 3. To uncover the causal 
paths behind the establishment of these agencies and gain a deep insight into 
what has driven this development, the method of process-tracing was selected. 
As King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 227) explain, process-tracing involves 
³VHDUFKLQJIRUHYLGHQFH± evidence consistent with the overall causal theory ± 
                                                 
1
 The cut-off point coincides with the start of my empirical research. Since 2006, two more 
agencies agency (European Institute for Gender Equality and European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights) have been established. European Agency for Fundamental Rights has 
been built on the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.  
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DERXWWKHGHFLVLRQDOSURFHVVE\ZKLFKWKHRXWFRPHZDVSURGXFHG´VHHDOVR
George and Bennett 2004). In this case, the outcome is the establishment of 
agencies. The decisional process is the EC/EU decision-making process from 
idea to final legislative decision. The causal theories are rational choice 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. As 
will be explained in chapter 2, hypotheses derived from these three strands of 
new institutionalism need not be mutually exclusive as they may prove to be 
able to explain different aspects of agency creation. The rationale behind the 
decision to devise a framework from new institutionalist theories will be 
outlined in chapter 2, in which I set out the theoretical framework and the 
hypotheses to be explored in the thesis. In chapter 2, I will also discuss what 
evidence will be sought to verify or falsify the hypotheses. 
 Documentary research was a crucial part of the data-gathering process. 
To a significant extent, the information needed to map and classify the 
agencies has been taken from the founding legislations of the agencies (see 
Appendix 1). However, I have also consulted the official web sites of the 
agencies, agency work programmes, budget documentation and similar. For the 
second empirical step essential information was provided by documents from 
the EU institutions, such as legislative proposals from the Commission, EP 
reports and debates, Council documentation, opinions from the EESC and, of 
course, the final legislative texts. To complement the information from these 
official documents, with a particular emphasis on gaining an understanding of 
the political climate of the time of the establishment of the agencies, secondary 
sources in the form of previous studies and news reports have been consulted.  
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 In order to move beyond the story of official documentation, the 
documentary research was complemented by semi-structured elite interviews. 
During 2008, I visited each of the four case study agencies and interviewed 
officials with varying functions. An implication of the regulatory state is that 
specialist agencies have considerable influence over policy-making. To find 
out if this is true in the case of Community Agencies, I also interviewed 
Commission representatives with experience from working with these 
agencies. Interviews with similarly knowledgeable representatives from the EP 
(two elected MEPs and two employed officials) further contributed to a more 
nuanced understanding of the role the agencies play in European governance. 
In total, I conducted 21 interviews (see Appendix 2). 
 An important advantage of using semi-structured interviews is that it 
allows the interviewees to describe, explain and elaborate on their personal 
experiences freely and in their own words (see for example Bryman 
2004: 145).2 The choice of semi-structured interviews proved to be very useful. 
Throughout my research a number of interviewees drew my attention to facts 
and events that I had not been able to foresee from the initial documentary 
research. To steer the conversation onto the topics that I wished to find out 
more about, I prepared a list of topics and questions to be used as a guide for 
the interview (see Bryman 2004: 321). Some questions were used for all 
interviews, but in situations where the documentary research had pointed to 
particular concerns with regards to an agency or institution, special questions 
on these issues were added to the guide. During the interviews I made notes 
about key points. In most cases, interviewees did not object to my recording 
                                                 
2
 Structured interviews are useful for finding out specific facts. This was not my prime concern 
here as I used documentary research for that purpose.  
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the whole interview. However, there were exceptions. In particular, some 
interviewees requested that their names were not mentioned, and some 
LQIRUPDWLRQZDVJLYHQ³RIIWKHUHFRUG´$Q\ZLVKHVWKHLQWHUYLHZHHVH[SUHVVHG
in these regards were of course granted. To ensure consistency and to avoid 
inconsistent conventions for referencing, all interviewees have been 
anonymised in this thesis. 
 A methodological overview would not be complete without a comment 
on potential bias and how to avoid it. Any researcher relying on interview data 
DOVRUHOLHVRQWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶JLYLQJDFFXUate information. Interviewees may 
have their own agenda, or they may be hesitant to present opinions that are not 
compatible with official norms. Wherever possible, I have attempted to avoid 
bias induced by such concerns through triangulation of information. In other 
words, I have sought to confirm information from more than one source. When 
interviewees clearly have presented a personal view, it has been presented as 
such in the thesis. Needless to say, more detailed information about national 
positions within the Council could have contributed to a yet more refined 
picture of agency establishment. However, given the aim to identify the main 
objectives behind agency creation, and recalling that the Council tend to reach 
consensus before making decisions even in situations where it is not legally 
obliged to do so (Lewis 2003a: 997), I argue that a presentation of the final 
agreement is sufficient.  
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
The chapter immediately following this introduction sets out the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. In the first major section of chapter 2, I discuss and 
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HQJDJHZLWKSUHYLRXVDFDGHPLFUHVHDUFKRQµUHJXODWRU\VWDWHV¶DQGµDJHQFLHV¶
Importantly, this involves disentangling these core concepts, but I also outline 
observed empirical variation of agency experiences, and reflect on the 
implications of viewing the EU as a regulatory state. The second major section 
of chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of European integration and governance 
theories, with a particular emphasis on new institutionalist theories. I present 
arguments for why new institutionalist theories are suitable for the study of 
Community Agency establishment. The chapter ends with a tabular summary 
of the hypotheses to be explored in the case study chapters. 
The first empirical step of the investigation and the rationale behind the 
selection of the four case studies are covered in chapter 3. First I present a 
definition of Community Agencies and relate this to the previous discussion of 
WKHµDJHQF\¶FRQFHSW)ROORZLQJWKLV,Pap the Community Agencies 
established between 1975 and 2006, classifying them according to time of 
establishment, size, functions, governance structures, financial arrangements 
and location. The chapter reveals considerable variation in all these dimensions 
within the Community Agency group. To achieve the stated aim of this thesis 
to further discussions on the EU as a regulatory state, I argue that the variation 
with regards to functions is the most crucial aspect to explain. This guides the 
selection of case studies. 
The case studies are presented in chapters 4-7. In these chapters, I trace 
the process leading up the establishment of Cedefop, EMEA, EASA and 
FRONTEX, respectively. Each chapter follows a largely chronological 
structure. I first give a brief presentation of the agency, before discussing the 
context in which the agency was established. Next I present the positions of the 
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(8LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKH((6&DQGUHIOHFWRQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFH
today. The findings are then discussed in relation to the hypotheses set up in 
chapter 2, and summarised in a brief concluding section. 
In the final chapter of the thesis, I first summarise and compare the key 
findings for each agency. The conclusions drawn are then related to the wider 
academic discussion of regulatory states, with a particular focus on the 
implications of viewing the EU as a regulatory state.  
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Theoretical framework: New Public Management, 
µWKHUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶DJHQFLHVDQG(XURSHDQ
governance 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will set out the theoretical framework to be applied in this 
thesis. The theoretical framework draws on new institutionalist theories, 
developed as part of the governance approach to European studies, and on 
public management literature. 
Agencification, i.e. the establishment of agencies to which a variety of 
tasks are delegated, has been observed in a variety of political settings, and has 
attracted considerable attention from scholars interested in public management 
and administration. It has been argued that the establishment of agencies is part 
of a paradigm shift in public management, often referred to as New Public 
Management (NPM), which is characterised by ideas RI³OHVVHQLQJRU
UHPRYLQJGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHSXEOLFDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU´+RRG
1995: 94), and by ³GHOHJDWLRQRIPDQDJHULDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDODXWRQRP\LQD
YDULHW\RIGHFHQWUDOL]HGIRUPV´0LQRJXH 653; see also Döhler 2002). 
2QHVWUDQGRIWKH130OLWHUDWXUHFRQFHUQVWKHGHEDWHRQWKHLGHDRIµWKH
UHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶VHHIRUH[DPSOHCaporaso 1996; Majone 1994; 1997). Other 
VWUDQGVVHHNWRFRQFHSWXDOLVHµagencies¶ and to identify drivers behind agency 
creation (see IRUH[DPSOH(SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ¶VJames 2001; 
McCubbins and Page 1987; Pollitt et al. 2001; Talbot 2004; Thatcher 2002a).  
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Due to its ever-FKDQJLQJQDWXUHWKH³(XURSHDQSURMHFW´KDVEHHQWKH
subject of intense academic study, and there is a wealth of literature available 
on the subject. Whilst early work almost exclusively had an international 
relations approach and focused on integration, loosely defined as the pooling of 
sovereignty to supranational institutions, recent studies more often treat the 
European Union as a political system in its own right, and approach it from a 
governance perspective. This change can be attributed to Hix (1994) who 
argued that international relations approaches are appropriate for explaining 
integration, but approaches developed within comparative politics would be 
better suited to explain the politics of the European Union. In a later article, 
Hix (1998) went a step further and called for researchers to realise the 
limitations of viewing the EU as a sui generis phenomenon, arguing that 
comparison with other political systems would significantly improve our 
understanding of how the EU works. However, there is no such thing as one 
governance approach, and different scholars have chosen to approach the EU 
from a number of different perspectives (see Pollack 2005: 36). Rational choice 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism, 
collectively referred to as new institutionalism, have been proved to have wide 
appeal, and can contribute significantly to our understanding of EU politics 
(see for example Hall and Taylor 1996, March and Olsen 1989; Peterson 1995; 
Przeworski 2004). Other approaches include multi-level governance and 
network analysis (see Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch 1999; Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank 1993). 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section deals 
with NPM literature, and discusses the regulatory state and agencies. The 
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second section provides a review of European integration and governance 
literature, and presents a case for why new institutionalist theories are 
appropriate as a framework. The third section consists of a tabular summary of 
the hypotheses to be explored and what evidence is needed to verify or falsify 
the hypotheses. 
 
2.2 New Public Management, the regulatory state and 
agencies 
The establishment of agencies is not a phenomenon unique to the EU context, 
but can be seen as part of a wider trend in public management, commonly 
referred to as New Public Management (NPM). Academic studies of NPM 
often focus on regulatory policy-making, in particular regulation by agencies, 
and it has been argued that this transformation of public management 
organisation has led to a major shift in governance patterns. Indeed, the shift is 
considered significant enough to motivate a new conceptualisation of the 
µVWDWH¶7KLVSDUWRIWKHFKDSWHULVGLYLGHGLQWRWZRVXE-sections. In the first, I 
GLVFXVVWKHFRQFHSWDQGLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHµUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶7KHVHFRQGVXE-
VHFWLRQGHDOVVSHFLILFDOO\ZLWKDJHQFLHVFRYHULQJGHILQLWLRQVRIµDJHQFLHV¶DQ
overview of empirically observed variation between agencies, and an outline 
how previous studies have sought to explain this variation in practice.  
 
2.2.1 The regulatory state: concept and implications 
7KHFRQFHSWRIWKHµUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶ZDVGHYHORSHGLQFRQQHFWLRQWRWKHVWXG\
of NPM, loosely defined as changing patterns in economic management, public 
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administration and accountability observed particularly from the 1980s and 
onwards (see Hood 1991; James 2001; Moran 2002).3 Significant for NPM is a 
VKLIWLQ³emphasis from process accountability towards a greater element of 
accounWDELOLW\LQWHUPVRIUHVXOWV´ (Hood 1995: 94), and it is associated with 
the increased use of ³DSDUWLFXODUO\$QJOR-American form of business 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ´ (James 2001: 247). In practical terms, this implies more private-
sector style management in public administration, and a focus on what the 
public administration can deliver rather than how it is delivered.  
To understand the link between the idea of the regulatory state and 
public management in the United States, it is necessary to consider some of the 
traditional differences in public management between the United States and 
Europe. Whilst recognising that there are significant differences amongst 
European countries, it makes sense to speak of an ideological cleavage between 
the United States and Europe regarding the principles of public sector 
management. This cleavage can be attributed to differing ideological views on 
the functioning of the market. The traditional American view is that the market 
normally functions well, and that interference with market forces is only 
justified in clear cases of market failure (Majone 1996: 50). This has resulted in 
a system where the management of public utilities largely has been left in 
private hands, and the threat of market failure has been addressed by subjecting 
the private owners to regulation, which is developed and upheld by agencies or 
commissions (Majone 1996: 15). In Europe, by contrast, the market has 
traditionally been viewed with more suspicion, and a common belief has been 
that public ownership gave governments increased ability to regulate their 
                                                 
3
 For a more detailed account of the principles of NPM, see Hood (1991; 1995). 
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economies and to protect public interests (Majone 1996: 11; 
see Braithwaite 2000: 224).  
As public ownership did not appear to deliver the expected benefits, 
public opinion in Europe swung in the 1980s, and there was a macro-economic 
paradigm shift from Keynesianism to more neo-liberal solutions (0ĦOOHUDQG
Wright 1994: 2).4 The result of this public management change was 
SULYDWLVDWLRQRILQGXVWULHVEXWDOVR³WKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZLQVWUXPHQWVRI
regulation and the HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIQHZUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULWLHV´Levi-Faur 
2005: 19, see Caporaso 1996; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Gilardi 2002; Moran 
2001; Thatcher 2002c). Market regulation gained prominence at the expense of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and income redistribution. This shift in focus of 
state activities marks a move from the Keynesian to the regulatory state 
(Majone 1997: 140-141). At the same time, the idea spread that ³>D@V
economies became larger and more complex, the central state could not acquire 
the local knowledge to intervene effectively´%UDLWKZDLWH 231).  This 
argument has been applied to wider issues than market regulation, and today 
the regulatory state also concerns itself with social regulation and the 
protection of consumer interests (see Moran 2002: 394).  
An inventory of the academic literature on the regulatory state reveals 
that the idea of the EU as a regulatory state is closely linked to the work of one 
person, Giandomenico Majone. Majone (1997: 159) describes the regulatory 
state DV³characterized by pluralism, diffusion of power, and the extensive 
delegation of tasks to non-majoritarian institutions like the independent 
DJHQFLHVRUFRPPLVVLRQV´. Another important aspect of the regulatory state is 
                                                 
4
 According to Majone (1997: 142), some of the criticism raised of the traditional form of 
public management organisation in Europe is not altogether accurate or empirically supported. 
However, this does not change the fact that voters increasingly expressed support for a change.  
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that the judicial branch of government has become increasingly involved in 
policy making and administration (Majone 1997: 156). In his work, Majone 
presents two lines of arguments for why the EU is a regulatory state, which 
may be divided into a historic part concerned with the creation of the single 
market and a structural part concerned with the issue of legitimacy (Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger 2006: 35).  
In line with neofunctionalism, Majone (1996: 66) argues that the 
functional needs of the single market have required substantial transfer of 
policy-making power to the EU-level. Demand for EU-level regulation comes 
from multi-national and export-oriented companies, public interest groups and 
member states, all of which have stood to gain from EU-level regulation. 
Companies tend to favour EU-level regulations over national ones as they 
make it possible to avoid costs that arise as a consequence of having to adhere 
to several different national standards. Public interest groups typically call for 
European regulation if they are unable to make their national government 
impose the regulation they wish for, as illustrated by the case of environmental 
or consumer protection groups in countries with low standards of protection 
(Majone 1996: 67). Member states, finally, could have a lot to gain by having 
their national standards incorporated into EU law, Majone (1996: 67-68) 
argues. For example, a country with high standards of health and safety 
protection in the work place would see the comparative advantage of countries 
with low levels of said protection reduced if they have their own high standards 
adopted by the whole EU. European regulation can be supplied by the 
Commission, which, according to Majone (1996), harbours a wish to maximise 
its influence by increasing the scope of its competences.   
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The notion that market regulation is more important than income 
redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation is essential for an 
understanding of the structural part of 0DMRQH¶V 63) argument. The key 
difference is that regulatory policy-making is less dependent on budgetary 
constraints than the other twoDQGVWDWHV¶EXGJHWVDUHWRDODUJHH[WHQW
GHSHQGHQWRQVWDWHV¶DELOLW\WRWD[DQGOHYHORIWD[UHYHQXHV7KH(8EXGJHWLV
rigid and small in comparison to the budgets of Member States, and the EU has 
no independent tax power (Majone 1997: 150). Thus, it is very difficult for the 
EU to engage in non-regulatory policies, and if the Commission wishes to 
increase its competencies, which Majone (1996; 1997) assumes that it does, it 
has to do so through increased regulatory activity. As most costs arising from 
regulatory policy-making are borne by the regulated and not the regulator, 
budgetary considerations impose only soft constraints on regulators 
(Majone 1996: 64). This, as summarised by Craig 1999: 4³provides the 
IRXQGDWLRQIRUWKHYLVLRQRIWKH(&DVDµUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶´By characterising 
the EU as a regulatory state, ZHSUHVXSSRVHWKDW³WKH(8SROLW\KDVDFKLHYHGD
considerable degree of maturity as a political system´DQGthat LW³has come to 
H[HUFLVHµFODVVLFDO¶IXQFWLRQVRISROLWLFDOV\VWHPVVXFKDVWKHSURGXFWLRQRI
pubOLFSROLF\´(Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006: 35). 
7KHULVHRIUHJXODWRU\VWDWHVZKHWKHULWLVPHPEHUVWDWHV¶FKDQJLQJ
WKHLUSROLFLHVRUWKH(8¶VHQJDJLQJLQWKHVRUWRIVWDte-like activities it is able 
to, has implications for how we conceptualise and achieve legitimacy for the 
political system. An interesting discussion concerns the notions of input-
RULHQWHGOHJLWLPDF\µgovernment by the SHRSOH¶) and output-oriented 
legitimacy (µJRYHUQPHQWfor the SHRSOH¶A political system that relies on input 
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legitimacy is a political system where the focus is on participation and where 
LQGLYLGXDOVGRQRWIHDUPDMRULW\UXOHGXHWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³DSUH-existing 
FROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\´Scharpf 1999: 10). If democratic legitimacy is defined as 
³GLUHFWUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRWKHYRWHUVRUWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWH[SUHVVLQJWKHFXUUHQW
SDUOLDPHQWDU\PDMRULW\´WKHUHJXODWRU\VWDWHZKHUH³WHFKQRFUDWLFH[SHUWV´
employed by various agencies perform a broad variety of tasks, will 
undoubtedly suffer from a democratic deficit (Majone 1997: 159). However, a 
political system can achieve output-RULHQWHGOHJLWLPDF\³IURPLWVFDSDFLW\WR
solve problems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved 
through individual action, through market exchanges, or through voluntary 
FRRSHUDWLRQLQFLYLOVRFLHW\´6FKDUSI 11). For this to succeed, it is 
VXIILFLHQWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVLQWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPSHUFHLYH³DUDQJHRIcommon 
interests that is sufficiently broad and stable to justify institutional 
DUUDQJHPHQWVIRUFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ´ (Scharpf 1999: 11). Here, the Madisonian 
model of democracy, the goal of whLFKLV³WRSURWHFWPLQRULWLHVIrom the 
µW\UDQQ\RIWKHPDMRULW\¶DQGWKHMXGLFLDOH[HFXWLYHand administrative 
IXQFWLRQVIURPUHSUHVHQWDWLYHDVVHPEOLHVDQGIURPILFNOHPDVVRSLQLRQ´, 
provides an alternative model of democracy where delegation is used as a 
strategy to restrain rule by the majority by giving authority to non-elected 
officials, who ³KDYHOLPLWHGRUQRGLUHFWDFFRXQWDELOLW\WRHLWKHUSROLWLFDO
PDMRULWLHVRUPLQRULWLHV´0DMRQH 160). As proponents of the regulatory 
state focus more on what the political system can deliver rather than how it is 
delivered, they would emphasise output legitimacy. Hence, if we characterise 
the EU as a regulatory state and accept the notion of output-oriented legitimacy 
we also take a stand on the issue of the democratic deficit of the EU. The lack 
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of a strong enough sense of a common identity in the EU, which according to 
Scharpf (1999) makes it exceedingly difficult to achieve input legitimacy, 
becomes less of a problem.  
Given traditional views on political organisation in Europe, it is not 
certain that political opinion in Europe would accept output legitimacy as 
sufficient, however. In contrast, as Majone (1996: 15) argues, expertise has 
always been seen as an important source of legitimacy in the US. In more 
centralised political systems in Europe there has been more emphasis on public 
organisation¶V being accountable to the parliaments (see Bouckaert and Peters 
2004: 25). From this it follows, I argue, that delegation to independent agencies 
will be regarded with more suspicion in Europe. Furthermore, I agree with 
0DMRQH¶V 327) view that, within the EU, there exists a norm of 
³LQVWLWXWLRQDOEDODQFH´DQG(8LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHVKDYHD
³UHFLSURFDOGXW\RIOR\DOFRRSHUDWLRQ´, which in practice makes it difficult to 
establish accountability for decisions. Delegation to yet other bodies than the 
RQHVFUHDWHGE\WKH7UHDWLHVFRXOGEHSHUFHLYHGDVDYLRODWLRQRI³IXQGDPHQWDO
DQGSUHVXPDEO\LPPXWDEOHSULQFLSOHVRIWKHFRPPXQLWDULDQV\VWHP´0DMRQH
2002: 321; see Williams 2005). The US system, by contrast, is characterised by 
a much clearer separation of powers, and delegation to agencies appears not to 
upset the fundamental principles upon which the political system rests.  
Bearing in mind these difficulties, I argue that what Majone (1997: 160) 
refers to as ³>S@URFHGXUDOOHJLWLPDF\´ is of great importance for Community 
Agencies today. As suggested by the name, this type of legitimacy is derived 
from the agencies¶ being created by and following correct procedures. For 
example, it can imply that the agencies have been created in accordance with 
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existing rules; that their creation, objectives and legal authority are decided 
upon by elected officials and that the activities of the agencies are open to 
review (see Thatcher 2002a: 958).  
 
2.2.2 Agencies 
Delegation to agencies is a key characteristic of the regulatory state. However, 
agencies come in different shapes and sizes, and there are great variations in 
the functions that they are established to fulfil (see Gilardi 2002: 874). The 
Community Agencies will be mapped in the next chapter. In this section, I will 
first discuss the agency concept and disentangle its components. I will then 
proceed to discuss academic literature on agency design, seeking to explain 
variation in practice.  
 TKHUHDUH³QXPHURXVRYHUVLPSOLILFDWLRQVPLVFRQFHSWLons, half-truths 
DQGVRPHWLPHVHYHQGRZQULJKWIDEULFDWLRQVDERXWYDULRXVµDJHQF\¶
H[SHULHQFHV´ (Talbot 2004: 3). This, and the fact that it is difficult to find a 
XQLYHUVDOGHILQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPµDJHQF\¶FDQEHH[SODLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDW
public law varies between countries (Pollitt et al. 2001: 273). Nevertheless, 
scholars working on agencies have identified some core elements to make up 
WKHµDJHQF\¶FRQFHSWDQGVXPPDULVHWKHDJHQF\H[SHULHQFH)LUVWIRUDQ
RUJDQLVDWLRQWREHFRQVLGHUHGDQµDJHQF\¶LWRXJKWWREH³DWDUP¶VOHQJWKRU
IXUWKHU´IURPFHQWUDOPLQLVWULHVDQGGHSDUWPHQWVTalbot 2004: 5; see Thatcher 
2002b,QRWKHUZRUGV³WKHµDJHQF\¶SURJUDPPH´LVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\
³>V@WUXFWXUDOGLVDJJUHJDWLRQDQGRUWKHFUHDWLRQRIµWDVNVSHFLILF¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV´
(Talbot 2004: 6). 6HFRQGLWRXJKWWRKDYH³LWVRZQSRZHUVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
JLYHQXQGHUSXEOLFODZ´7KDWFKHUE DQGEH³subject to at least some 
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public/administrative law procedures´7DOERW 5). This involves 
³>J@iving the [agency] DFOHDUµFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶± in the form of some sort of 
OHJLVODWLRQRUDWOHDVWDIRUPDOLIQRWVWDWXWRU\µIUDPHZRUNGRFXPHQW¶± 
which sets out its purpose, powers and governance arrangements´7DOERW
2004: 7KLUGLWRXJKWWREH³VWDIIHGE\SXEOLFVHUYDQWV´7DOERW 5) and 
EH³QHLWKHUGLUHFWO\HOHFWHGQRUPDQDJHGE\HOHFWHGRIILFLDOV´7KDWFKHU
2002b: 956). Fourth, the idea of performance contracting is central to 
governance by agencies (James 2001; Talbot 2004). This does not refer to a 
contract in the legal sense of the word.5 Instead it refers to methods of setting 
targets, monitoring and reporting performance (Talbot 2004: 6). The purpose is 
to protect the interests of those affected by agency activities (James 2001: 238). 
How this is done varies between political settings, but a common practice is to 
make one individual the chief executive, or the director, of the agency, and 
make her/him responsible for managing the agency (James 2001: 235-236; 
Talbot 2004: 8).6 Talbot (2004: 8) also draws attention to the practice of setting 
XS³VHSDUDWHDFFRXQWV´IRUWKHDJHQF\ 
 Having identified the unifying features of agency experiences, I will 
proceed to outline variation in practice between agencies and present 
explanations for this variation observed in previous academic studies.  
 The variation easiest to identify, and arguably the most striking 
variation, concerns the functions which agencies have been set up to perform. 
A comprehensive overview of activities often delegated to agencies is offered 
                                                 
5
 As Talbot (2004: H[SODLQVLQODZFRQWUDFWV³DUHDWZR-way process in which both parties 
can GHIDXOWDQGEHKHOGWRDFFRXQWIRUGRLQJVR´7DOERW 14) is not aware of any cases 
where an agency has tried to use any kind of contract to hold a government accountable for 
FKDQJLQJWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VRSHUDWLRQV, and, for this reason, we can conclude that 
the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda applies only to the agencies but not the central 
government.  
6
 For examples of how this is dealt with by different countries, see Talbot (2004: 15). 
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by Bouckaert and Peters (2004: 38-43), who point to seven different types of 
DJHQF\IXQFWLRQV7KHILUVWLVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQZKLFKFRXOGLQYROYH³GLUHFW
VHUYLFHGHOLYHU\´EXWLWFRXOGDOVRLQYROYH³WKHWUDQVIHURIIXQGV´(Bouckaert 
and Peters 2004: 38-39). In the latter case, agencies have been set up to ³PDNH
decisions about grants and contracts as a means of insulating these decisions 
IURPGLUHFWSROLWLFDOFRQWURO´%RXFNDHUWDQG3HWHUV 39). The second 
agency activity is regulation of the economy and of society. The perceived 
advantages of this type of agency are the possibility to isolate or distance 
regulatory functions from political pressures, and to facilitate input into 
regulatory activities for those affected by the regulation (Bouckaert and Peters 
2004: 40). A third task often delegated to an agency is to provide advice and 
DVVLVWLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISROLFLHVUHODWHGWRWKHDJHQF\¶VDUHDRIH[SHUWLVH
The idea behind such agencies, according to Bouckaert and Peters (2004: 40), 
is that they are capable of giving unbiased suggestions on policy issues of 
major concern, and these agencies involve experts in their policy-making. 
Fourthly, agencies engage in information-gathering and dissemination. Again, 
delegation could mean that the gathering of data is at least partially insulated 
from direct political pressures. This could be particularly important when 
dealing with socio-economic data such as criminality, poverty and 
unemployment where it is of uttermost importance that objectivity is 
maintained (Bouckaert and Peters 2004: 41). Research is a fifth common type 
of agency activity. The rationale behind delegating research tasks to 
independent agencies is the wish for objectivity as regards results, but also a 
desire to give research organisations the opportunity to decide themselves what 
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to research.7 The sixth type of agency listed by Bouckaert and Peters 
(2004: 42) performs tasks of a judicial nature, and functions as tribunals and 
public enquiries when the regular court system in welfare states simply cannot 
cope with the adjudication required for all the many government programmes 
devised. The seventh type of agency listed is created to provide 
³UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODQGSDUWLFLSDWRU\RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUVHgments of the civil 
VRFLHW\´%RXFNDHUWDQG3Hters 2004: 43).  
 Agencies also vary in dimensions other than functions. The relationship 
between the agency and the central government or authority is one such 
dimension (Bouckaert and Peters 2004: 29). There are also significant 
variations between agencies in terms of governance structure. This can concern 
OHJDOVWDWXVILQDQFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVDSSRLQWPHQWRISHUVRQQHODQG³GHJUHHRI
PDQDJHULDOLQYROYHPHQWRIPLQLVWULHVDQGRWKHUSROLWLFDOHQWLWLHVRURIILFLDOV´
(Bouckaert and Peters 2004: 37; see Gains 2004; Horn 1995; McCubbins and 
Page 1987; Thatcher 2002b). The concept of agency autonomy is central to all 
these dimensions, and the autonomy of agencies over issues such as financial 
matters, appointment of personnel and policy decisions can vary substantially. 
As Bouckaert and Peters (2004: 29) state, simply concluding that an agency is 
DXWRQRPRXV³PD\GLVJXLVHVXEVWDQWLDOYDULDWLRQLQWKHLUDELOLW\WRDFWRQWKHLU
RZQDQGWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRLQIOXHQFHSXEOLFSROLF\´  
 A series of explanations for variation in practice has been offered in 
previous academic studies. Horn (1995: 24) argues that variation in agency 
design can be explained to an extent by examining transaction costs, and his 
overarching argument is that ³OHJLVODWRUVFKRRVHWKRVHDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
                                                 
7
 This is not without problems. Whilst govHUQPHQWVPD\ZLVKWR³SUHYHQWWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
VRPHIRUPRIRIILFLDOVFLHQFH´XOWLPDWHO\WKH\DUHPRVWRIWHQLQFKDUJHRIWKHPRQH\DOORFDWHG
to research and so could influence the research agenda (Bouckaert and Peters 2004: 42). 
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DUUDQJHPHQWVWKDWEHVWDGGUHVVWKHWUDQVDFWLRQSUREOHPVWKH\HQFRXQWHU´ 
7UDQVDFWLRQFRVWVFDQEHGHWHUPLQHGE\³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOGLIIHUHQFHVDPRQJ
FRXQWULHV´+RUQ 1995: 9) and the level of uncertainty and conflict in a given 
policy area (Bawn 1995: 63; Horn 1995: 15; McCubbins and Page 1987: 414).  
Horn (1995: 15) argues that high levels of uncertainty and conflict increases 
the legislators¶ costs of adopting detailed, refined legislation wherefore high 
levels of conflict and uncertainty tend to lead to vague legislation. Huber and 
Shipan (2002: 215), on the other hand, argue that legislators tend to devise 
precise legislation when there is a high level of policy conflict, when 
legislative capacity is high (i.e. ZKHQ³WKHOHJLVODWLYHPDMRULW\LVDEOHWRDIIRrd 
WKHFRVWVRIZULWLQJSROLF\GHWDLOVLQWRVWDWXWHV´ZKHQWKHUHLVQRFRQIOLFW
EHWZHHQWKHWZRFKDPEHUVLQDELFDPHUDOV\VWHPDQGZKHQ³WKHSROLWLFDO
system does not allow the legislative majority to rely on nonstatutory factors to 
influence policy impOHPHQWDWLRQ´. As examples of nonstatutory factors, they 
mention levels of corporatism and centralization (Huber and Shipan 
2002: 218). The perceived risk of regulatory agencies being captured by the 
regulated interests can also play a part in explaining agency design 
(see Thatcher 2002b: 958).   
Other explanations focus more on how the legal and administrative 
tradition of the political setting in which the agency operates can also influence 
agency design (Döhler 2002). For instance, the UK has a tradition of non-
statutory political administration organisations, whereas the legal basis of 
agencies appears to be more significant for agencies established by the 
American Congress (Gains 2004: 56-58; Bouckaert and Peters 2004: 25; 
McCubbins and Page 1987). The oWKHUOLQHRIDUJXPHQWLQ+RUQ¶V 11) 
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work points to ³WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVIDFHGE\DGPLQLVWUDWRUV´, and 
KROGVWKDW³the institutional arrangements faced by administrators are likely to 
have a systematic influence on the type of person who seeks public sector 
employment, the type of employee who ends up being promoted to a position 
RIUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGWKHLQFHQWLYHVKHRUVKHIDFHVRQFHDSSRLQWHG´+RUQ
1995: 11). Levy and Spiller (1996) also belong to this tradition of stressing 
existing political institutions, but they take a somewhat broader approach, 
stressing the interaction between political and social institutions, economic 
conditions and regulatory processes. They argue that in addition to formal 
governance arrangements and a politiFDOV\VWHP¶V³administrative capabilities´
DWWHQWLRQPXVWEHSDLGWR³>F@ustom and other informal but broadly accepted 
norms that tacitly restrain the actions of individuals or institutions´/HY\DQG
Spiller 1996: 4). Levy and Spiller (1996: 4) also stress ideology, maintaining 
WKDW³>W@he character of the contending social interests within a society and the 
balance between them´PD\DOVRLQIOXHQFHDJHQFLHV 
 
2.3 European integration and governance theory  
Traditionally, the fault line in European integration studies has been between 
neofunctionalists, who emphasise the role of supranational actors in driving 
integration forward, and intergovernmentalists, who argue that integration is 
GULYHQE\PHPEHUVWDWHV$VWKHVHWKHRULHVDUH³the intellectual precursors of 
DQ\WKHRU\RI(8SROLWLFV´ (Hix 2005: 15), the first sub-section of this part of 
the chapter covers them before moving on to discussing the attempt to bridge 
the gap between them made by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998:1). The 
second sub-section presents the multi-level governance approach (MLG), 
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which provides a good description of the polity in which Community Agencies 
function. The third sub-section, which is the most important for our 
understanding of the establishment of Community Agencies, discusses the 
three strands of new institutionalist theory: rational choice institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. It also includes an 
overview of drivers behind delegation observed in previous studies. 
 
2.3.1 European integration theory: neo-functionalism, (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism and supranational governance  
Neofunctionalists, headed by Haas (1968), were the first to theorise European 
integration (see also Lindberg 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 1971). 
The importance attributed to the role of actors other than state governments in 
furthering integration, and the assumptions that states are neither unitary actors 
nor the only actors on the international stage are crucial to neofunctionalist 
theory (see Craig 1999:3). This pluralist theory of integration holds that 
European integration is determined by elites, which Haas (1968:17) defines as 
³WKHOHDGHUVRIDOOUHOHYDQWSROLWLFDOJURXSVZKRKDELWXDOO\SDUWLFLSDWHLQthe 
PDNLQJRISXEOLFGHFLVLRQV´,W predicts that elite groups could form links 
across state borders, which allows them to surpass their respective national 
governments and have an impact on international politics (see Cornett and 
Caporaso 1992; Craig 1999).  
The concept of spillover is central to neofunctionalist explanations of 
European integration (Haas 1968; Lindberg 1963). A widely cited explanation 
is offered by Lindberg (1963: 10), who writes that ³µVSLOO-RYHU¶UHIHUVWRD
situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation 
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in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which 
LQWXUQFUHDWHDIXUWKHUFRQGLWLRQDQGDQHHGIRUPRUHDFWLRQDQGVRIRUWK´. 
Such a situation can arise due to the interconnectedness of economies. To reap 
maximum benefits of the integration of one sector of the economy it could 
prove necessary to integrate yet another sector (see Haas 1968: 103). Spillover 
FDQDOVRRFFXUDVDUHVXOWRILQWHUHVWJURXSV¶VKLIWLQJWKHLUOR\DOWLHVIURP
national to supranational institutions, or as a result of deliberate attempts by 
supranational institutions to cultivate support for further integration through 
interaction with non-governmental actors.  
 Several scholars have remarked that neo-functionalism provided fruitful 
explanations of European integration in the 1950s, whereas it ran into 
difficulties in explaining the slow-down of integration in the 1960s (see Craig 
1999; Hix 2005; Moravcsik 1993). The apparent failure of neofunctionalism 
paved way for intergovernmentalism, which holds that although the state is not 
the only actor in international affairs, it is the most prominent one (see 
Hoffmann 1966). Assuming that states act in their own self-interest, and that 
their actions are determined by geopolitical interests, intergovernmentalists 
argue that integration is more likely to take place in low politics sectors than 
high politics sectors.  
In the early 1990s, Moravcsik presented a version of 
intergovernmentalist theory, which he termed liberal intergovernmentalism. 
This theory differs from traditional intergovernmentalism in that it does not 
view the state as a unitary actor, and it disputes the claim that the state has a 
fixed set of preferences based on geopolitical concerns (see Moravcsik 
1993: 481). Liberal intergovernmentalists argue that decisions made by state 
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governments to pool sovereignty to supranational institutions are taken 
following a two-level game, where the domestic arena constitutes the first level 
and the international bargaining table constitutes the second level (Moravcsik 
1993; 1998$WWKHILUVWOHYHOWKHSUHIHUHQFHVRIWKHVWDWHRULWV³bargaining 
VSDFH´,  is determined following a period of interest aggregation by the 
domestic government which, driven by an urge to remain in power, weighs up 
the interests and relative influence of societal groups within that state 
(Moravcsik 1993: 496$WWKHVHFRQGOHYHODJRYHUQPHQW¶VEDUJDLQLQJ
leverage is largely determined by ³WKHUHODWLYHLQWHQVLW\RIQDWLRQDO
SUHIHUHQFHV´, which implies that ³>W@KHPRUHLQWHnsely governments desire 
agreement, the more concessions and the greater effort they will expend to 
DFKLHYHLW´ (Moravcsik 1993: 499). To make accurate predictions about 
bargaining outcomes in the EU context, Moravcsik (1993: 498; 1998: 60-61) 
argues, we must also assume that cooperation is voluntary, that governments 
FDQILQGRXWRWKHUJRYHUQPHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVUHODWLYHO\HDVLO\DQGWKDWWKH
institutional arrangements lead to low transaction costs of intergovernmental 
negotiation. Moravcsik (1998: 9) argues that national governments determine 
integration, and that delegation to EU institutions is ³best explained as efforts 
by governments to constrain and control one another ± in game-theoretical 
language, by their effort to enhance the credibility of commitPHQWV´  
In an attempt to add a nuance to debates on European integration, Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz (1998:1) proposed a theory of European integration that 
IRFXVHVRQ³WKHSURFHVVWKURXJKZKLFKVXSUDQDWLRQDOJRYHUQDQFH± the 
competence of the European Community to make binding rules in any given 
policy domain ± KDVGHYHORSHG´ (see also Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). 
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7KHWKHRU\KDVEHHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³VXSUDQDWLRQDOJRYHUQDQFH´(Branch and 
Øhrgaard 1999), but this is not a name that Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) 
used. Rather, they object to having their theory labelled supranational 
governance (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1999: 144). The core ideas of this 
theory are to study the mode of governance of different EU policy areas, and 
that each one then can be placed at different positions along an imagined 
continuum the stretches from an ideal-type intergovernmental mode of 
governance, which functions as described by Moravcsik (1993; 1998), to a 
supranational one, where supranational institutions are the key actors (Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 8). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 11) argue 
that the more intense transnational activity there is in a given policy area, the 
further towards the supranational pole of the continuum it will be located, and a 
polLF\DUHD¶V PRYHPHQWDORQJWKHFRQWLQXXPRFFXUVEHFDXVH³LQFUHDVLQJOHYHOV
of cross-border transactions and communications by societal actors will 
increase the perceived need for European-level rules, coordination, and 
UHJXODWLRQ´7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWUDQVQDtional interests is emphasised also by 
Kohler-Koch (1999: 27), who, similarly to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, argues 
WKDW(&SROLFLHV³DUHKLJKO\VHFWRUVSHFLILF´2QFH(XURSHDQUXOHVKDYHEHHQ
introduced into a policy area, they begin to define the roles of actors as well as 
to shape the context in which they pursue their interests. Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz (1998: FDOOWKLVG\QDPLF³LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ´ Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz have been criticised by Branch and Øhrgaard (1999: 136) for 
creating a mirror image of liberal intergovernmentalism by downplaying the 
importance of grand bargains of integration and overemphasising everyday 
decision-making. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1999: 150) replied to this 
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FULWLFLVPE\VD\LQJWKDWWKH\³H[SOLFLWO\DUJXHWKat intergovernmental 
EDUJDLQLQJLVXELTXLWRXVLQWKH(8´DQGWKDWZKDWWKH\KDYHDFKLHYHGZLWK
WKHLUWKHRU\³LVWRSODFHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOEDUJDLQLQJLQLWVLQVWLWXWLRQDODQG
SROLWLFDOFRQWH[W´  
As the theories discussed above are useful for our understanding of 
European integration, it follows naturally that they would be considered in a 
thesis that concerns the European project. However, I argue that none of them 
holds explanatory value for an analysis of the establishment of Community 
Agencies. Importantly, the fact that agencies are set up in policy areas where 
sovereignty is already pooled calls into question the applicability of any theory 
that focuses the transfer or pooling of sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
Moreover, neofunctionalism explains well how integration spills over from one 
area to another, in particular when it comes to day-to-day decision-making, but 
it does not account for choice of institutional form. Intergovernmentalism, 
which arguably is best suited to explaining the outcomes of treaty negotiations, 
is inappropriate due to its state-centred nature. Community Agencies are set up 
by an act of secondary legislation within the first pillar, which means that 
individual member states do not have the final say, and cooperation is not 
voluntary. Finally, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 16) claim to explain why 
integration has proceeded faster in some policy areas than others, but they 
FOHDUO\VWDWHWKDWWKHLUWKHRU\³GRHVQRWWHOOXVZKDWVSHFLILFUXOHVDQGSROLFLHV
will emerge, nor what organizational form supranational governance will 
DFTXLUH´ 
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2.3.2 Multi-level governance 
The multi-level governance approach (MLG) was developed by Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank (1996), and concerns the functioning of the European polity 
rather than integration per se. As this is an approach for how to view 
governance in the EU, rather than a theory from which hypotheses can be 
derived, it is not used for the theoretical framework of this thesis. However, I 
argue that its description of how policy is made provides a useful background 
to the environment in which Community Agencies function, and it helps to 
keep this background in mind when mapping out what actors were involved at 
what stage in the process leading up to agency establishment. For these 
reasons, MLG merits coverage in this review chapter. 
Crucial to the MLG approach is the rejection of any assumptions of a 
separation between domestic and international arenas (Marks, Hooghe and 
Blank 1996: 346-347). According to the MLG model, ³SROLWLFDODUHQas are 
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGUDWKHUWKDQQHVWHG´, and ³GHFLVLRQ-making competencies are 
VKDUHGE\DFWRUVDWGLIIHUHQWOHYHOV´0DUNV+RRJKHDQG%ODQN 346). 
Furthermore, MLG makes a clear distinction between institutions, i.e. the state 
DQGWKH(8³DVVHWVRIUXOHV´DQGDFWRUVLHLQGLYLGXDOVRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQG
similar that act within these institutions (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996: 348). 
In their article, Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996) provide several examples of 
what they see as evidence of MLG in day-to-day decision-making in the 
European polity, and I will briefly mention some of their main points here.  
 As regards the agenda-setting stage, the Commission¶VIRUPDOULJKWRI
initiative clearly makes it powerful, but the ideas behind proposals do not 
always originate in the Commission, but can come from national governments 
35 
 
or even subnational organisations. Moreover, as a thinly staffed organisation, 
the Commission is dependent on consultation with various other bodies in 
order to elicit expertise. Regarding the legislative stage, power has been 
increasingly shared between the Council and the EP since the introduction of 
the consultation and co-decision procedures. The introduction of qualified 
majority voting (QMV) has further weakened the ability of individual member 
states to control the outcome of decision-making. At the implementation stage, 
contacts between different levels of government is required ³>W@RWKHH[WHQWWKDW
EU regulations affect policy areas where authority is shared among central and 
subnational levels of government´0DUNV+RRJKHDQG%ODQN 368). 
Finally, Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996) argue that MLG is present in 
adjudication within the EU, as manifested in the co-existence of national and 
EU law.  
 In the case study chapters of this thesis, we will see that the ideas 
behind the creation of Community agencies do not always originate in the 
Commission, that the Council and the EP have to reconcile their views, and 
that the agencies have to cooperate with actors at various levels.  
 
2.3.3 New Institutionalisms 
As the EC/EU has become more established, researchers increasingly analyse 
the polity from a comparative politics perspective. New institutionalism, the 
central belief of which is that ³>S@ROLWLFDOGHPRFUDF\GHSHQGVQRWRQO\on 
economic and social conditions but also on the deVLJQRISROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´
has proved to be useful to understand EU decision-making (March and Olsen 
1989: 17). New institutionalists believe that institutions shape outcomes by 
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influencing the norms and actions of political actors, and that the functioning 
RILQVWLWXWLRQV³GHSHQG[s] on the conditions under which they emerge and 
HQGXUH´(Przeworski 2004: 527). Common to new institutionalist analyses is a 
wish ³WRHOXFLGDWHWKHUROHWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVSlay in the determination of social 
DQGSROLWLFDORXWFRPHV´ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 936). However, the aim is not 
merely to show that institutions matter, but ³WRJXLGHLQTXLU\LQWRZKLFKRI
many more-or-less stable features of collective choice settings are essential to 
understanding collective choice behavior DQGRXWFRPHV´Diermeier and 
Krehbiel 2003: 124). Within the institutionalist camp, scholars have made 
somewhat different assumptions of how politics works, and, for this reason, it 
makes sense to speak of three strands of institutionalist theory: rational choice 
institutionalist theory, sociological institutionalist theory and historical 
institutionalist theory.  
 I argue that new institutionalist theories are suitable for the analysis of 
the establishment of Community Agencies for two key reasons. First, as will be 
demonstrated shortly, these theories have been used to analyse questions of 
delegation and institutional design in a variety of political settings, and are not 
restricted to analysis of the EU as a sui generis phenomenon (see for example 
Bell 2002; Helgøy 2006; Lodge 2003; Therkildsen 2001). This suits my 
purposes as I see the establishment of Community Agencies as part of the 
wider trend of public management change described in the first section of this 
chapter. The use of these theories also allows for comparison across systems. 
Second, as previous research has shown that, since the introduction of the 
codecision making procedure, cleavages in EU policy debates are increasingly 
³interinstitutional´UDWKHUWKDQLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOwe can assume that theories 
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that highlight the importance of institutions in a wide sense would contribute 
considerably to our understanding of the processes behind the establishment of 
Community Agencies (Peterson 2001: 300). As will be outlined in the case 
study chapters, a number of actors are involved in the processes leading up to 
agency establishment, but their room for manoeuvre is circumscribed by 
detailed procedures and more or less established praxis. This leads me to 
conclude that the institutionalist presumption that institutions do matter and 
shape outcomes is a fruitful starting point for the analysis of the establishment 
of Community Agencies. 
  As the three strands of new institutionalism make different 
assumptions about how decisions are reached, a framework constructed from 
the three of them makes it possible to set up several competing hypotheses, 
which can be tested, verified or falsified. By using all three, I avoid having to 
accept categorical assumptions about the behaviour of relevant actors from the 
start but can test the theories against each other. The goal is not to prove one 
wrong for definite, but to find out if one is better suited for explaining the 
establishment of Community Agencies. It is also plausible that not all agencies 
can be explained by the same logic, and that the theories are able to capture 
different aspects. Below, I will discuss each of the three new institutionalist 
strands. For each one, I will begin by outlining its core assumptions. This will 
be followed by an overview of previous academic studies using the theoretical 
strand in question to identify drivers behind agency creation. Finally, I will 
spell out what hypothesis/hypotheses we can deduce with regards to the 
establishment of European Community Agencies and what evidence is needed 
to verify or falsify the hypothesis/hypotheses. 
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 Rational choice institutionalism was developed in connection to 
studies of American congressional behaviour primarily in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Finding that the majoritarian decision-making style used in Congress did not 
lead to policy instability as rational choice theory would predict, analysts began 
to seek explanations for policy outcomes in institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Pollack 2001). The insights and models developed in this political setting 
proved apt to travel to other political settings, and were soon taken up by 
scholars working on the EU (Pollack 2005; Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002). As 
discussed by Hall and Taylor (1996: 944-945), rational choice institutionalism 
assumes that ³UHOHYDQWDFWRUVKDYHDIL[HGVHWRISUHIHUHQFHVRUWDVWHV . .), 
behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these 
preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive 
FDOFXODWLRQ´ 3ROLWLFVLVYLHZHGDVD³VHULHVRIFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQGLOHPPDV´ 
ZKHUHRXWFRPHVDUHGHWHUPLQHGE\³VWUDWHJLFLQWHUDFWLRQ´Hall and Taylor 
1996: 945). The role of institutions in this process is to structure the interaction 
between various actors and lead them towards particular outcomes ³E\
affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by 
providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty 
about the corresponding behaviour of others and aOORZµJDLQVIURPH[FKDQJH¶´
(Hall and Taylor 1996: 945). Rational choice institutionalists explain the origin 
of institutions by a functional logic, which means that ³LWH[SODLQVWKHRULJLQV
of an institution largely in terms of the effects that follow froPLWVH[LVWHQFH´
(Hall and Taylor 1996: 952; see Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002; Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2002).  
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 This functional logic takes its analytical expression in principal-agent 
models and the notion of transaction costs (see (SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ1999; 
Tallberg 2002; Huber and Shipan 2002). Rational choice institutionalists argue 
that delegation takes place if the perceived gains from delegation exceed the 
costs. Costs of delegation are slippage, which refers to situations where the 
conditions the principals have given the agents lead the agents to behave in 
ways different from what was intended, and shirking, which refers to situations 
where the agents begin to pursue their own preferences rather than the ones of 
the principal (Pollack 2003: 26). The gains of delegation come in the form of 
lowered political transaction costs. Thus, rational choice institutionalists 
predict that delegation takes place in order for principals to lower political 
transaction costs (see Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002). This can be done by 
reducing information asymmetries, by facilitating credible commitment and by 
improving policy-making efficiency.  
Rational choice institutionalism is the most common approach for 
studies of delegation, and it has been proved useful for analysing delegation in 
a range of political contexts (see for example Franchino 2004; Huber 2000; 
Pollack 2002, 2003; Tallberg 2002; Thatcher 2002a). In a study of delegation 
choices by the American Congress, McCubbins and Page (1987) have shown 
that complexity arguments can be used to explain delegation. They argue that 
the complexity of many problems that face the American Congress requires 
considerable resources, and as resources are scarce, legislators decide to 
delegate legislative powers to agencies (McCubbins and Page 1987: 409). 
6LPLODUO\(SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ 30) argue that ³OHJLVODWRUVPD\ZLVK
to free up time to spend on constituency service, simultaneously taking 
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DGYDQWDJHRIDJHQF\H[SHUWLVH´ Arguments that delegation takes place in order 
to gather and take advantage of agency expertise as well as to increase 
efficiency of decision-making can also be found in studies by Bouckaert and 
Peters (2004), Pollack (2003), Pollitt et al. (2001) and Tallberg (2002), to 
mention a few examples. Previous studies have also shown that a wish to 
secure credible commitment by removing responsibility for upholding 
particular policies from elected politicians and delegate it to agencies is a 
driver behind delegation ((SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ*LODUGL Pollack 
2003). Credibility is a problem for elected politicians due to policies being time 
inconsistent. For instance, the pressure of public opinion might tempt 
politicians into pursuing a different policy from what was initially agreed, and 
democratic processes may lead to changes in government and thereby also 
changes in policy preferences. Research has also shown that politicians tend to 
wish to commit themselves credibly to policies by delegating to an agency 
ZKHQWKHSROLFLHVLQTXHVWLRQ³LPSRVHFRQFentrated costs and generate diffuse 
EHQHILWV´3ROODFN $VVKRZQE\(SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ1999: 
201), elected politicians are more likely to retain regulatory responsibility 
ZKHQEHQHILWVFDQEHWDUJHWHGWR³particular constituents´LHZKHQthey can 
easily claim credit for the policy, and more likely to delegate when costs are 
incurred by powerful interests, i.e. when they may wish to shift blame for the 
policy (see Hood 2002).8 Large industries can be examples of powerful 
interests, and Gilardi (2002: 884-888) has indeed found that there is a positive 
link between market opening and agency creation. 
                                                 
8
 Some authors, for instance Tallberg (2002), have chosen to present blame-shifting as a 
separate hypothesis. In this thesis, I take the same line as Pollack (2003) and treat the blame-
shifting argument as subsidiary to the credible commitment argument. 
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Arguably, the large number of actors involved in Community Agency 
creation (i.e. the Commission, the Member States as represented by the 
Council, the EP and other consultative bodies such as the European Economic 
and Social Committee) complicates the use of principal-agent analysis. 
+RZHYHUDVVKRZQE\)UDQFKLQR¶VVWXG\DUDWLRQDOFKRLFH
institutionalist framework of analysis can be used even when decision-making 
powers are shared.  
Following on from the functional logic presented above, the overarching 
hypothesis from this perspective is that Community Agencies are established in 
order for EU decision-makers to lower their political transaction costs. This can 
be disentangled further into three separate hypotheses about why agencies are 
created. First, Community Agencies are created because informed decision-
making in particular policy areas requires advanced technical or scientific 
expertise, which cannot be obtained within the existing institutions. The idea is 
that information asymmetries can be reduced as agencies employ expert staff 
and develop the necessary expertise, which is then shared with decision-
makers. Second, Community Agencies are created because EU decision-
makers wish to ensure credible commitment to particular policies. By 
transferring the responsibility for regulation and/or information gathering to an 
agency they have the opportunity to isolate it from political pressures. Third, 
Community Agencies are created in order to increase the efficiency of policy-
making.  
The policy area in which an agency operates gives an indication about 
whether specific technical or scientific expertise is needed. However, in order 
to verify the expertise hypothesis more specific hard evidence in the form of 
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direct references to such a motive is needed. If an agency is established in 
order to take advantage of technical expertise, I expect highly technical tasks to 
have been delegated to the agency and I expect statements indicating that the 
agency will be the only body having these responsibilities in Europe. It is not 
sufficient if the agency has been given the role to coordinate technical and 
scientific work performed by other authorities such as member state agencies 
and institutes. In other words, the founding legislation and other sources must 
spell out that the specific competence is to be gathered within the agency itself. 
The competence demands placed on staff as specified in regulation also serve 
as indicators for this hypothesis. The absence of specific technical tasks and a 
unique technical role weakens the hypothesis. 
If an agency is established in order to ensure credible commitment, I expect 
the agency to have a strong, independent mandate. This includes regulatory 
functions. An agency that has the power to regulate is undoubtedly more 
powerful than one that does not, and if decision-makers wish to commit 
credibly to a policy we expect them to decrease their ability to change 
regulation by delegating responsibility for the regulation in question to an 
agency. If credible commitment is a motive we would also expect to see direct 
references to the need for credibility, for instance through an emphasis on the 
equal application of regulation throughout the territory. If an agency is given 
the role of arbiter between parties affected by particular policies or decisions, 
this is also considered evidence in favour of the credible commitment 
hypothesis. By contrast, if credible commitment is not a key motive behind 
agency establishment, we might observe a weaker mandate, and we expect the 
agency to be dependent on other bodies. For instance, the agency may be 
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dependent on member states to commit resources or information for the 
effective functioning of the agency. It could also be dependent on the 
Commission and/or member states in determining its priorities of action as set 
out in work programmes and similar. 
At least in theory the efficiency hypothesis is easy to verify and difficult to 
falsify. The reason for this is that increasing efficiency has the character of a 
µFDWFKDOO¶DUJXPHQWDVHIILFLHQF\LVXQLYHUVDOO\UHJDUGHGDVDSRVLWLYHDQGDV
nobody would openly declare a wish to decrease efficiency. If increasing 
efficiency is a key motive behind the establishment of an agency we will 
expect direct references to a need for efficiency, for instances ideas about 
streamlining practices, in relevant documents and interviews. Delegation of the 
task of drafting specific technical regulation would allow time for the 
Commission to free up time for other activities, which would make decision-
making more efficient. As it is not realistic to expect statements directly 
opposing the efficiency hypothesis, the absence of references to efficiency 
gains will have to suffice as evidence against the hypothesis. 
 Sociological institutionalism was developed within organisation 
theory, and it holds that institutions are created as a response to choices made 
by individuals, and these choices are made on the basis of socially constructed 
preferences, which means that they might not necessarily fulfil particular 
functional needs (see From 2002). This is not to say that sociological 
institutionalists deny rational action on behalf of individuals. Sociological 
institutionalists argue that individuals may very well act in a way that they 
perceive as rational, but the idea that a particular action is rational is itself 
socially constructed (Hall and Taylor 1996). Sociological institutionalists 
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employ a broad definition of institutions, arguing that the origin of institutions 
and institutional change must be seen in a wider social and cultural context 
where not only organisational structures but also shared ideas, norms and 
values are taken into account (Hall and Taylor 1996). In contrast to rational 
choice institutionalism, which regards DFWRUVDV³XWLOLW\-PD[LPL]HUV´ZLWK
exogenously given preferences, sociological institutionalists view actor 
preferences as endogenous to institutions and argue that the institutions 
themselves influence the identities, preferences and behaviour of individuals 
(From 2002: 225; Lewis 2003:107; Jupille and Caporaso 1999: 432; 
Pollack 2005). In accordance, they DUJXHWKDWDFWRUVLQDJLYHQVLWXDWLRQ³ORRN
to socially constructed roles and institutional rules and ask what sort of 
EHKDYLRXULVDSSURSULDWHLQWKDWVLWXDWLRQ´UDWKHUWKDQFDOFXODWLQJKRZWR
maximise utility (Pollack 2005: 23). These assumptions about the behaviour of 
actors lead us to explanations for the diffusion of organisational forms across 
political systems, so-called institutional isomorphism. In the words of 
McNamara (2002: 59), for sociological institutionalists ³WKHFKRLFHRI
organisational form is linked to social processes that legitimate certain types of 
institutional choiFHVDVVXSHULRUWRRWKHUV´see Hall and Taylor 1996: 949). 
From this follows that ³WKHVLPLODULW\RIRUJDQLVDWLRQDOIRUPDFURVVVHWWLQJVRI
social interaction, will be the expected outcome, as actors borrow those models 
collectively sanctioned as successful even though they may be decoupled from 
RULQFRQJUXHQWZLWKIXQFWLRQDOQHHGV´ (McNamara 2002: 62).  
Previous academic literature shows that sociological institutionalism 
with its focus on the importance of ideas and how they are spread across 
political settings can contribute to our understanding of the spreading of 
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particular institutional forms. James (2001: 237) puts forward the argument 
that the idea of letting separate agencies deal with various executive tasks bears 
UHVHPEODQFHWR:RRGURZ:LOVRQ¶VOate 19th century idea that politics and 
administration should be separated. Studies by James (2001) and Pollitt et al. 
(2001) suggest that agencification can be linked to ideas that unbundling of 
administration by creating smaller agencies with distinct functions may have 
various benefits. Ideas about the benefits of particular institutional forms can 
be spread through ³SROLF\-WUDQVIHU´ZKLFKUHIHUVWR³YROXQWDU\´DVZHOODV
³FRHUFHG´DGRSWLRQRISROLFLHVDQG³OHVVRQ-GUDZLQJ´ZKLFK³LQFOXGHVPRVW
observation of and UHIOHFWLRQRQRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶H[SHULHQFHVLQRUGHUWRGUDZ
SRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHOHVVRQV´-DPHV 241; see Dolowitz and March 
1996; Rose 1993). Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 64, 66) argue that 
the homogenization RI³RUJDQizational IRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHV´FDQEHFDSWXUHGE\
the concept of institutional isomorphism, which can be of a coercive, mimetic 
or normative character.9 Arguments that particular institutional forms spread 
due to their having become normatively sanctioned are also found in 
0F1DPDUD¶V 2002) studies on the spread of independent central banks. 
As regards agencies, Gilardi (2005: 85) hypothesises that they have spread as a 
result of countries adopting similar solutions to similar challenges that they 
have all had to face at about the same time, and that the ability and/or wish of 
international organisations to promote the spread of agencies plays a role in 
this development.  
                                                 
9
 Coercive isomorphism is dHVFULEHGDVDSURFHVVWKDW³UHVXOWVIURPERWKIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDO
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and 
E\FXOWXUDOH[SHFWDWLRQVLQWKHVRFLHW\ZLWKLQZKLFKRUJDQL]DWLRQVIXQFWLRQ´ (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991: 67). Mimetic isomorphism can be described as a form of voluntary lesson-
drawing. Normative isomorphism refers to processes in which normative rules about 
professional behaviour spreads across professional networks in organisations (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991: 70-71).   
46 
 
With its different assumptions about the preferences of actors, 
sociological institutionalism offers an interesting alternative explanation for 
delegation and it is especially suitable for answering questions about timing 
and institutional design. The central claim from this perspective is that 
Community Agencies are created because of the agency form being 
normatively sanctioned. More specifically, the hypothesis is that Community 
Agencies are created because EU decision-makers have been led to believe that 
more or less independent agencies are the best organisational forms through 
social processes of lesson-drawing and institutional borrowing in which EU 
decision-makers have learnt and copied from other political settings.  
To verify this hypothesis I would need to find evidence that shows that 
other institutions served as models for the agencies. Direct references to how 
other institutions would make suitable examples on which to model the 
agencies constitute strong evidence in favour of this hypothesis. If it could also 
be proved that the same people were involved with the model institution and 
the new agency, this would further strengthen the hypothesis. More general 
statements about the desirability of the agency form are also pieces of evidence 
to support sociological institutionalist claims. 
 Historical institutionalist analyses focus on development over time 
and on the specific context in which institutions develop (see Thelen 1999). 
Similarly to sociological institutionalism, it takes a broad view of how 
institutions influence individual behaviour, and includes ³QRUPDWLYHDQG
cultural dimeQVLRQVZKLFKJREH\RQGUDWLRQDOLVWFDOFXODWLRQV´ (Bulmer 
1998: 370). It also tends to emphasise the fact that power relations embedded 
in already existing institutions give some actors or interests more influence 
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than others over the creation of new institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954). 
The concept of path dependency, which refers to situations in which previous 
decisions set up the boundaries for future development, is central to historical 
institutionalism (see Peters et al. 2005; Hall and Taylor 1996). Sometimes 
decisions have unintended consequences, and, in extreme cases, path 
dependency can lead to lock-ins. This is a situation where previous decisions 
have had such a restrictive effect that there is only one possible development 
(Pierson 1996). An event or a situation that sets development down a particular 
path is referred to as a critical juncture or branching point (Hall and Taylor 
7KHSHULRGVLQEHWZHHQDUHUHIHUUHGWRDV³SHULRGVRIFRQWLQXLW\´+DOO
and Taylor 1996). Thus, historical institutionalists hold that explanations for 
delegation can be found through analysis of critical junctures and path 
dependency.    
Analyses of the creation of agencies using this perspective are scarce, 
but there is evidence that path dependency holds explanatory value. In a study 
of the so-FDOOHGµ1H[W6WHSV¶DJHQFLHVLQWKH8.Gains (2004) has shown that 
the pre-µ1H[W6WHSV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQRIFHUWDLQ%ULWLVKGHSDUWPHQWVKDVLQIOXHQFHG
what agencies were set up in connection to the unbundling of these 
departments and how the agencies came to operate. '|KOHU¶V study of 
the establishment of regulatory agencies in Germany has also pointed to the 
importance of administrative traditions. 
 The fact that this approach allows for the consideration of specific 
events, which may serve as critical junctures determining future development 
through path dependency, contrast it from the other strands of new 
institutionalism where the preferences of actors play an essential role in 
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explanations of delegation. HistoricDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶VIXQGDPHQWDOEHOLHIWKDW
power relations embedded in existing institutions give some actors more 
influence than others in the establishment of new institutions makes it 
appropriate for studies of EU decision-making, as the EU decision-making 
system, where some actors have privileged access to the agenda-setting stage 
through committee systems and similar, is clearly full of embedded power 
relations. As regards Community Agencies, the historical institutionalist 
hypothesis is that these agencies were established as a result of previous 
decisions and events, which served as critical junctures leading EU decision-
makers down a development path leading towards the creation of a particular 
agency.   
 An assessment of this hypothesis requires the examination of the 
political situation around the time of establishment of each case study. To 
verify the hypothesis it must be possible to construct a strong argument for 
why a particular event was crucial. If documents related to the establishment 
process and interviewees make references to specific events and highlight them 
as particularly important, this is regarded as evidence in favour of the historical 
institutionalist hypothesis. To falsify or weaken the hypothesis, counterfactual 
analysis will be used to construct arguments to show why a particular event did 
not play a critical role in determining the decision to create an agency. 
  
2.4 Theoretical framework: a summary  
The table below summarises the hypotheses derived from the three strands of 
new institutionalism and the type of evidence to be sought to verify or falsify 
the hypotheses. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of hypotheses and evidence 
Hypotheses: 
Evidence in favour Evidence against 
Hard Soft Hard Soft 
Rational choice:     
Expertise 
Highly 
technical tasks, 
Unique role as 
centre of 
expertise 
clearly 
specified, 
Demands on 
staff 
competence 
regulated 
Technical 
policy area 
Absence of 
positive 
indicators 
Absence of 
positive 
indicators 
Credible 
commitment 
Regulatory 
tasks, Explicit 
references to 
credibility, 
Arbitration 
tasks 
Vague 
references to 
credibility 
Dependence on 
other bodies for 
resources and 
setting of 
priorities 
Absence of 
positive 
indicators 
Efficiency 
Drafting of 
specific 
legislation 
delegated, 
References to 
streamlining of 
practices 
Vague 
references to 
streamlining of 
practices 
Statements 
denying 
importance of 
efficiency 
(unlikely) 
Absence of 
positive 
indicators 
Sociological:     
Institutional 
borrowing 
Explicit and 
specific 
references to 
models, 
Personal 
linkages 
between agency 
and model 
Statements 
about agencies 
as desirable 
Outright 
rejections of 
other models 
Absence of 
positive 
indicators  
Historical:     
Critical 
junctures and 
path 
dependency 
Explicit direct 
references to 
the specific 
events 
Vague 
references to 
specific events 
Counterfactual 
analysis 
Counterfactual 
analysis 
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Mapping European Community Agencies 
3.1 Introduction  
Agencification has been observed across political settings, and as demonstrated 
in the previous chapter there is a great deal of variation in practice. Agencies 
may have very different functions and levels of responsibility. They may have 
different legal status, governance structures and financial arrangements. 
7RJHWKHUWKHVHDVSHFWVGHWHUPLQHDQDJHQF\¶VOHYHORIDXWRQRP\DQGDELOLW\WR
influence policy. Furthermore, agencies may vary in size, be set up at different 
times and in different locations. In this chapter, the Community Agencies 
established between 1975 and 2006 will be mapped and classified with regards 
to these aspects. The map and classification will then serve as a starting point 
for a discussion of the rationale behind the selection of Cedefop, EMEA, 
EASA and FRONTEX as case studies.  
The mapping of agencies is not only necessary in order to make an 
informed selection of case studies, which is essential for the achievement of  
WKLVUHVHDUFKSURMHFW¶VDLPVWRH[SODLQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDJHQFLHVDQG
investigate if different logics need to be applied to explain different aspects of 
agencies. Identifying similarities and mapping variation between the agencies 
also have wider relevance. As explained in the previous chapter, delegation to 
agencies is an important aspect of the regulatory state. To forward the debate 
on the EU as a regulatory state, with its wider implications for the 
conceptualisation of legitimacy, we first need to clarify what roles agencies are 
expected to play in governance. Literature on the regulatory state emphasises 
the importance of independent, regulatory agencies and assumes that 
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technocrats play a significant role in governance. Thus, if this overview of the 
agencies reveals a large number of agencies with regulatory functions and a 
high level of independence from central decision-makers, which allows its 
expert staff significant direct influence over policy, it lends more support to the 
idea of the EU as a regulatory state than if the opposite is found. At a more 
practical level, awareness of differences (and similarities) between agencies is 
important for accurate evaluation of the agency system. In an evaluation of the 
agency system it is essential to compare like with like. As will be shown, 
Community Agencies are diverse bodies and what is considered successful for 
one type of agency may not be so for another, for instance.  
The chapter is structured as follows: First, I will define the term 
µ&RPPXQLW\$JHQF\¶ and relate it to definitions of agencies presented in 
chapter 2. This will be followed by a section in which agencies are mapped and 
classified with regards to time of establishment, size (as measured by staff and 
budget resources in 2007), functions, governance structures, financial 
arrangements and location. The chapter ends with a discussion section where I 
outline the rationale behind the selection of Cedefop, EMEA, EASA and 
FRONTEX as case studies.  
 
3.2 How do we define Community Agencies? 
Drawing on existing academic literature on agencies, the previous chapter 
HVWDEOLVKHGWKDWIRUDERG\WREHFODVVLILHGDVDQµDJHQF\¶LWRXJKWWRVDWLVI\WKH
following four conditions.  
- ,WRXJKWWREH³DWDUP¶VOHQJWK´IURPFentral government (Talbot 
2004: 5). 
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- Its powers and responsibilities ought to be given under public law 
(Thatcher 2002b: ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWLWPXVWKDYH³a clear 
µFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶´HLWKHULQWKHIRUPRIOHJLVODWLRQRU³a formal (if not 
VWDWXWRU\µIUDPHZRUNGRFXPHQW¶´ (Talbot 2004: 8). 
-  ,WRXJKWWREH³VWDIIHGE\SXEOLFVHUYDQWV´7DOERW 5) and not 
be elected or managed by elected politicians (Thatcher 2002b: 956)  
- It must be subjected to performance contracting, i.e. there are 
methods of setting targets, monitoring and reporting performance 
(James 2001; Talbot 2004). 
According to the official definition a Community Agency is  
a body governed by European public law; it is distinct from the Community 
Institutions (Council, Parliament, Commission, etc.) and has its own legal personality. 
It is set up by an act of secondary legislation in order to accomplish a very specific 
WHFKQLFDOVFLHQWLILFRUPDQDJHULDOWDVNLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V
³ILUVWSLOODU´ (Europa web portal 2007a). 
 
The facWWKDWWKH\DUH³GLVWLQFWIURPWKH&RPPXQLW\,QVWLWXWLRQV´PHDQVWKDW
WKH\IXOILOWKHILUVWFULWHULRQRIEHLQJDW³DUP¶VOHQJWK´IURPFHQWUDO
JRYHUQPHQW%\EHLQJ³VHWXSE\DQDFWRIVHFRQGDU\OHJLVODWLRQ´EHLQJ
³JRYHUQHGE\SXEOLFODZ´DQGKDYLQJ³OHJDO SHUVRQDOLW\´WKH\IXOILOWKHVHFRQG
criterion. The Community Agencies all enjoy the most extensive legal status 
given to legal persons under Member State laws, which means that they may 
take legal action in Member States with all that entails. Furthermore, the 
protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities 
applies to all Community Agencies. Thus, we can conclude that there is no 
variation between the Community Agencies in terms of legal status. The acts of 
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secondary legislation by which the Community Agencies are established, and 
subsequent amendments of these texts, outline the powers and responsibilities 
of the agencies. These documents also reveal that the Community Agencies 
IXOILOWKHWKLUGDQGIRXUWKFULWHULDRIµDJHQFLHV¶7KHfounding legislations show 
WKDWWKHDJHQFLHVDUH³VWDIIHGE\SXEOLFVHUYDQWV´DQGWKDWWKH\DUH³neither 
GLUHFWO\HOHFWHGQRUPDQDJHGE\HOHFWHGRIILFLDOV´7KDWFKHUE 956). They 
also show that the performance of the agencies is subjected to target setting, 
monitoring and reporting. For instance, each agency has a work programme 
where its goals and priorities are set out, and each prepares an annual report on 
its activities. All agencies are subject to checks by the European Court of 
Auditors (Europa web portal 2007b), and the anti-fraud office, OLAF, can 
carry out investigations into the activities of the agencies (Council Decision 
1999/394).  
 As the EU also has other types of agencies, it is necessary to point out 
in what way Community Agencies differ from these. In addition to Community 
$JHQFLHVWKH(8KDVµ&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\$JHQFLHV¶
µ3ROLFHDQGMXGLFLDOFRRSHUDWLRQLQFULPLQDOPDWWHUVDJHQFLHV¶µ([HFXWLYH
DJHQFLHV¶DQGµ(85$720DJHQFLHVDQGERGLHV¶(XURSDZHESRUWDOD
µ&RPPRQ)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\$JHQFLHV¶DQGµ3ROLFHDQGMXGLFLDO
FRRSHUDWLRQLQFULPLQDOPDWWHUVDJHQFLHV¶RSHUDWHZLWKLQWKHVHFRQGDQGWKLUG
SLOODUUHVSHFWLYHO\µ([HFXWLYHDJHQFLHV¶DUHFUHDWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ
without involvement of the other institutions (Council Regulation No 58/2003). 
They are set up for a fixed term to manage Community programmes, and they 
DUHDOZD\VORFDWHGLQ%UXVVHOVµ(85$720DJHQFLHVDQGERGLHV¶DUHDVWKH
name indicates, solely associated with EURATOM.   
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3.3 Community Agencies established 1975 ± 2006 
Between 1975 and 2006, twenty-two Community Agencies were established. 
The previous section showed that there is no variation between the agencies in 
terms of legal status. However, the agencies are very diverse in all other 
respects. In the following sections, these agencies will be mapped and 
classified according to time of establishment, size (as measured by budget and 
staff resources in 2007)10, functions, governance structures, financial 
arrangements and location. The variation between the agencies is summarised 
in the following tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Table 3.1 Summary of key agency information A 
Agency Year  Staff Budget Function 
Cedefop 1975 ~125 16.5 Advisory 
EUROFOUND 1975 107 20.2 Advisory 
EEA 1990 170 33.7 Advisory 
ETF 1990 126 19.1 Advisory 
EMCDDA 1993 94 14.2 Advisory 
EMEA 1993 440 154.5 De facto regulator 
OHIM 1993 600+ 275.6 De jure regulator 
EU-OSHA 1994 62 14.7 Advisory 
CPVO 1994 42 12.9 De jure regulatory 
CdT 1994 180 34.7 Implementation 
EUMC 1997 37 9.4 Advisory 
EAR 2000 ~260 24.6 Implementation 
EFSA 2002 285 61.1 De facto regulator 
EMSA 2002 135 46.1 De facto regulator 
EASA 2002 ~300 70.5 De jure regulator 
ENISA 2004 44 6.9 Advisory 
ECDC 2004 ~90 27 Advisory 
ERA 2004 ~90 14.7 De facto regulator 
GSA 2004 46 412.3 De jure regulator 
FRONTEX 2004 78 42 Advisory 
CFCA 2005 38 5 Advisory 
ECHA 2006 recruiting 15 De facto regulator 
 
 
                                                 
10
 As EUMC ceased to exist in 2006, the information for this agency is from that year.  
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Sources: Cedefop (2007); EUROFOUND (2007); European Environment 
Agency (2007a); European Training Foundation (2007); European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2007); European Medicines Agency 
(2007); OHIM Human Resources Department (2007); European Agency for 
Safety and Health at Work (2007); Community Plant Variety Office (2007); 
Translation Centre for Bodies of the European Union (2007a); European 
Agency for Reconstruction (2007); European Food Safety Authority (2007); 
Stimpson (2007); European Aviation Safety Agency (2007b); European 
Network and Information Security Agency (2007); European Railway Agency 
(2007); FRONTEX (2007a); European Commission (2006); European 
Chemicals Agency (2007); Statement of revenue and expenses 2007 for 
Cedefop, EUROFOUND, ETF, EMCDDA, EU-OSHA, CPVO, EAR, EMSA, 
ENISA, ECDC and GSA; European Environment Agency (2007b); European 
Medicines Agency (2006); Office for the Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(2006); Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (2007b); 
European Food Safety Agency (2006); European Aviation Safety Agency 
(2007c); European Railway Agency (2006); FRONTEX (2007b); Community 
Fisheries Control Agency (2007). 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of key agency information B 
 
Agency Governance Financial 
arrangements Seat 
Cedefop stakeholders Subsidy Thessaloniki, Greece 
EUROFOUND stakeholders Subsidy Dublin, Ireland 
EEA EP Subsidy Copenhagen, Denmark 
ETF standard Subsidy Torino, Italy 
EMCDDA EP Subsidy Lisbon, Portugal 
EMEA EP+stakeholders Mixed London, United Kingdom 
OHIM standard Self Alicante, Spain 
EU-OSHA stakeholders Subsidy Bilbao, Spain 
CPVO standard Self Angers, France 
CdT stakeholders Self Luxembourg 
EUMC EP+stakeholders Subsidy Vienna, Austria 
EAR standard Subsidy Thessaloniki, Greece 
EFSA stakeholders Subsidy Parma, Italy 
EMSA standard Subsidy Lisbon, Portugal 
EASA standard Mixed Cologne, Germany 
ENISA standard Subsidy Heraklion, Greece 
ECDC EP Subsidy Stockholm, Sweden 
ERA standard Subsidy Valencienne, France 
GSA standard Subsidy Brussels, Belgium 
FRONTEX standard Subsidy Warsaw, Poland 
CFCA standard Subsidy Vigo, Spain 
ECHA EP Subsidy Helsinki, Finland 
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3.3.1 Time of establishment 
In this dimension, the agencies can be classified according to which wave of 
agency creation they belong to, i.e. 1970s, 1990s or 2000s. The first group is 
made up of two agencies, Cedefop and EUROFOUND which were established 
in 1975. The second group consists of nine agencies, eight of which were 
established in the first half of the 1990s. Only EUMC was established in 1997. 
The third group is the largest group with eleven agencies established in the 
2000s.  
 
3.3.2 Size as measured by staff and budget resources in 2007 
As shown in table 3.1, staff and budget resources vary greatly between the 
agencies. In terms of staff resources, we can distinguish three groups of 
agencies: small agencies (up to 100 employees), medium-sized agencies 
(between 101 and 299 employees) and large agencies (300 or more 
employees). According to this classification, most agencies are small or 
medium-size. There are ten small agencies, eight medium-size ones and three 
large ones (EMEA, OHIM and EASA). ECHA only began recruitment in 2007, 
but the goal is that this agency is to have over 400 employees in 2010, which 
would make this one of the largest agencies (ECHA 2007). In terms of budget, 
we can also distinguish three groups: small budget (XSWR¼ million), 
medium-sized budget ¼ 000 001- ¼ million) and large budget (more than 
¼ million). Again, most agencies are small or medium-size. There are eight 
agencies in the small budget category, ten agencies in the medium-size budget 
category and four agencies in the large budget category. However, we can 
DVVXPHWKDW(&+$ZKLFKLQKDGDEXGJHWRI¼PLOOLRQDQGWKXV
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belonged in the small budget category, will soon acquire a larger budget as its 
operations are expanded and more people are recruited to the agency. 
 Staff remuneration is one of the largest expenses for many of the 
agencies. Thus, it is unsurprising that staff resources and budget resources 
often are linked. Seven agencies are placed in the small category for staff as 
well as budget, and eight agencies are similarly classified as medium-sized. 
Based on figures for 2007, ECDC and FRONTEX are classified as small in 
terms of staff but medium-sized in terms of budget. However, as a result of 
recent recruitment these two agencies could now be re-classified as medium-
sized also in terms of staff (Statement of revenue and expenditure of the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control for the financial year 
2008; Statement of revenue and expenditure of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) for 
the financial year 2008). The three largest agencies in terms of staff resources, 
i.e. OHIM, EMEA and EASA, all belong to the large budget category. The 
fourth agency with a large budget is GSA, which is a small agency in terms of 
staff resources. The large budget in this case can be explained by the high costs 
associated with tasks the agency is set up to perform.  
 
3.3.3 Functions 
An examination of the functions and responsibilities of the agencies shows that 
the agencies can be classified into four groups: de jure regulators, de facto 
regulators, implementation agencies and advisory agencies (see table 3.1). As 
agencies may have more than one function, this classification focuses on the 
H[WHQWRIWKHDJHQFLHV¶SRZHUVDQGRQWKHLUPRVWSURPLQHQWIXQFWLRQV)RU
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instance, an agency with de jure regulatory tasks which also has advisory tasks 
is classified as a de jure UHJXODWRUDVWKHUHJXODWRU\WDVNGHILQHVWKHDJHQF\¶V
policy-making power. As the functions of an agency have the most significant 
impact on what role the agency can play in governance, it is on this variable 
that the most emphasis is placed when the case studies are selected.  
 De jure regulators are the most powerful agencies as they have 
mandates that allow them to make decisions that are binding for individuals, 
and sometimes also to draft legislation. These agencies are regulatory agencies 
in the strictest sense of the word, and their creation is thus closely linked to the 
argument of the EU as a regulatory state.  Four agencies (OHIM, CPVO, 
($6$DQG*6$EHORQJWRWKLVJURXS*6$IXQFWLRQVDVWKH(8¶VOLFHQVLQJ
authority vis-à-vis the private concession holder responsible for 
implementation and management of the Galileo deployment and operating 
phases. OHIM and CPVO are property rights agencies. OHIM is concerned 
with industrial property rights and CPVO with plant variety rights. Within their 
respective field of activity, these agencies have the tasks of scrutinising, 
granting and declining applications for property rights valid throughout the EU. 
In the case of CPVO, the process includes technical examination of the plant in 
question. With the exception of OHIM, the agencies in this group have 
mandates that allow them to draft legislation and forward it to the Commission, 
ZKLFKUHWDLQVWKHVROHULJKWRIIRUPDOLQLWLDWLYHLQWKH(8¶VGHFLVLRQ-making 
process. EASA has been given a particularly powerful position in this regard as 
its opinions must be sought and cannot be ignored. When the rules concerned 
are of a technical nature, and especially if they concern construction, design or 
RSHUDWLRQDODVSHFWV³WKH&RPPLVVLRQPD\QRWFKDQJHWKHLUFRQWHQWZLWKRXW
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SULRUFRRUGLQDWLRQZLWKWKH$JHQF\´Regulation No 1592/2002, article 12:2b). 
GSA drafts legislation in preparation of formal Commission proposals, and 
CPVO may only propose amendments.11  Certification tasks are important for 
EASA and GSA. Whereas GSA is responsible for certification of GNSS 
components, EASA issues and revokes airworthiness and environmental 
FHUWLILFDWLRQVIRURUJDQLVDWLRQVDSSOLDQFHVSDUWVDQGSURGXFWV($6$¶V
FHUWLILFDWLRQUXOHVDUHRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³VRIWODZ´DVWKH\DUHQRWPDQGDWRU\
but actors that do comply get issued a certificate (EASA 2007a). Compliance is 
monitored either by EASA itself or by other entities that have been approved to 
carry out these inspections. Of the four agencies in this group, EASA is the one 
with the broadest variety of tasks, and it has an international role to play. 
EASA cooperates with international and third country authorities, assists 
Member States to fulfil their international obligations and assists Member 
States and the Community in their relations with third countries. The agency 
may also develop and finance its own studies. Decisions by OHIM, CPVO and 
($6$FDQEHFKDOOHQJHGFRPSODLQWVDUHILUVWGLUHFWHGWRWKHDJHQFLHV¶%RDUGV
of Appeal and after that to the European Court of Justice. The founding 
legislation of GSA, on the other hand, does not mention appeal procedures.  
 De facto regulators are less powerful than de jure regulators as they do 
not have the right to make decisions that are binding for individuals. However, 
their mandates are such that it is reasonable to assume that decision-makers 
nearly always follow the opinions or recommendations of the agencies when 
making decisions.  Five agencies (EMEA, EFSA, EMSA, ERA and ECHA) 
                                                 
11
 The President, i.e. the highest official, of CPVO can draft amendments to EU plant variety 
law and place these before the Board of the agency, which can then decide to forward these 
with or without amendments to the Commission (Council Regulation No 2100/94, articles 36 
and 42). 
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belong to this group, and they all operate in fields where expert technical and 
scientific knowledge could be considered necessary for informed decision-
making. EMEA and ECHA are concerned with the safety of medicines and 
chemicals, respectively. A central task of EMEA is to evaluate and form expert 
opinions on products that producers wish to sell on the EU market. These 
opinions are then forwarded to the Commission, which formally decides 
ZKHWKHURUQRWWRJUDQWDXWKRULVDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVRI(0($¶VH[SHUWRSLQLRQ
Thus, what distinguishes this agency from the de jure regulators is that it does 
not have the formal decision-makiQJSRZHU7KHIDFWWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VRSLQLRQ
GLUHFWO\LQIRUPVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQGLVWLQJXLVKHVLWIURPWKHDGYLVRU\
agencies, and is the determining factor in the classification of this agency as a 
de facto regulator. At the moment, ECHA is responsible for checking that 
registration dossiers submitted by manufacturers and importers of chemicals 
comply with EU requirements, and the agency may also request that chemical 
products are registered if it may pose a risk to human health (Regulation No 
1907/2006, article 7). ECHA is currently under development, but the 
information available on this agency suggests that it will develop a role very 
similar to the one of EMEA. Key tasks for ERA are to develop criteria and 
formats for safety certificates in the field of railway traffic and to recommend 
safety targets to the Commission. These tasks are similar to the certification 
tasks of EASA and GSA, but in the case of ERA the mandate is so far limited 
to making suggestions to the Commission. At first glance, EFSA and EMSA 
may appear to be advisory agencies. EFSA, which has a focus on risk 
assessment and risk communication, gathers and analyses scientific and 
technical data related to food safety in a wide sense and makes sure that the 
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information gathered reaches Community institutions, Member States, the 
public and other interested parties.12 EMSA analyses studies related to 
maritime safety, maritime security and prevention of ship pollution. What sets 
these agencies apart from the agencies classified as advisory agencies is that 
their legislation clearly declares that their advice will serve as a scientific basis 
for Community legislation (see Regulation No 178/2002, article 22; Regulation 
No 724/2004, article 2a). All agencies in this group also have non-regulatory 
tasks, including networking with the aim of disseminating information and/or 
best practice. Important non-regulatory tasks for EMSA include visits and 
inspections to monitor port state control, classification societies13 and the 
training of ship crews (EMSA 2007). 
  Only two agencies (CdT and EAR) are classified as implementation 
agencies. EAR was a temporary agency, and its activities were phased out in 
2008. The main objective of EAR was to implement the Community assistance 
programmes in former Yugoslavia, but the agency also had the task of 
providing information on the situation in the area (Council Regulation No 
2667/2000). CdT is unique in that its main purpose is to provide services to the 
other decentralised bodies. Its classification into this group follows from the 
assumption that translation is a service that the agency implements.  
 The most common type of agency is the advisory agency. The eleven 
remaining agencies belong to this group. Although these agencies are not 
regulatory agencies, they may play a significant role in governance through the 
institutionalisation of norms, values and working practices. It must also be 
                                                 
12
 The agency is to provide advice on plant health, animal welfare and health, human nutrition 
and crisis management procedures (Regulation 178/2002, articles 22-23). 
13
 ³&ODVVLILFDWLRQVRFLHWLHVDUHRUJDQLVDWLRQVZKLFKGHYHORSDQGDSSO\WHFKQLFDOVWDQGDUGVWRWKH
design, construction and assessment of ships (and other marine facilities) and which carry out 
VXUYH\ZRUNRQVKLSV´EMSA 2009). 
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acknowledged that although the EU decision-making bodies are not obliged to 
follow the advice given by these agencies, they may chose to do so, which 
could give these agencies more influence than indicated in the formal 
documents. All agencies active within the social policy and education field, i.e. 
Cedefop, EUROFOUND, ETF and EU-OSHA, are classified as advisory. The 
group also includes ECDC, which operates in a highly technical field, and 
FRONTEX, the activities of which concern a policy area that only recently 
came under the jurisdiction of the EU. The most common tasks of agencies 
within this group are the compilation and dissemination of information and 
best practice. In practice, this often involves networking and the organisation 
of workshops or conferences. Efforts to make data comparable are particularly 
prevalent in the information-related work of EEA and EMCDDA. However, 
Cedefop also has the task to encourage joint approaches such as the 
approximation of standards and mutual recognition of qualifications. 
Coordination tasks are important for FRONTEX and CFCA. These agencies 
have the additional tasks of assisting with training of border guards and fishing 
inspectors respectively. In most cases, the purposes and tasks of the advisory 
agencies are not particularly controversial. FRONTEX has proved to be an 
H[FHSWLRQDQGVRPHRIWKLVDJHQF\¶VWDVNVZHUHKRWO\GHEDWHGGXULQJthe 
establishment process. The issues causing the most controversy were the 
DJHQF\¶VWDVNRISURYLGLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV³ZLWKWKHQHFHVVDU\VXSSRUWLQ
RUJDQLVLQJMRLQWUHWXUQRSHUDWLRQV´DQGWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQLGHQWLI\LQJ³EHVW
practices on the acquisition of travel documents and the removal of illegally 
present third-FRXQWU\QDWLRQDOV´Council Regulation 2007/2004, articles 2 and 
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9). The agency may cooperate with Europol, international organisations and 
third country authorities with responsibility in the relevant field. 
  
3.3.4 Governance structures 
The Community Agencies show many similarities in internal structure. They 
all have an Executive Director, a Board and one or more scientific committees. 
The Directors are responsible for the day-to-day running of the agencies and 
the implementation of the budgets, and they act as the legal representatives of 
the agencies.14 The size and composition of the Boards vary, but Member State 
representatives and Commission representatives are always included. Member 
State representatives are appointed by the Council and Commission 
representatives are appointed by the Commission. The Commission 
representatives can never form a majority on their own. The number of 
Commission representatives varies between six, as in the example of CFCA, 
and one, as in the example of EASA. As indicated in table 3.2, the agencies can 
be classified into four groups in terms of Board structure and Board members 
with full voting rights.  
The largest group, consisting of eleven agencies, have Boards where 
only Commission representatives and Member State representatives have 
voting rights. Within this group there is considerable variation between the 
agencies, however. For instance, several of these agencies also have observers 
with limited or no voting rights on the Board. EEA, GSA and FRONTEX have 
provisions for the inclusion of third country representatives and the Boards of 
                                                 
14
 For details on what this may entail, see the founding legal documents for each agency and/or 
agency work programmes. 
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ERA, EMSA and ENISA include observers representing stakeholders. The 
EAR Board included an observer from the European Investment Bank (Council 
Regulation No 2667/2000, article 4). CFCA and FRONTEX stand out as not all 
EU Member States need be included on their Board. In the case of CFCA, 
every Member State has the right to appoint a Board member but the founding 
legislation does not oblige them to do so (Council Regulation No 768/2005, 
DUWLFOH'XHWRWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ)5217(;¶VRSHUDWLRQVDQGWKH 
Schengen-agreement, the non-Schengen members United Kingdom and Ireland 
are only observers on the FRONTEX Board.  
A second group consists of five agencies the Boards of which include 
stakeholders in addition to Commission and state representatives. Again, the 
Boards may include observers. Three of the agencies in this group, Cedefop, 
EUROFOUND and EU-OSHA, have a tripartite governance structure 
LQYROYLQJWKHVRFLDOSDUWQHUVLHHPSOR\HUV¶DQGHPSOR\HHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV,Q
all three cases, the representatives of the social partners are appointed by the 
Council on proposal from relevant organisations. The other two agencies in this 
group are CdT and EFSA. The Board of CdT includes representatives of bodies 
WKDWXVHWKHDJHQF\¶VVHUYLFHV,QWHUPVRIJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUH()6$VWDQGV
out from the other Community Agencies. The Board of this agency consists of 
fourteen people, four oIZKLFKDUHWRKDYHD³EDFNJURXQGLQRUJDQLVDWLRQV
UHSUHVHQWLQJFRQVXPHUVDQGRWKHULQWHUHVWVLQWKHIRRGFKDLQ´Regulation No 
178/2002, article 25). The Board members are appointed by the Council from a 
list of potential Board members drawn up by the Commission, and the Council 
is to consider the opinion of the EP before making appointments.  The 
IRXQGLQJOHJLVODWLRQVWLSXODWHVWKDWDSSRLQWPHQWVRXJKWWREHPDGH³LQVXFKD
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way as to secure the highest standards of competence, a broad range of relevant 
expertise and, consistent with these, the broadest possible geographic 
GLVWULEXWLRQZLWKLQWKH8QLRQ´5HJXODWLRQ1RDUWLFOH 25). 
The third group consists of four agencies (EEA, EMCDDA, ECDC and 
ECHA) which have Boards made up of Commission representatives, Member 
State representatives and EP appointees. Each agency has two EP appointees 
on the Board. In the case of EMCDDA the founding legislation specifies that 
the people appointed by the EP should be scientists, and in the case of ECHA it 
is specified that they should be independent. As with the previous groups, 
agency Boards sometimes include observers. For instance, the ECHA Board 
include observers representing stakeholders. 
 The final group of two agencies (EMEA and EUMC) have Boards, 
which, in addition to Commission and state representatives, include 
stakeholders and EP appointees with voting rights. In addition to one 
representative from each Member State and two representatives from the 
Commission, the EMEA Board includes two representatives appointed by the 
(3WZRUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRISDWLHQWV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVRQHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI
GRFWRUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGRQHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIYHWHULQDULDQV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV
(Regulation No 726/2004, article 65). The representatives of the different 
organisations are appointed by the Council on the basis of a candidate list 
created by the Commission. The Parliament has the right to be consulted about 
its views on the candidate list and relevant background documentation. In the 
case of EUMC, there was one Board member appointed by the EP and one 
Board member appointed by the Council of Europe, the inclusion of which 
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served to reinforce the cooperation between the two organisations (Council 
Regulation No 1035/97, articles 7-8).  
In most cases, the terms of tenure for Community Agency Boards are 
between three and five years. Exceptions are EAR where the term of tenure 
was only 2.5 years, and EEA and ENISA where the terms of tenure are not 
specified. In the case of EEA, each Member State nominates their 
representatives who may then serve for any length of time as long as s/he is 
still an official in a ministry at Member State level (Stanhardt 2009). Similarly, 
the Member States decide how long representatives serve on the ENISA Board 
(Bergström 2009).  
In most cases the Boards are responsible for the appointment of the 
DJHQFLHV¶'LUHFWRUVRQSURSRVDOIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ7KHH[FHSWLRQVDUH
EMSA and ERA, where Commission proposals are non-mandatory, OHIM and 
CPVO, where the Council appoints the Directors, and Cedefop where the 
Director is appointed by the Commission. The Directors for OHIM and 
Cedefop, however, are selected from a list prepared by their Boards, and the 
Board of CPVO is consulted. With the exception of the Director for EAR, who 
served for 30 months, and the Director of ENISA, whose term is a maximum of 
five years, the Directors serve for a renewable term of five years. 
 
3.3.5 Financial arrangements 
$JHQFLHV¶ILQDQFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVDUHLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHLUOHYHORIDXWRQRP\$Q
agency that is self-financed, i.e. has the right to raise its own revenue, 
undoubtedly has better opportunities to pursue independent action than an 
agency that is dependent on subsidies for its finances. The Community 
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Agencies can be classified into three groups according to sources of revenue: 
90% or more from subsidies, 90% or more from fees, and mixed revenue. As 
shown in table 3.2, as many as 17 agencies depend on subsidies for 90% or 
more of their income. ECHA, which currently belongs in this category, is 
expected to increasingly receive more and more revenue from fees, however. 
For all of these agencies, the largest sources of revenue are subsidies from the 
budget of the European Community. In the case of EEA, the EC subsidy makes 
up 86% of the budget, and the rest of the income comes from third party 
subsidies. In all other cases, the EC subsidy makes up over 95% of the budget. 
Other minor sources of income for agencies in this group include third party or 
voluntary contributions and fees for services rendered. Three agencies, OHIM, 
CPVO and CdT, receive over 90% of their income from fees paid by users of 
WKHDJHQFLHV¶VHUYLFHV2+,0DQG&392DUHHQWLUHO\VHOI-financed. CdT 
receives a grant for interinstitutional cooperation, which makes up about 5% of 
the budget. In the case of CdT, the fees are paid by other EU bodies, which 
means that although the agency is not technically subsidised, it is dependent on 
other EU bodies for its finances. Two agencies, EMEA and EASA have mixed 
sources of revenue. They can raise their own revenue by charging fees, but 
they also depend on subsidies. For its budget, EMEA depends on fees for 
around 70% and on subsidies for 27%. EASA receives 62% of its income from 
fees and 34% from an EC subsidy. The remaining parts of the budgets of these 
agencies can be classified as miscellaneous revenue.  
5HVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHDJHQFLHV¶EXGJHWUHVWVZLWK
their Directors, and the budgetary discharge procedures for the agencies are 
outlined in their governing legislations. With the exception of OHIM and 
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CPVO, which are entirely self-financed, all agencies follow the same 
SURFHGXUHIRUEXGJHWDU\GLVFKDUJH)LUVWHDFKDJHQF\¶VDFFRXQWLQJRIILFHU
forwards the provisional accounts and reports on budgetary and financial 
PDQDJHPHQWWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDFFRunting officer. S/he then consolidates 
them and forwards them to the Court of Auditors, the Council and the EP. 
After having received comments from the Court of Auditors, the Director of 
HDFKDJHQF\GUDZVXSWKHILQDODFFRXQWVRQZKLFKHDFKDJHQF\¶V%RDUG is to 
deliver an opinion. This opinion together with the final accounts will then 
forwarded by the Directors to the EP, the Council, the Commission and the 
&RXUWRI$XGLWRUV7KH'LUHFWRUVDUHDOVRREOLJHGWRFRPPHQWRQWKH$XGLWRUV¶
report and send this to the Boards. The final accounts are published, and 
discharge is given by the EP on recommendation from the Council. 
OHIM and CPVO are obliged to forward information on their accounts 
to the Court of Auditors and the Commission. Their accounts are also 
forwarded to the Board (CPVO), the Budgetary Committee and the EP 
2+,0'LVFKDUJHIRU2+,0¶VEXGJHWLVJUDQWHGE\WKH%XGJHWDU\
&RPPLWWHHDQGGLVFKDUJHIRU&392¶VEXGJHWLVJUDQWHGE\LWV%RDUG 
 
3.3.6 Location 
As shown in table 3.1, the Community Agencies are spread out across the EU. 
$FFRUGLQJWRRIILFLDO(8VRXUFHVDJHQFLHVDUH³an answer to a desire for 
geographical devolution´(Europa web portal 2009). Only one agency, GSA, is 
located in Brussels. In 2007, the countries with the most agencies were Greece 
and Spain with three agencies each. However, since EAR was phased out in 
2008, Greece now has two agencies. The other countries with two agencies are 
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France, Italy and Portugal. It should also be noted that Cedefop, another 
agency located in Greece, was initially set up in West Berlin, Germany, and 
was moved to Greece in 1995. Poland, which is host to FRONTEX, is the only 
state joining the EU in 2004 or after to have a Community Agency on its 
territory. Decisions on where to place Community Agencies are taken by the 
Council.  
 
3.4 Discussion and case selection 
Previous literature has pointed to variation between agencies in terms of size, 
legal status, governing structures, financial arrangements, functions and 
responsibilities. Variation can of course also be found in terms of timing of 
establishment and location. With the exception of legal status, which is the one 
dimension that unites Community Agencies, this chapter has confirmed that 
there is significant variation also between Community Agencies. To explain 
the establishment of these diverse bodies, the variation between them must be 
reflected in the selection of case studies. In this section, I will discuss the 
variation observed between the agencies and outline the rationale behind the 
selection of Cedefop, EMEA, EASA and FRONTEX as the case studies of this 
WKHVLV,QWKHVHOHFWLRQRIFDVHVWXGLHVWKHDJHQFLHV¶IXQFWLRQVDQG
responsibilities, timing of establishment, size, governance structures and 
financial arrangements have been taken into account. 
 To achieve the aim of contributing to our understanding of how 
governance in the EU works, the functions and responsibilities of the agencies 
are crucial. Thus, the most emphasis is placed on this variable when selecting 
case studies. As discussed previously, the agencies can be classified into four 
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groups in terms of what functions they are set up to fulfil. De jure regulatory 
agencies are the most powerful agencies as they make binding decisions, and 
some of them may also draft legislative proposals to be forwarded to the 
Commission. The de facto regulatory agencies play a clearly visible role in 
European governance as their opinions and recommendations often translate 
directly into law. The impact of the advisory agencies may appear more subtle, 
but starting from the assumption that institutions matter I hold the view that 
these agencies may play a significant role in governance through the 
institutionalisation of norms and working practices. Moreover, the fact that EU 
decision-making bodies are not legally obliged to consult these agencies in the 
decision-making process does not mean that they do not seek agency opinion 
and incorporate it into law, giving these agencies more influence than 
suggested in official documents. As indicated by the name, the implementation 
agencies are predominantly concerned with the implementation of tasks and 
services devised by central decision-makers. CdT is important in that it 
provides services that other bodies need to function but, apart from its 
involvement in interinstitutional cooperation, this agency does not play an 
active role in governance. More people were affected by work of EAR; 
however, as this agency was only temporary, it is not a suitable case study for a 
project aiming to contribute to our understanding RIDJHQFLHV¶UROHLQ
governance at the EU-level. For these reasons, case studies will only be 
selected from the three groups de jure regulators, de facto regulators and 
advisory agencies. The selection of EASA, EMEA, Cedefop and FRONTEX 
satisfies the selection criterion of at least one agency from each to these three 
groups. 
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 To address the historical institutionalist hypothesis that specific events 
and the specific setting in which institutions are created and develop play an 
important role in explaining the establishment of institutions, agencies 
established at different times must be selected as case studies. Selection on the 
timing of establishment variable is also needed to address sociological 
institutionalist ideas of the importance of institutional borrowing. Three waves 
of agency creation can be distinguished: 1970s, 1990s and 2000s. The first 
group includes two advisory agencies: Cedefop and EUROFOUND. As 
Cedefop was the first Community Agency it was selected from this first group. 
The groups of agencies established in the 1990s and 2000s include agencies 
with all types of functions. The de facto regulator EMEA was selected from the 
1990s group as it was the first Community Agency to be given a regulatory 
function. EASA and FRONTEX belong to the group of agencies established in 
the 2000s. By selecting EASA, which is a de jure regulator and FRONTEX, 
which is an advisory agency, I ensured variation in terms of functions between 
agencies created at roughly the same time.   
 The chosen case studies also capture some of the variation in term of 
agency size. The regulatory agencies EASA and EMEA are large in terms of 
staff as well as budget resources. Cedefop is medium-sized. Based on figures 
from 2007, FRONTEX was classified as small in terms of staff resources and 
medium-size in terms of budget. However, the agency has since recruited more 
staff. The agencies established from 2004 and onwards are classified as small 
in terms of staff, but, as the case of FRONTEX shows, the small size in 2007 
may simply be GXHWRWKHDJHQFLHV¶VWLOOEHLQJLQWKHSURFHVVRIEXLOGLQJXS
their organisation. With the notable exception of CPVO, the operations of 
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which directly affect only a limited number of actors, the regulatory agencies 
tend to be larger in terms of staff and/or budget than the advisory agencies. 
 As regards governance structures, the distinction between agencies with 
a standard Board composition, i.e. where the Board consists of Commission 
and Member States only, and agencies where additional actors are represented 
is reflected in the choice of case studies. EASA and FRONTEX have Boards 
with Commission and Member State representatives. FRONTEX, however, 
constitutes a somewhat special case in that the United Kingdom and Ireland are 
allowed as observers only due to their absence from the Schengen agreement. 
The Board of Cedefop includes stakeholders in the form of the social partners. 
(0($¶V%RDUGLQFOXGHVVWDNHKROGHUVLQWKLVFDVHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIGRFWRUV¶
YHWHULQDULDQV¶DQGSDWLHQWV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDVZHOODs two people appointed by 
the EP. As shown in table 3.2, later agencies tend to have a standard Board 
composition. Of the agencies established in the 2000s, only EFSA has 
stakeholders on the Board, and EDCD and ECHA are the only agencies to have 
EP representatives. In terms of management recruitment, Cedefop is unique in 
that it is the only agency where the Director is appointed directly by the 
Commission.   
 Turning our attention to the financial arrangements of the agencies, we 
can see that the choice of case studies reflect the division between agencies that 
rely on subsidies for nearly the entire budget, as exemplified by Cedefop and 
FRONTEX, and agencies that also rely on fees, as exemplified by EMEA and 
EASA. All advisory agencies depend on subsidies for their budget. EMEA was 
the first agency to be given the right to charge fees for its services to any 
VLJQLILFDQWH[WHQW*LYHQWKDWWKHOHYHORIDQDJHQF\¶VILQDQFLDOLQGHSHQGHQFH
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determines the level of autonomy an agency can enjoy, one could argue that an 
entirely self-financed agency ought to have been included as a case study. One 
of these, CdT, has already been ruled out as a case study due to the nature of its 
functions, which does not allow the agency to impact on governance in any 
other way than LQGLUHFWO\WKURXJKWKHIDFLOLWDWLRQRIWKHRWKHUDJHQFLHV¶ZRUN
OHIM and CPVO were considered and could have been selected on the 
grounds of being de jure regulators as well as self-financed. However, as the 
aim of this research project motivated a focus on the functions of the agencies, 
EASA is a more interesting representative of the de jure regulators due to the 
role this agency plays in the legislative process. Here it must be recalled that 
EASA drafts legislation in preparation of Commission proposals, and that the 
Commission is legally obliged to consult EASA on technical rules. OHIM does 
not have this role, and CPVO may only propose amendments to existing 
legislation. 
 The locations of agencies have not attracted attention in previous 
literature. A reason for this could be that previous studies of agency creation 
often have focused on the establishment of agencies within particular countries. 
Agency establishment in the EU arguably has an added dimension of 
intergovernmental tension, which it is worth acknowledging, although it is not 
emphasised in the thesis. It has been argued that the fact that the agencies are 
spread out across the territory is related to a desire to decentralise some EU 
functions. However, it is also reasonable to assume that agencies are spread out 
to give various states a share of EU jobs and the associated prestige of hosting 
an agency. It is interesting to note that most powerful agencies, i.e. the 
regulatory agencies, tend to found in the larger Member States. Examples are 
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EMEA in the United Kingdom, OHIM in Spain, CPVO and ERA in France, 
and EASA in Germany. Poland, which was the largest state to join the EU in 
2004, is also the only of the Central- and Eastern European states to have an 
agency. It can also be noted that Cedefop was transferred from Germany to 
Greece in 1995, which several interviewees at Cedefop indicated had to do 
with intergovernmental bargaining preceding the decision to locate the 
European Central Bank in Frankfurt (Interviews Cedefop Official 1; Cedefop 
Official 3; Cedefop Official 4).  
 In summary, the selection of Cedefop, EMEA, EASA and FRONTEX 
reflect the variation between Community Agencies as shown in table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Summary of variation across case studies 
Agency Year Function Size Financial 
arrangements 
Governance 
structures 
Cedefop 1970s Advisory Medium Subsidy Stakeholders 
EMEA 1990s De facto 
regulatory 
Large Mixed Stakeholders 
+ EP 
EASA 2000s De jure 
regulatory 
Large Mixed Standard 
FRONTEX 2000s Advisory Small/ 
Medium 
Subsidy Standard 
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Tracing the establishment of the European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training 
(Cedefop)  
4.1 Introduction 
The Council¶VGHFLVLRQWR establish the European Centre for the Development 
of Vocational Training (Cedefop) in 1975 marks the beginning of the 
agencification of Europe. Cedefop was the first Community Agency to be 
established, and as such it has served as a precedent for the over twenty 
Community Agencies that the EU has today. Its founding legislation is Council 
Regulation EEC No 337/75. Cedefop is classified as an advisory agency, which 
is medium-sized, dependent on subsidies, and has a tripartite governance 
VWUXFWXUHLQYROYLQJWKHVRFLDOSDUWQHUVLHHPSOR\HUV¶DQGHPSOR\HHV¶
organisations.  
 In this chapter, I will trace and analyse the establishment of Cedefop 
with focus on the central aspects of agency establishment identified in chapter 
2, (i.e. timing of establishment, tasks, governance structures and financial 
DUUDQJHPHQWV,ZLOODOVRUHIOHFWRQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQance today.  
 Three hypotheses about the motives behind Cedefop have been deduced 
from rational choice institutionalist theory. This perspective suggests that the 
agency has been created as a response to a need for technical expertise, 
credible commitment or increased efficiency. I argue that these functional 
concerns have very limited explanatory value for the establishment of Cedefop. 
The agency operates in a policy area where objective science is scarce and 
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where normative reasoning underlies many decisions. This chapter will also 
show that decision-makers have not provided Cedefop with possibilities to 
offer employment conditions that can compete with those of the Commission 
and that there is an element of competition between the agency and Member 
States when it comes to the employment of experts. Thus, I argue that decision-
makers were not primarily concerned with creating Cedefop as the centre of 
expertise. Neither does my research support the idea that a wish for credible 
commitment was a key driving factor behind the establishment of Cedefop. 
The agency has no means of enforcing commitment and lacks tasks linked to 
commitment concerns. Moreover, this chapter will show that whilst there is 
evidence to suggest that some actors saw the agency as a means to ensure 
credible commitment to the social dialogue through making social partner 
representation on the Board a legal requirement, decision-makers were not 
willing to go far enough to make such a commitment credible in the long term. 
The social dialogue has declined over time. As to the hypothesis that the 
agency has been created to increase efficiency, I have not found any evidence 
for this being an important argument for decision-makers in this case.  
Sociological institutionalist theory suggests that the agency has been 
created following a convergence of ideas about the desirability of the agency 
form, which has resulted in institutional borrowing from another political 
setting. Based on substantial empirical evidence, I will make a case that 
institutional borrowing indeed occurred and that Cedefop was modelled on a 
German vocational training institute.  
Historical institutionalist theory claims that the origin of Cedefop must 
be sought in the historical context in which it was created and that the 
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establishment of the agency was preceded by specific events (critical junctures) 
which led decision-makers down that path of development. I argue that this 
hypothesis holds true with regards to Cedefop. The agency was created at a 
time of economic crisis, rising unemployment and social unrest. Enlargement 
of the EC to the United Kingdom and Ireland, which were heavily affected by 
industrial decline, was also a contributing factor to vocational training being 
placed on the political agenda. At the same time, trade unions gained 
prominence at the European level through the establishment of the European 
Trade Union Congress (ETUC), which is to be regarded as a critical juncture in 
the history of trade union influence in Europe.  
 The chapter will show that in order to explain in the establishment of 
Cedefop, we need to look to sociological institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism. Whereas the former helps us to understand the choice of a 
body independent from central authorities, the latter explains well the timing 
aspect. 
 
4.2 Background and the establishment process 
4.2.1 Cedefop Ȃ a brief presentation 
Initially set up in West Berlin, Germany, the agency moved to Thessaloniki, 
Greece, in 1995. The key functions have remained the same, however. Within 
the policy field of vocational training, the core tasks are to compile and 
disseminate information, to contribute to research, to act as a forum and to 
encourage joint approaches such as mutual recognition of qualifications and the 
approximation of standards. In practical terms, this means that the agency 
78 
 
publishes reports, organises workshops and engages in a number of networks 
(Cedefop 2005 Annual Report).   
 The social partners play a crucial role in the governance of Cedefop. 
The Governing Board of the agency consists of three representatives from the 
&RPPLVVLRQDQGRQHJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRQHHPSOR\HUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHDQGRQHHPSOR\HHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIURPHDFK
Member State. The Commission appoints its own representatives whereas the 
other representatives are appointed by the Council on the basis of candidates 
OLVWVGUDZQXSE\0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGHPSOR\HUV¶DQGHPSOR\HHV¶
organisations. Council Regulation No 2051/2004 clearly states that a list of 
members must be published in the Official Journal as well as on the agency 
web site, and all actors involved in the governance of the agency are obliged to 
strive for gender balance when making appointments. The Board members 
serve for a renewable period of three years. In comparison with the Boards of 
several other agencies, the Board of Cedefop comes across as more dependent 
on the Commission; when adopting the annual work programme of the agency, 
they must do so in agreement with the Commission. Council Regulation EC 
2051/2004, article DOVRVWDWHVWKDWWKHDQQXDOZRUNSURJUDPPH³VKDOOWDNH
LQWRDFFRXQWWKHSULRULW\QHHGVLQGLFDWHGE\WKH&RPPXQLW\LQVWLWXWLRQV´,Q
addition, albeit from a list of candidates compiled by the Board, the 
Commission appoints the Director of the agency (for a renewable term of five 
years). 
In October 2007, the agency employed around 125 staff (Cedefop 
7KHDJHQF\¶VEXGJHWIRUWKHVDPH\HDUZDVDURXQG¼PLOOLRQZLWK
RYHU¼ 16 million being a subsidy from the EC budget (Statement of revenue 
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and expenditure of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (Cedefop) for the financial year 2007).  
  
4.2.2 Setting the context: attitude change to social policy, active 
trade unions, social dialogue, EESC and Maria Weber 
Given the political situation and the commitments of the European Community 
(EC) in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s it is hardly surprising that the 
first Community Agency was established in the social policy field. At the 
creation of the EC, only limited attention was given to social policy and the 
impact of economic integration on social affairs was initially largely left to be 
dealt with at Member State level. Varsori (2004: 66) points to the lack of an 
LQGHQWLILHG³FRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUN´DQGZLWK,WDO\DVDSRssible exception, 
HDFK0HPEHU6WDWH¶VGHVLUHWRIROORZLWVRZQQDWLRQDOSDWKDVUHDVRQVIRUWKH
initial lack of cooperation. This attitude is further expressed in article 118 of 
the Treaty, which gave the Commission the task of promoting cooperation in 
the field but did not include a mechanism for intervention at the Community 
level (Guasconi 2004: 55). The fact that the Treaty includes provisions 
concerning free movement of workers, equal pay for men and women and the 
creation of the European Social Fund need not be seen as evidence of a pan-EC 
commitment to these policies, and Guasconi (2004: UHIHUVWRWKHPDV³D
concession on the part of the European governments to the strong pressure 
H[HUWHGE\,WDOLDQUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV´7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDWWKHUHwas no 
European level activity in the field. As will be explained shortly, there was 
considerable activity, in particular on behalf of certain individuals, within the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). We can also note that the 
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Council lay down ³JHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVIRULPSOHPHQWLQJDFRPPRQYRFDWLRQDO
WUDLQLQJSROLF\´in 1963 (Commission 1974: 17). 
Ideas and opinions amongst key European decision-makers about the 
need for cooperation on social policy in general, and vocational training in 
particular, shifted radically in the late 1960s and 1970s for a number of 
reasons. Needless to say, the economic crisis of the 1970s, and the rise in 
unemployment levels which followed, had a role to play in prompting political 
leaders to seek new solutions (see Varsori 2004: 57-58). Of the current 
Member States, Italy was particularly affected by unemployment and looked to 
the Community for help in tackling the Mezzogiorno question in particular 
(see Varsori 2004: 67). Furthermore, the imminent enlargement of the EC to 
include Ireland and the United Kingdom, two countries affected by industrial 
decline, drew the attention of European leaders to social policy and the idea of 
cooperation in the vocational training field (Guasconi 2004: 58; Varsori 
2004: 67). The student revolts of 1968 also forcefully highlighted the 
HPHUJHQFHRIQHZVRFLDOIRUFHVDQGEURXJKWSROLWLFLDQV¶DWWHQWLRQWRWKH
educational systems throughout Western Europe (Guasconi 2004: 57; Varsori 
2004: 66; Wollschläger 2000: 6). In terms of major EC events, Guasconi 
(2004: 57) identifies the 1969 The Hague summit and the Werner Plan, which 
included references to the need for social partner dialogue in order to create a 
monetary union, as turning points in the development of social policy. 
Guasconi (2004) and Varsori (2004) argue that, at the time of the 1972 Paris 
summit, social policy had become a goal in its own right.  
In the early days of European cooperation, social dialogue, i.e. 
consultation between the European institutions and the social partners, was 
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carried out in advisory committees. According to Guasconi (2004: 56), this was 
in part due to divisions and political differences within the trade union 
movement.15 The opportunities for trade union influence improved 
significantly in 1973 when the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
was established. The formation of ETUC united the fragmented trade union 
PRYHPHQWDQGHQVXUHGD³UROHDVDVRFLDOLQWHUORFXWRULQWKHH\HVRIWKH
(XURSHDQLQVWLWXWLRQV´*XDVFRQL 58). I argue that the active, strong and 
influential trade union movement was crucial for the establishment of Cedefop 
as vocational training was often the interest and responsibility of trade unions 
(see Varsori 2004: 66; Wollschläger 2000: 6). 
The EESC serves as a channel for trade union influence on European 
policy, and scholars interested in the development of European social policy, 
including vocational training, have claimed that this committee was 
instrumental in the early development of social policy (Guasconi 2004: 55; 
Varsori 2004: 65, Dundovich 2004). This was also confirmed in my interviews 
of people with long experience from Cedefop. According to Varsori 
(2004: 67), Germozzi, an Italian member of the EESC, made the suggestion in 
1969 that the EESC was to engage itself in the issue of vocational training, and 
in early 1970 the issue was discussed in the E(6&¶V6RFLDO$IIDLUV6HFWLRQ$W
this meeting, a study group, chaired by Germozzi, was set up to look into 
vocational training in Europe and its work was presented in the form of a report 
                                                 
15
 Guasconi (2004: DOVRDWWULEXWHVWKLVWRHPSOR\HUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV³UHODWLYHODFNRI
LQWHUHVW´IRUWUDGHXQLRQFRRSHUDWLRQDQGZKDWVKHGHVFULEHVDV³WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHVLUHWR
UHWDLQFRQWURORIWKHVWLOOHPEU\RQLFGHYHORSPHQWRIVRFLDOSROLF\´ 
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signed by Maria Weber (Dundovich 2004: 46). This report suggested the 
establishment of a vocational training centre.16 
 In the period from November 1970 to July 1971, Council initiatives 
were taken to step up cooperation in vocational training. For instance the 
Commission was asked to draft policy and the issue of vocational training was 
discussed in the Standing Committee on Employment (Varsori 2004: 67). At 
this meeting, Maria Weber, vice-President of Deutscher Gewerkschaftbund and 
member of the EESC, stated that 
the organisation has long hoped to see the creation of a European Institute that might 
promote research in the domain of training and establish the framework for fruitful 
collaboration among national institutions. It should be possible to finance the creation 
of such an institute out of the Community budget (quoted in Varsori 2004: 67 from 
BAC 64/84, 970, Standing Committee on Employment ± Draft minutes of the second 
meeting of the standing Committee on employment ± Brussels, 27 May 1971). 
 
At this time, the Commission still did not have the creation of a vocational 
training agency as an objective, and, as will be discussed in the section on the 
Council, not all Member States were entirely convinced of its benefit (see 
Guasconi 2004: 59; Varsori 2004: $FFRUGLQJWR*XDVFRQL¶V 59) 
analysis, the change in attitude amongst Member State leaders  
was shaped by an explicit request from the European unions, which, in June 1972, 
SUHVHQWHGDPHPRUDQGXPIRUWKH6XPPLWFDOOLQJRQµWKH&RPmunity governments 
and institutions to give practical support to the creation of a European labour institute 
aimed to train and prepare union leaders for their task of representing workers in 
WHUPVRIWKH(XURSHDQGLPHQVLRQ¶.  
  
                                                 
16
 1RWHVIURPWKH((6&¶V6RFLDO$IIDLUV6HFWLRQPHHWLQJVKRZVWKDW:HEHUDOVRKHUHVSRNHRXW
in favour of the creation of a vocational training centre (Varsori 2004: 67). 
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My sources indicate that the importance of Maria Weber for the establishment 
and design of Cedefop cannot be underestimated. In 1969, the Bundesinstitut 
IĦU%HUXIVELOGXQJVIRUVFKXQJZDVVHWXSLQ*HUPDQ\DQG:HEHUZDVLQYROYHG
in this organisation (Wollschläger 2000: 10). Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that she would have been inspired by this organisation when drafting the report 
that suggested the creation of Cedefop. As Wollschläger (2000: 10) puts it, the 
SURSRVDOFOHDUO\KDG³ODµVLJQDWXUHGHO¶$OOHPDJQH¶´DQGLQWHUPVRI
organisation and tasks the agency bore clear similarities with the German 
vocational training centre.17 Indeed, an interviewee at Cedefop said that 
&HGHIRSFRXOGEHFDOOHG0DULD:HEHU¶V³FKLOG´ (Interview Cedefop Official 2). 
In summary, the economic and social climate in the late 1960s to mid-
1970s was such that advocates of common efforts in social policy more easily 
than previously could find an audience for their ideas. There was an emphasis 
on social dialogue, and the trade union movement, which was strong at the 
time, formed a European-level organisation.  
 
4.2.3 The proposal from the Commission 
The official proposal from the Commission to establish Cedefop was submitted 
to the Council in April 1974. In the proposal, the Commission (1974: 18) stated 
WKDW³>W@KHJHQHUDOREMHFWLYHRIWKH&HQWUHVKDll be the promotion and 
development of vocational training and continuous training at Community 
OHYHO´7KHLGHDZDVWKDW&HGHIRSZRXOG³HQFRXUDJHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRID
                                                 
17
 Similar centres were set up also in France, Austria and Italy at about the same time 
(Wollschläger 2000: 7) 
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FRQFHUWHGDSSURDFKWRSUREOHPVRIFRPPRQLQWHUHVW´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
1974: 18). 
 The proposed tasks of the agency focused on activities related to the 
collection and dissemination of information. In particular, the Commission 
emphasised networking and cooperation with organisations concerned with 
vocational training. It was suggested that WKHDJHQF\ZDVWR³FROODERUDWHDV
FORVHO\DVSRVVLEOH´ZLWKVSHFLDOLVHGERGLHVSXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVDQG³WKH
RUJDQL]DWLRQVRIZRUNHUVDQGHPSOR\HUV´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ 18). 
Although vocational training is not a technical field in the traditional sense of 
the word, the Commission (1974: 17) DUJXHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VWDVNVLQ
SDUWLFXODU³WKHVHDUFKIRUDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHQHZSROLF\JXLGHOLQHVIRU
YRFDWLRQDOWUDLQLQJ´ZHUHRID³VSHFLDOL]HGDQGWHFKQLFDOQDWXUH´DQGUHTXLUHG
³WKHHVWDEOLVKPent of a body distinct from the departments of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ´7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQWKRXJKWWKDWWKHUHZDVVRPH
need for the pooling of expertise, which would support the rational choice 
institutionalist hypothesis that agencies are created to gather technical 
expertise. However, the emphasis on networking with other specialised bodies 
equally suggests an acknowledgement of the fact that the agency was not likely 
to be the centre of expertise in the field, at the least not in the short term.  
Regarding the management of the agency, the Commission (1974: 18) 
proposed a Board consisting of fifteen members appointed by the Commission. 
)LYHRIWKHVHZHUHWREH³GHVLJQDWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ´ILYHZHUHWREH
VXJJHVWHGE\ZRUNHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGIive were to be suggested by 
HPSOR\HUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV7KHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHVRFLDOSDUWQHUVZDVDUHVSRQVH
to a concern that the implementation of a common policy on vocational 
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training would give rise to yet more complex issues (see European 
Commission 1974: 17). Board members would serve for a period of three 
years, which could be renewed. It was suggested that the Board, in 
collaboration with the Commission, would decide on financial and staff 
regulation. The Commission further proposed that the Board would appoint the 
Director and the members of an Experts Committee, the role of which would 
be to answer questions related to agency activities, including the appointment 
of the Director (European Commission 1974: ,QWHUPVRIWKHDJHQF\¶V
work programme, it was proposed that the Board would draw it up but that 
VXJJHVWLRQVPDGHE\WKH((6&DQG³SULRULW\QHHGV´LQGLFDWHGE\WKH
Community institutions were to be taken into account. According to Varsori 
(2004: 68), some Commission officials were very cautious when it came to the 
level of independence of the agency, and thought that the agency ought to be a 
³VDWHOOLWH´RIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ18 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVHGPDQDJHPHQW
arrangements clearly indicate that, rather than seeking to insulate vocational 
training from political pressures, wide consultation was deemed necessary. 
This weakens the rational choice institutionalist hypothesis that the agency was 
created to secure credible commitment. 
The Commission proposed that the agency was to be financed by a 
subsidy from the EC budget, and that the budget was to be checked by the EC 
Audit Board (Commission 1974: 20). The Commission also proposed that the 
Board ought to forward annually the accounts to the Commission, which ought 
to forward the accounts together with the report of the Audit Board to the 
Council and the Parliament.   
                                                 
18
 Varsori makes a reference to BAC 64/84, 1001, Note for the attention of Mr Shanks by G . 
Schuster, 18.2.1974. 
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4.2.4 The European Parliament 
The EP was consulted in January 1974. The Committee on Social Affairs and 
Employment was assigned the role of committee responsible, and Ferruccio 
Pisoni, a Christian Democrat, had the role of rapporteur. The report was 
debated and adopted in September 1974.19 
 A widely held view within the EP was that Community efforts within 
the field of vocational training to date had been disappointing and characterised 
by a lack of activity (see European Parliament 1974a: 20; European Parliament 
1974b: 10; European Parliament 1974c). The rapporteur and most of the 
speakers in the EP debates indicated that the establishment of Cedefop, as a 
potential remedy to this problem, was worthy of support. The Communist and 
$OOLHVJURXSGLVDJUHHGRQWKHJURXQGVWKDW³GRXEWVDQGREVFXULWLHVVXEVLVWRQ
WKHFRQFHSWLRQDQGFRQWHQWRIYRFDWLRQDOWUDLQLQJDWWKH(XURSHDQOHYHO´
(European Parliament 1974c: 20). These reservations aside, the EP viewed 
harmonisation of vocational training standards as beneficial, and indicated that 
these ideas were already accepted at Community level as a means to the end of 
³IXOODQGEHWWHUHPSOR\PHQW´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWE 10). Overall, the 
documents and debates from the EP strongly suggest that the establishment of 
Cedefop cannot be seen in isolation but must be viewed as part of an ongoing 
strategy to harmonise vocational training policy. Thus, we can conclude that 
the historical context and a convergence of ideas around certain ideals are 
HVVHQWLDOIRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH(3¶VYLHZVRQHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKLV
agency.  
                                                 
19
 Three suggested amendments to the report were also debated. Two of them were approved.  
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 To pursue the general objectives discussed above, the EP argued that 
the harmonisation of standards ought to be a crucial task of Cedefop. 
Interestingly, the EP wanted to grant the agency more political influence than 
what the Commission did. In the EP report it was suggested that Cedefop 
VKRXOGVXEPLW³SUDFWLFDOSURSRVDOVWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ´DQGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶V
suggestions could be immediately translated into formal proposals from the 
Commission (European Parliament 1974b: 11). 
 The question of how the agency was to be managed was a source of 
disagreement between the EP and the Commission and within the EP itself. 
Whereas the Commission wanted free hands in suggesting its Board 
representatives, the EP suggested that two of the Commission representatives 
RQWKHDJHQF\%RDUGPXVWEH³TXDOLILHGHGXFDWLRQDOLVWV´DQGRQHPXVWEHD
³GHOHJDWHIURPWKH(XURSHDQ<RXWK)RUXP´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW 
1974a: 22).20 The inclusion of the social partners in the governance of the 
agency through representation on the Board was widely regarded as positive. 
The Communist and Allies Group went as far as to table an amendment 
suggesting that the workers and trade unions ought to make up the majority on 
WKHDJHQF\¶VERDUG(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWH7KLVZDVUHMHFWHG,Q
DGGLWLRQWKH(3SURSRVHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶V([SHUWV&RPPLWWHHEHGRXEOHG
The EP Committee on Budgets, however, disagreed as it thought the 
effectiveness of the committee would be hampered if this suggestion was put 
into practice (European Parliament 1974b: 22). The EP discussions of the 
DJHQF\¶VJRYHUQDQFH demonstrate the prevalence of the idea of the benefit of 
social dialogue, which, arguably, was a product of its time.  
                                                 
20
 7KLVLGHDZDVQRWSDUWRI3LVRQL¶VRULJLQDOUHSRUW,WZDVDGGHGDVDPHQGPHQWIROORZLQJWKH
EP debates.  
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As regards the budget and financial arrangements of the agency, the EP 
was dissatisfied with the proposed budget, which was regarded as too small. 
The EP Committee on Budgets, however, was pleased with the level of 
budgetary conWURODQGDUJXHGWKDWWKH(3ZRXOGKDYH³IXOOFRQWURORYHU
EXGJHWDU\PDQDJHPHQW´European Parliament 1974b: 23; see EP Debates 25 
September, 1974). 
 
4.2.5 The Council 
In January 1974, the Council approved a social action programme, a goal of 
which was to achieve ³DSSUR[LPDWLRQRIWUDLQLQJVWDQGDUGV´ (European 
Commission 1974: 17).  Another prioritised objective was the establishment of 
DYRFDWLRQDOWUDLQLQJDJHQF\DQGWKH&RXQFLODUJXHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\³LV
necessary for the effective implementation of [the common vocational training] 
SROLF\´&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQ1RUHFLWDOV 
 With regards to the tasks of the agency, there are no major differences 
EHWZHHQWKH&RXQFLO¶VYLHZDVH[SUHVVHGLQWKHIRXQGLQJOHJLVODWLRQDQGWKH
proposal from the Commission. However, Guasconi (2004: 60) implies that it 
was not easy for the Member State governments to agree on the functions of 
WKHDJHQF\DQGVKHFODLPVWKDW³WKH8.GHOHJDWLRQH[SUHVVHGVWURQJ
UHVHUYDWLRQVDERXWWKHFUHDWLRQRI&HGHIRS´GXULQJDPHHWLQJRI WKH&RXQFLO¶V
social group. Indeed, according to Varsori (2004: 68), the UK delegation was 
even prepared to veto the legislation had it not been made clear that Cedefop 
was to be an assistant body and not a policy-maker in its own right. This view 
that Cedefop was to be an advisory agency appears to have become the 
dominant one. Varsori (2004: ZULWHVWKDW³>W@KH&RXQFLO¶VLQWHQWLRQZDV
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FHUWDLQO\QRWWRSURPRWHWKHFUHDWLRQRIDERG\PDNLQJSROLF\FKRLFHV´
Cedefop was to support choices made by the Council and the Commission.  
 As to the governance structure, the Council legislated in favour of a 
larger Board than the Commission suggested, deciding that the Board should 
be composed of thirty members.21 This can be attributed to the fact that the 
German delegation, which was hostile to the idea that the social partners would 
EHLQPDMRULW\³H[HUWHGSUHVVXUH´RQWKHRWKHUGHOHJDWLRQVWRFKDQJHWKH%RDUG
structure so as to ensure a majority vote for governments (Guasconi 2004: 60). 
There is reason to believe that the other states were relatively easily persuaded. 
According to Varsori (2004: ³PRVW0HPEHU6WDWHVZHUHNHHQWROLPLWWKH
powers of the Commission, placing the emphasis on the predominantly 
LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOQDWXUHRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ´,Qconnection to the change 
of Board structure, the Committee of Experts, which was a source of conflict 
between the Commission and the EP, was removed (Varsori 2004: 69).  
 7KH&RXQFLOODUJHO\IROORZHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDODERXWWKH
DJHQF\¶VILQDQFLDODrrangements. It was decided that the agency was to be 
financed by a subsidy, and that budgetary discharge was to be given to the 
Board by the Council and the EP (Council Regulation No 337/75, articles 11-
12). 
 
4.2.6 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee 
The EESC was consulted by the Council in April 1974, and finalised its 
opinion in July the same year. Mrs Weber, whose influence has already been 
                                                 
21
 Three members from the Commission and then nine from each of the following groups: 
HPSOR\HUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVHPSOR\HHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQG0HPEHU6WDWHV,QODWHUUHYLVLRQVWKH
size of the Board has been increased to accommodate for the inclusion of more Member States. 
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highlighted, served as rapporteur. The opinion was adopted by 60 votes to 37 
(6 abstentions).  
 The EESC (1974: 42) claimed to welcome the proposal to establish 
&HGHIRS³ZLWKSDUWLFXODUDSSURYDO´DQGSRLQWHGRXWWKDWLWKDGSUHVVHGIRUWKH
creation of this type of agency for about fourteen years. The main reason why 
the EESC (1974: 42) wanted to see the establishment of Cedefop was a belief 
WKDW³RQO\DFHQWUDOLQVWLWXWHRIWKLVVRUW´ZRXOGEHDEOHWRDVVHPEOHWKH
LQIRUPDWLRQUHTXLUHGWRHQDEOHUHOHYDQWERGLHV³to draw the right conclusions 
and take the proper policy decisions with a view to the practical harmonization 
of education and training systems for young people and adults´. The indication 
of the influence of the trade union movement can be seen in that the EESC 
SRLQWHGVSHFLILFDOO\WRWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQLPSURYLQJZRUNHUV¶FRQGLWLRQV 
 As a first task for the agency the EESC suggested making an inventory 
of vocational training research. Other important tasks for the agency, according 
to the EESC, would be the standardisation of terminology and statistics as well 
as the coordination of research regarding the comparison of different national 
systems. The EESC was clearly focused on harmonisation. Arguably, this 
provides some support for the rational choice institutionalist hypothesis that the 
agency was created to increase efficiency in policy-making. 
The EESC (1974: 45) wished to see a Board composed of four 
PHPEHUVIURPHDFKRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQHPSOR\HUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVHPSOR\HHV¶
RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGIRXUPHPEHUV³UHSUHVHQWLQJYDULRXVDFWLYLWLHV´VXSSRVHGO\
with connection to the vocational training field. Great emphasis was given to 
the involvement of the social partners and other actors associated with 
vocational training. For instance, the EESC (1974: 45) held the view that the 
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Commission representatives need not necessarily be Commission officials 
ZRUNLQJLQUHOHYDQWILHOGVEXWFRXOGEH³OHDGLQJLQGHSHQGHQWILJXUHVLQWKH
HGXFDWLRQDQGYRFDWLRQDOWUDLQLQJZRUOG´7KH((6&WKRXJKWWKDWWKH%RDUG
ought to appoint its own Chair, rather than having the Commission do it, as the 
Commission proposed. At the same time, the EESC was of the opinion that the 
DJHQF\¶V%RDUGRXJKWWRXSGDWHWKH&RPPLVVLRQUHJXODUO\ZLWKLWVDFWLYLWLHV
and that priority needs indicated by Community institutions and bodies ought 
WREHLQFOXGHGLQWKHDJHQF\¶VSURJUDPPHRIZRUk. 
The EESC did not comment in detail on the financial arrangements. 
However, the committee issued a few words of caution, arguing that decisions 
WRHVWDEOLVK³QHZ&RPPXQLW\DJHQFLHVZLWKWKHLURZQVWDIIVDQGEXGJHWVDUH
QRWWREHWDNHQOLJKWO\´DQGWKDWagency establishment must be subjected to 
cost-effectiveness analysis (European Economic and Social Committee 
1974: 42). This shows that the EESC was concerned about efficiency. 
  
4.2.7 ǯǣ social dialogue, successful 
initiatives and a focus on control 
One cannot analyse the role of Cedefop in European governance without 
commenting on the status of the social dialogue. The documentary research and 
interviews with officials at Cedefop clearly show that, at the time of the 
DJHQF\¶VHVWDblishment, trade unions were confident, the social dialogue was 
active and there was faith that this would continue to be the case. Maria Weber 
VDZWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&HGHIRSDVD³FRPPLWPHQWRIWKH(XURSHDQXQLRQV
towards promoting a Community social diDORJXH´DQGDUJXHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\
had been established as a result of the hard work of trade union representatives 
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in various advisory committees (Guasconi 2004: 61). That Cedefop was 
created to serve as a forum for social dialogue was confirmed by officials at the 
Commission and Cedefop (Interview Commission Official 2, Interview 
Cedefop Official 4). 
 From interviews with officials at Cedefop it became clear that the social 
dialogue is not as active as it used to be. In particular, the influence of the 
social partners is not as strong as it once was. An important reason for this, 
according to an official with extensive experience from Cedefop, was the 
EUHDFKRIDJHQWOHPHQ¶VDJUHHPHQWFRQFHUQLQJWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIWKH'LUHFWRU
(Interview Cedefop Official 1). Although the Commission has always been in 
charge of the appointment of Director, tradition had it that the appointed person 
was close to the social partners. According to Cedefop Official 1, in the 1990s 
the Commission began to want more influence, and, as a consequence, in 2004 
the Commission invited candidates who had not been recommended by the 
social partners for the post of Director. This, Cedefop Official 1 argued, was 
the end of social partner influence over recruitment. Another interviewee with 
long experience from Cedefop confirmed that the appointment of Director is 
politicised, and that the change of directors has a significant impact on the 
functioning of the agency (Interview Cedefop Official 2). 
 There are, however, other factors that can explain limited social partner 
cooperation. For instance, sometimes the social partners have other priorities 
than cooperation with Cedefop (Interview Cedefop Official 2). The same 
interviewee also raised language issues as a hindrance for social partner 
involvement. To an extent this is due to the use of technical language that is not 
easily accessible for social partner representatives who may not have the same 
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level of education as the Cedefop officials. Another issue is the increased use 
of English in communication, which the interviewee implied leads to the 
exclusion of non-English speakers and gives some representatives, in particular 
the British, a comparative advantage. 
 Cedefop is an advisory agency and it does not have a mandate to make 
decisions binding for individuals. Having said that, an official at the 
Commission stated that more and more work done by Cedefop is taken up by 
the Commission (Interview Commission Official 2). The European CV and the 
European credit system in VET are important CedeIRS³SURGXFWV´WKDWDUHQRZ
well spread (see Interview Cedefop Official 5). Clearly, Cedefop has proved to 
be in a good position to engage in what some academic writers have referred to 
DV³QRUPGLIIXVLRQ´see Acharya 2004; Manners 2006). When talking to 
Cedefop employees, however, one could tell that there was a feeling that the 
agency perhaps is not as visible as it ought to be; that its work is often taken up 
by the Commission although the agency does not always receive what agency 
personnel would regard as due credit (see in particular Interview Cedefop 
Official 7).22 Cedefop reports are produced on the basis of information received 
WKURXJKWKHDJHQF\¶VFRQVWDQWO\DFWLYHReferNet network (Interview Cedefop 
Official 3). 
 Although several of interviewees described the relationship between the 
Commission and Cedefop as good or improving, it is apparent that there are 
VRPHWHQVLRQV$VSUHYLRXVO\PHQWLRQHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVWURQJLQIOXHQFH
over the appointment of Director was a somewhat sensitive spot for some of 
the interviewees. Some interviewees also drew attention to the differences in 
                                                 
22
 Interviews carried out in March and April 2008. 
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economic resources between the two organisations. For instance, as the 
Commission is able to offer higher salaries, available outside experts are more 
likely to offer their services to the Commission rather than to Cedefop. This 
indicates that EU decision-makers are not committed to making Cedefop an 
agency where all top expertise is gathered. At the same time, it appears that the 
two organisations now cooperate more closely as a result of the Copenhagen 
SURFHVV¶VEULQJLQJWKHLUDJHQGDVFORVHUWRJHWKHU,QWHUYLHZ&RPPLVVLRQ
Official 2). 
The issue of control is central to the relationship between Cedefop and 
the EP. It must be remembered that the EP itself has been, and still is to an 
extent, struggling to assume a more prominent position within the Community. 
Varsori (2004: 70-71) argues that the EP had some concerns about the amount 
of control it would be able to exercise over Cedefop once the agency was 
created. As a result, Varsori (2004: 71) argues, Cedefop made attempts at 
cultivating good links with the EP over the coming years. The most important 
way in which the EP can control the agency is through its control of the 
&RPPXQLW\¶VEXGJHWIURPZKLFK&HGHIRSUHFHLYHVQHDUO\ all its revenue. A 
IHZLQWHUYLHZHHVDW&HGHIRSVWDWHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVDUHQRW
adequate, and some implied that the EP has a lot to do with this. Commission 
2IILFLDOFRQILUPHGWKDWWKH(3KDVXVHGLWVSRZHUWRSXWVRPHRIWKHDJHQF\¶s 
budget in reserve. This appears to be a hindrance for the agency. Another 
budget related issue, brought to my attention by an official at Cedefop, 
concerns the fact that the budget functions according to a cameralistic 
principle, which means that it is difficult to carry money over from one year to 
WKHQH[W,QWHUYLHZ&HGHIRS2IILFLDO$VWKHDJHQF\¶VSURMHFWVDUHQRW
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cameralistic, it is at times difficult to implement the budget. It has happened 
that the agency has not spent the entire budget at the same time as the agency 
has asked for more money the year after. The EP has reacted by asking why the 
agency asks for more money when it does not spend what it already has. As 
UHJDUGVWKH(3¶YLHZRQDJHQFLHVLQJHQHUDORQHLQWHUYLHZHHVDLGWKDWWKH(3
complains about agencies but then it says yes to the establishment of new ones 
anyway (Interview Cedefop Official 2).  
 Interviewees at Cedefop emphasised the importance of the relationship 
between Cedefop and Member States, which was generally described as good. 
Needless to say, though, there are differences between states. There also 
DSSHDUHGWREHDQLVVXHZLWK0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ZDQWLQJWRSURWHFWWKHLUQDWLRQDO
authorities, which at times leads to their not sending the top people as seconded 
experts to Cedefop. This also shows that Member States are hesitant towards 
making Cedefop a centre of expertise in the way foreseen by rational choice 
institutionalist theory.   
 Returning to the issue of control, we can note that numerous control 
mechanisms are imposed on the agency, and transparency has become 
increasingly important. The goals of the agency are specified in official work 
programmes, and procedures for budgetary discharge are outlined in the 
founding legislation. Moreover, the agency is required to follow very similar 
procedures to those of the larger EU institutions on issues such as procurement. 
Interviews with staff at Cedefop made it clear that it is no secret that these rules 
are sometimes problematic for the agency. Interviewees openly stated that this 
bureaucracy is burdensome (Interview Cedefop Official 5; Interview Cedefop 
Official 1). One interviewee pointed to the trade off between efficiency in 
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control and the efficiency to get things done (Interview Cedefop Official 1). 
However, another interviewee saw no real way around it and said that the 
control is necessary (Interview Cedefop Official 2). 
 It is reasonable to assume that the increased focus on transparency and 
control can be related to a very bad audit report a few years back (Phone 
Interview Cedefop Official 8; Interview Cedefop Official 1). The report is not a 
confidential document, and interviewees did not object to speaking about it. 
However, some interviewees were reluctant to have their comments recorded 
or requested to speak off the record. Since these irregularities were discovered, 
things have changed. For instance, following her appointment in 2005, the 
current Director, Aviana Bulgarelli, made a conscious decision to strengthen 
WKHDJHQF\¶VLQWHUQDODXGLWV\VWHPInterviews Cedefop Official 5, Cedefop 
Official 6). In addition, an interviewee mentioned that the recruitment 
procedures have become more professional over time (Interview Cedefop 
Official 2). 
 
4.3 Discussion 
As Cedefop was the first Community Agency to be created, its establishment in 
1975 marks the beginning of the agencification of Europe. The agency was 
created at a time of intense trade union activity. The inclusion of the social 
SDUWQHUVRQWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGLVDGHILQLQJIHDWXUHZKLFK&HGHIRSVKDUHV
with EUROFOUND and EU-OSHA. Although the agency is advisory, there is 
evidence that products of its work have become widespread, the European CV 
being one example. In this chapter, I have traced the process leading up to the 
establishment of Cedefop and reflected on the DJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFH
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today. In the following sections, I will discuss the findings in relation to the 
theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2. 
 
4.3.1 Rational choice institutionalist theory 
From rational choice institutionalist theory the hypotheses were derived that 
Cedefop was created in order to lower transaction costs by becoming a centre 
of expertise, and/or by ensuring credible commitment, and/or by increasing 
efficiency (see Pollack 2001; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002).  
 Considering first the hypothesis that Cedefop was established to gather 
expertise, I conclude that there is not much evidence in favour of this idea. The 
agency operates in a policy field where there is very limited undisputed 
science. The fact that Member States have such different arrangements for 
vocational training is a testament to that. No doubt, Cedefop officials have 
considerable knowledge, and at the time of the establishment of the agency, the 
Commission argued that the specialised nature of the tasks required a body 
separate from the Commission (European Commission 1974: 17). However, 
my research has revealed that decision-makers have not been willing to grant 
the agency the conditions necessary to become a centre of expertise in the 
sense presumed by rational choice institutionalist theory. For instance, the 
agency cannot compete with the Commission in terms of salaries, which means 
that top experts may be more likely to offer their services to the Commission 
instead. Furthermore, there appears to be an element of competition between 
Member State authorities and Cedefop; arguably in order to protect their own 
status, Member State authorities may be reluctant to send their top experts as 
seconded experts to Cedefop. It must also be noted that Cedefop to a 
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significant extent is dependent on information provided by other authorities 
through the ReferNet network. 
 The usual interpretation of the credible commitment argument is that 
delegation takes place in order to uphold commitment of all actors involved to 
a particular policy or decision. Given that there was no single agreed common 
policy on vocational training in 1975, Cedefop cannot have been established to 
ensure commitment to a particular policy. Moreover, the agency lacks 
regulatory and arbitration tasks. However, I argue that the credible 
commitment cannot be completely disregarded, and with a somewhat modified 
interpretation it can contribute to our understanding of Cedefop establishment. 
My research has shown that Cedefop can be seen as part of a series of 
initiatives in the social policy field, and that some actors were disappointed 
with the previous lack of activity in the field. Furthermore, the trade union 
movement was a strong driving force. There is evidence that the influential 
trade unionist Maria Weber saw the establishment of Cedefop as a commitment 
to social dialogue. Thus, the establishment of this agency can be seen as a 
commitment to engagement of some sort in the social policy field and to a 
particular form of governance, in this case the involvement of the social 
partners. This said, with the benefit of hindsight we can see that the 
commitment to social dialogue was not that strong as it has not been 
completely honoured. Interviewees at Cedefop stated that the influence of the 
social partners has GHFOLQHGWKHEUHDFKRIWKHJHQWOHPHQ¶VDJUHHPHQW
concerning the appointment of Director being a tangible example.  
 A key predicted role for Cedefop was to contribute to the harmonisation 
of standards in vocational training. Whilst an argument can be made that 
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harmonised standards could increase the efficiency of the common market by 
facilitating movement of labour, it is noteworthy that my research does not 
provide any evidence that an efficiency concern was a major factor behind the 
decision to establish an agency. When outlining their rationales for the creation 
of Cedefop, decision-makers did not emphasise efficiency. However, budget 
related queries tended to focus on cost effectiveness, which indicates that there 
may have been some concern about efficiency even though it was not a major 
factor. 
 
4.3.2 Sociological institutionalist theory 
Sociological institutionalist theory would predict that Cedefop was created as a 
result of institutional borrowing, which occurs when the ideas of decision-
makers have converged around the notion that a particular institutional form is 
desirable. The emphasis of this theory makes it very helpful in explaining the 
choice of a body separate from the central institutions.  
 As will be discussed in more detail in the next section on historical 
institutionalism, the political climate in the 1970s was conducive to the 
establishment of an agency in the social policy field. My research has pointed 
to the strength of the trade union movement, and showed that there was a 
widespread idea that social partner involvement in social policy was desirable 
and legitimate. Indeed, all institutions and the advisory body EESC were 
positive to the involvement of the social partners in the management of the 
agency. This was confirmed by interviewees with long experience from 
Cedefop, who emphasised the importance attributed to the social dialogue. In 
addition, social dialogue was emphasised at the Hague Summit, and within the 
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Werner Plan, clearly showing that this idea was widely approved. Thus, I argue 
that there is convincing evidence for stating that sociological institutionalist 
theory holds significant explanatory value for the management aspect of 
Cedefop establishment. Moreover, documents and debates from the EP point to 
a widespread idea of the benefit of harmonisation in the vocational training 
field.  
There is also hard evidence in favour of institutional borrowing being at 
work. In the years preceding Cedefop establishment, a number of European 
countries established vocational training institutes, and especially the German 
%XQGHVLQVWLWXWIĦU%HUXIVELOGXQJVIRUVFKXQJ came to serve as a model for 
Cedefop  (Wollschläger 2000: 7). When Cedefop was set up it came to be 
similar to the German institute in terms of functions and organisation (see 
Wollschläger 2000). A crucial reason for this was that there was a personal 
linkage between the two organisations; Maria Weber, whose influence on 
Cedefop establishment was strongly emphasised by agency staff, was involved 
also in the creation of the German institute.  
 
4.3.3 Historical institutionalism 
From historical institutionalism I deduced the hypothesis that explanations for 
the establishment of Cedefop must be sought in the particular historical context 
in which it was established. This includes looking to specific events serving as 
critical junctures leading development down a particular path. I argue that this 
hypothesis holds true in the case of Cedefop, and that an understanding of the 
political and economic climate of the time is essential for explaining the 
establishment of the agency.  
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 The period around the establishment of this agency was marked by 
economic crisis and rising unemployment, which pressured political leaders to 
seek new solutions to social issues, such as unemployment (see Varsori 
2004: 57-58). Moreover, the student revolts of 1968 signalled the emergence of 
new social forces and drew attention to the systems of education found in 
Western Europe (Guasconi 2004: 57; Varsori 2004: 66; Wollschläger 2000: 6). 
This climate led to strong and active trade unions throughout Europe. Trade 
union representatives were present in the consultative EESC, and, as previously 
mentioned, their involvement was actively encouraged at the Hague Summit 
and in the Werner Plan. The ability of the trade union movement to influence 
European policy formation was further strengthened by the formation of 
ETUC, which unified the movement and is to be seen as a critical juncture for 
trade union influence on European level politics. In agreement with Guasconi 
(2004), I argue that the fact that trade unions were influential, which was also 
confirmed in interviews with Cedefop staff, was crucial for the establishment 
of Cedefop, as vocational training tended to be an important interest and 
responsibility of trade unions. Documentary research and interviews with 
experienced Cedefop staff pointed specifically to the influence of one 
individual from the trade union ranks, Maria Weber. She strongly advocated 
the establishment of such a centre, for instance in an EESC report, and she 
drafted the EESC report on the Commission proposal.  
 Another critical event that played an important role for the 
establishment of Cedefop was the imminent enlargement to the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. These two countries were affected by industrial decline, 
and, as this is often linked to increased need for vocational training, the 
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inclusion of these two countries played a part in raising the profile of the issue 
of cooperation in the field of vocational training. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This case study has shown that hypotheses derived from the three new 
institutionalist strands need not be mutually exclusive. In the case of Cedefop, 
sociological institutionalism has proved useful to explain the choice to 
establish a vocational training centre separate from the central institutions. This 
had already been done in a few European countries. The creation of the 
German vocational training institute played a particular role as the driving 
EESC figure, Maria Weber, was involved in the establishment of this body as 
well as Cedefop. Sociological institutionalism can also help us explain the 
management aspect of Cedefop. I have argued that the inclusion of the social 
partners in management was legitimised by the fact that the Werner Plan as 
well as the Hague summit had already endorsed the notion of an active social 
dialogue. Historical institutionalism can explain the timing of the establishment 
of the agency. My research has pointed to the importance of the political 
climate at the time. Enlargement and the formation of ETUC were important 
events, which served to increase the focus on vocational training and trade 
union influence. 
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Tracing the establishment of the European 
Medicines Agency (EMEA) 
5.1 Introduction 
In 1993, the Council legislated on authorisation and supervision procedures for 
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and on the establishment of a 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) (Council 
Regulation No 2309/93). In connection to a change of legislation in 2004, the 
name of the agency was shortened to the European Medicines Agency although 
the abbreviation EMEA was kept. As EMEA was the first Community Agency 
to be given a regulatory role, its establishment represents a significant change 
to the governance structures of the EU. EMEA is a de facto regulatory agency, 
which means that although the agency does not have the formal right to make 
decisions, the Commission nearly always follows agency opinion. Its extensive 
influence over which medicinal products will become available on the common 
market makes EMEA one of the most powerful agencies. Decisions made by 
WKHDJHQF\KDYHDQLPSDFWRQ(XURSH¶VODUJHDQGILQDQFLDOO\LPSRUWDQW
pharmaceutical industry, as well as any EU resident who may be in need of the 
products evaluated by the agency.  
 In this chapter, I will trace and analyse the establishment of EMEA 
with focus on the aspects central to agency establishment identified in chapter 
2, (i.e. timing of establishment, tasks, governance structures and financial 
DUUDQJHPHQWVDQGUHIOHFWRQWKHDJHQF\¶s role in governance today.  
 Rational choice institutionalist theory would suggest that the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWRI(0($FDQEHH[SODLQHGE\SROLWLFLDQV¶ZLVKWRORZHUSROLWLFDO
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transaction costs by the gathering of technical expertise, by ensuring of 
credible commitment, and by increasing efficiency (see Epstein and 
2¶+DOORUDQ3ROODFN,QWKLVFKDSWHU,DUJXHWKDWDOWKRXJK(0($
works in a highly technical field, the gathering of technical expertise was not 
the primary motive behind EMEA creation. The actual technical evaluations of 
medicines are carried out by national authorities, which report to EMEA. 
Moreover, to a significant extent, expertise had already been gathered in expert 
committees established before EMEA, and the agency was built on these 
existing structures. The hypothesis derived from rational choice 
institutionalism to find the most support throughout my research on EMEA is 
the credible commitment hypothesis; throughout the establishment process, 
there are numerous references to the importance of ensuring commitment to 
common standards. Moreover, arbitration tasks have been delegated to the 
agency. Efficiency concerns also hold significant explanatory value; in 
particular, there are several references to how harmonisation could be 
beneficial to the pharmaceutical industry.  
Sociological institutionalism emphasises the convergence of ideas and 
norms, and argues that delegation takes place when there is an ideological 
consensus, or near consensus, that delegation to an agency is the best way of 
organising public management (see McNamara 2002). This theory also 
emphasises institutional borrowing. In the case of EMEA, there is evidence to 
suggest that the existence of agencies in similar policy areas at national level 
served to legitimise the establishment of an agency at the European level. 
However, I have found no evidence to suggest that EMEA was modelled on 
another institution. In important respects, the structure of EMEA is different to 
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the previously established Community Agencies Cedefop and EUROFOUND, 
which could have served as models. Furthermore, my research shows that the 
US Food and Drugs Administration was rejected as a model.  
 Historical institutionalism regards the specific context in which 
institutions are created and develop to be very important (see Thelen 1999). 
This theory explains delegation through the analysis of critical junctures and 
path dependency. The study of documents related to the EMEA establishment 
process revealed that the harmonisation of marketing authorisation procedures 
for medicines has developed alongside the development of the single market. 
My research suggests that the actual completion of the internal market may 
explain the timing of EMEA establishment. However, to understand the wider 
process of harmonisation we must look further than the individual event of 
single market completion.  
 Thus, I argue that to fully understand EMEA establishment we must 
draw on the three strands of new institutionalist theory; the acceptance of one 
hypothesis does not mean that another must be refuted. The rational choice 
institutionalist credible commitment hypothesis is useful for explaining the 
DJHQF\¶VUHJXODWRU\DQGDUELWUDWLRQIXQFWLRQV7KHHIILFLHQF\K\SRWKHVLVLVDOVR
useful for explaining why particular functions were delegated. Sociological 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPH[SODLQVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQDJHQF\LQ(0($¶VSDUWLFXODU
policy area. Historical institutionalism is useful to explain the precise timing of 
agency establishment.   
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5.2 Background and the establishment process 
5.2.1 EMEA Ȃ A brief introduction 
In order to understand the role of EMEA it is necessary to have a basic 
understanding of the European authorisation procedures for medicines. To be 
sold on the EU market, medicinal products first need to be authorised, and this 
can be done in accordance with the following three procedures: the national 
procedure, the decentralised procedure and the centralised procedure.23 EMEA 
has important roles to play in the last two.  
 (0($¶VUROHLQWKHFHQWUDOLVHGSURFHGXUHLVWR evaluate medicinal 
products. The centralised procedure must be used for products produced by 
certain methods and for products that contain new active substances.24 
Companies can also choose to use the centralised procedure if they wish to 
have the medicine approved everywhere in the EU simultaneously with the 
same trade mark. In the centralised procedure, producers have to submit 
applications for authorisation directly to EMEA.  
 The decentralised procedure builds on the principle of mutual 
recognition, i.e. the idea that a medicine that is deemed to live up to the 
standards in one Member State ought to be considered safe in another. Here a 
company submits an application to the national authorities in one Member 
State, which will perform an evaluation of the product. In the event that the 
company would like to have the same product authorised in another country, a 
                                                 
23
 A market authorisation via the national procedure is only valid in the state where the 
application was filed. This procedure is used by pharmaceutical companies that only wish to 
sell its product in one Member State. The authorisation is granted by relevant national 
authorities.  
24
 For instance, products produced using biotechnology must be authorised via the centralised 
procedure. The types of products that need authorisation are listed in the annex to Regulation 
(EC) No 726/2004.   
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request is made to the relevant authorities in the second state to grant the 
DXWKRULVDWLRQEDVHGRQWKHHYDOXDWLRQGRQHLQWKHILUVWVWDWH(0($¶Vrole in 
this procedure is to serve as an arbiter when conflict occurs between national 
authorities.  
0XFKRIWKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNLVFRQFHQWUDWHGLQLWVVL[VFLHQWLILF
committees: the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use, the 
Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use, the Committee on 
Orphan Medicinal Products, the Committee on Herbal Medicinal Products, the 
Paediatric Committee and the Committee for Advanced Therapies. Each 
Member State appoints a member and an alternate to each committee after 
consultation with the EMEA Board. The committee members are to be 
DSSRLQWHGRQWKHJURXQGVRIUHOHYDQWH[SHULHQFHDQGH[SHUWLVHDQGWKH\³VKDOO
UHSUHVHQWWKHFRPSHWHQWQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHV´5HJXODWLRQDUWLFOH
This means, as confirmed by Commission Official 4, that EMEA does not have 
its own personnel to carry out evaluations of products. Whilst working on 
behalf of EMEA, the experts who evaluate the products are employed by 
national authorities, not by EMEA itself (Interview Commission Official 4).  
 Within its field of expertise, each committee is responsible for scientific 
evaluations of medicinal products that are to be authorised according to the 
centralised procedure. The opinion formed after such an evaluation forms the 
basis for a marketing authorisation to sell the product on the EU market. The 
final decisions about authorisation are taken by the Commission, however 
(Regulation 726/2004, article 10). If a marketing authorisation is granted, the 
product may be sold all over the Community (Regulation 726/2004, article 13). 
By contrast, if authorisation is not granted, the product may not be placed on 
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the EU market (Regulation 726/2004, article 3).25 Although the Commission 
has the final say on authorisation, EMEA clearly has significant influence over 
which medicinal products will become available within the EU. Thus, EMEA 
has de facto regulatory powers.  In addition to evaluating medicinal products, 
EMEA has obligations to provide scientific advice and to make information 
available about evaluated products, including reported adverse effects. 
 The Management Board of EMEA is composed of one representative 
per Member State, two representatives of the Commission and two 
representatives appointed by the European Parliament. In addition to this, there 
DUHWZRUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVIURPSDWLHQWV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVRQHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIURP
GRFWRUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGRQHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIURPYHWHULQDULDQV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQV
7KHVHVWDNHKROGHUV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDUHDSSRLQWHGE\WKH&RXQFLOLQ
consultation with the EP and on proposal from the Commission (Regulation No 
726/2004). Board members are appointed for a renewable three year term and 
³VKDOOEHDSSRLQWHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHLUUHOHYDQWH[SHUWLVHLQPDQDJHPHQWDQG
if appropriate, experience in the field of medicinal products for human and 
YHWHULQDU\XVH´5HJXODWLRQ1RDUWLFOH7KH%RDUGDSSRLQWVWKH
Director on proposal from the Commission, and is responsible for the adoption 
RIDQDQQXDOZRUNSURJUDPPHDQGDQDQQXDOUHSRUWRIWKHDJHQF\¶V activities. 
In June 2007, EMEA had about 440 employees, which makes it one of 
the largest Community Agencies (EMEA 2007). The budget for 2007 was 
¼ PLOOLRQ0RVWRIWKHUHYHQXHFDPHIURPVHUYLFHVUHQGHUHG¼ 106 
million) and the second largest source of income was the European 
&RPPXQLW\ZKLFKFRQWULEXWHVZLWKDVXEVLG\RI¼ 41 million. Other income 
                                                 
25
 Neither EMEA nor the Commission has the authority to decide on the pricing of products, 
(see Regulation 726/2004, article 1). 
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included third country contributions and income from administrative operations 
(EMEA 2006).  
 
5.2.2 Setting the context: successive harmonisation and building 
on existing structures 
EMEA undoubtedly plays a crucial role in the governance of medicinal 
products in the EU today. However, cooperation in the field has a much longer 
history than the agency. European states have been concerned about 
harmonisation of legislation related to medicinal products since the 1960s, 
when a form of the decentralised procedure for authorisations of products 
began to be phased in (see European Commission 1990a: 52). According to 
Abraham and Lewis (2000: 84), these first activities can be described as being 
³DJUDGXDODOLJQPHQWRIQDWLRQDOUXOHVDQGSURFHGXUHV´&RXQFLO'irective 
65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 laid down the first provisions of harmonisation 
LQWKHIRUPRI³FULWHULDIRUTXDOLW\VDIHW\DQGHIILFDF\´IRUPHGLFLQHVIRU
human use, and further harmonisation was brought in by Directives 
75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC, which also created the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (Council Regulation No 2309/93, p. 1-2). This 
committee was the predecessor of the Committee for Medicinal Products for 
Human Use (CMPH). The Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products 
(CVMP) was established in 1981 by Directive 81/851/EEC. In 1993, another 
Council Directive stated that  
in the event of a disagreement between Member States about the quality, safety or 
efficacy of a medicinal product which is the subject of the decentralized Community 
authorization procedure, the matter should be resolved by a binding Community 
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decision following scientific evaluation of the issues involved within a European 
medicinal product evaluation agency (Council Regulation No 2309/93, recital). 
 
Thus, when EMEA was formally established, there had been several rounds of 
harmonisation of policy, and the Council had already agreed that an arbiter at 
the European level was needed in the event of conflict between Member States. 
To an extent, the establishment of EMEA was a formalisation of already 
existing arrangements (Interview Commission Official 4).  
Prior to the adoption of the proposal to establish EMEA, the 
Commission (1990a: 5) outlined that it had consulted intensively for a several 
years, and found wide support for the establishment of the agency.26 
Consultation took place with Member States as well as with stakeholders such 
as health professionals, consumer groups and industry representatives 
(European Commission 1990a: 7). When interviewed for this project, an 
official at EMEA mentioned that it took about eight years from the time when 
the Commission issued a White Paper to the establishment of the agency 
(Interview EMEA Official 2).  
EMEA was built up around the two existing committees CPMP and 
CVM3ZKLFKZHUHFRPSOHPHQWHGZLWK³VXEVWDQWLDODGGLWLRQDOORJLVWLFDODQG
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHVXSSRUW´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQD 5).27 The Commission 
(1990b: DUJXHGWKDWWKHFUHDWLRQRI³DFRPSOH[VHWRIQHZDQGLQGHSHQGHQW
VWUXFWXUHVDW&RPPXQLW\OHYHO´DSSHDUHGXQIHDVLEOH,QVWHDGWKHLGHDVZHUH³WR
draw heavily on the resources and experience existing within the Member 
                                                 
26
 The Commission also declared to have wide support for the centralised procedure (which 
was a new measure) and the decentralised procedure (which built on the principle of mutual 
recognition), (European Commission 1990b: 5).  
27
 Expenses that the Community already had for these two committees were to be brought into 
the budget of the agency (European Commission 1990b: 190). 
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6WDWHV´DQGWRSRROUHVRXUFHV&RPPLVVLRQD 12). The Commission 
(1990a: 13) argued that the administrative support needed was better dealt with 
E\DQDJHQF\WKDQE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ³IRUPDQDJHULDODQGEXGJHWDU\UHDVRQV´
At the time of EMEA establishment, CPMP and CVMP were already involved 
in the evaluation of products and in pharmacovigilance. The crucial difference 
brought in by the EMEA legislation was that the opinions of the committees 
ZRXOG³DOVREHDGGUHVVHGWRWKH&RPPXQLW\LQVWLWXWLRQVIRUWKHDGRSWLRQRI
ELQGLQJGHFLVLRQVDW&RPPXQLW\OHYHO´&RPPLVVLRQD 12). The agency 
ZDVVHWXSWREH³SXUHO\DGYLVRU\´DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ (1990a: 21) argued that 
LWZDV³QHLWKHUSRVVLEOHRUDSSURSULDWH´VLFWRJLYHWKHDJHQF\WKHULJKWWR
make binding decisions. Having said that, the Commission also argued that it 
ZDV³LPSRUWDQWWRSURWHFWWKHLQWHJULW\RIWKH$JHQF\E\HQVXULQJWKDWDOO
questions of a scientific nature are resolved within the Agency structure and are 
not subject to a second review during the decision-PDNLQJSURFHVV´(XURSHDQ
Commission 1990a: 21). Only in exceptional circumstances would the 
Commission deviate from agency opinion and then detailed motivations would 
be needed (European Commission 1990b: 22). This confirms that EMEA is a 
de facto regulator. 
In its preparatory work, the Commission also remarked that many 
Member States had already delegated the task of evaluating medicinal products 
to independent agencies, and that the same arguments used to motivate this at 
nation state level were valid also at the Community level (European 
Commission 1990a: 14).28 Abraham and Lewis (2000: 77), who have 
researched the development of regulatory agencies in the pharmaceutical sector 
                                                 
28
 The Commission did not outline what it perceived these arguments to be, however. 
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in a number of European states, argue that the usual explanations of the need 
for scientific expertise and credible commitment cannot fully explain the 
creation of these agencies. Instead, they argue thDW³>D@FUXFLDOSDUWRIWKH
establishment of drug regulatory agencies has been a neo-liberal political 
agenda aimed at increasing the responsiveness of regulators to industrial 
GHPDQGVDWPLQLPDOH[SHQVHWRWKHVWDWH´$EUDKDPDQG/HZLV 78). The 
concern about industry was also shown in a comment from an MEP I 
interviewed, who remarked that it would not be good for industry if each 
Member State would have to carry out its own tests of medicines (Interview 
MEP 1). The constant reference to industry benefits in parallel to the references 
to public health, suggests that neo-liberal policy concerns may also hold 
explanatory value at European level. 
The objectives behind the creation of EMEA cannot be separated 
completely from the objectives behind the revised medicinal product 
regulations more broadly. The objectives for action fall into two categories: 
public health and industrial policy (European Commission 1990a: 8-9). In 
short, the public was believed to benefit by having access to safe products, 
guaranteed by scientific evaluations and harmonised criteria and by having 
access to consistent information. Industry was to benefit from guaranteed 
fairness in procedures.29  
As to financial concerns, it was believed that the setting up of the 
agency would lead to increased public expenditure in the short term, but that 
with a longer perspective the avoidance of duplication of work would lead to 
savings (European Commission 1990a: 34).  
                                                 
29
 For instance, it was suggested that all decisions must be published and that all negative 
decisions must be motivated (European Commission 1990b: 23)  
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To sum up, the Community had been concerned with harmonisation in 
the field since the 1960s. This harmonisation was driven by concerns over 
public health and industry efficiency. EMEA was built up around existing 
committees, and it was believed that an agency was needed to provide 
necessary support for the committees.  
 
5.2.3 The proposal from the Commission 
The proposal from the Commission to establish EMEA was published in 
December 1990.  
First, tKH&RPPLVVLRQRXWOLQHGWKHREMHFWLYHRI³SURJUHVVLYHO\
HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHW´DQGWKHQHHGIRUJRRGVZKLFKLQFOXGHV
medicinal products, to move freely on the market (European Commission 
1990b: 1). The Commission argued that a common market required common 
criteria for authorisation of medicinal products. This, I argue, suggests that the 
Commission was driven by credible commitment concerns. In the interest of 
public health, the Commission (1990b: 1) argued that authorisation should only 
EHJUDQWHGWRSURGXFWVIXOILOOLQJ³REMHFWLYHVFLHQWLILFFULWHULDRIWKHTXDOLW\WKH
VDIHW\DQGWKHHIILFDF\´ 
 A key task for the agency, accoUGLQJWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDO
ZRXOGEH³WRSURYLGHWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGWKH,QVWLWXWLRQVRIWKH&RPPXQLW\
ZLWKWKHEHVWSRVVLEOHVFLHQWLILFDGYLFH´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQE 12). 
The Commission also proposed that the agency be given the task of acting as 
an arbiter in the event of differences in opinion between national authorities 
with regards to products subjected to the decentralised authorisation procedure 
(European Commission 1990b: 2). The proposed delegation of arbitration tasks 
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serves as hard evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the Commission was 
concerned about ensuring a credible commitment to commonly agreed 
standards.  
 7KHDJHQF\¶VVWUXFWXUHZDVEXLOWXSDURXQGWKHDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJ
structures for cooperation in the field of medicines. The Commission proposed 
that all agency opinions on scientific matters should be prepared by the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products and the Committee for 
Veterinary Medicinal Products. The members of these committees were to be 
appointed by 0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGWKH\ZHUHQRWWR³KROGILQDQFLDORURWKHU
LQWHUHVWVLQWKHSKDUPDFHXWLFDOLQGXVWU\ZKLFKFRXOGDIIHFWWKHLULPSDUWLDOLW\´
(European Commission 1990b: 13). Above the committee structure that was 
already in place, the Commission proposed the creation of a Board consisting 
of two representatives from each Member State and two representatives from 
the Commission. The Commission suggested that the Board be responsible for 
WKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIWKHDJHQF\¶V'LUHFWRURQSURSRVDOIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ. 
Furthermore, the Commission proposed that the Board be in charge of adopting 
WKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNSURJUDPPHDQGSURGXFLQJDQDQQXDOUHSRUWRQDJHQF\
activity. These documents, it was proposed, were to be sent to Member States, 
the Commission, the EP, the Council and the Scientific Council, which was an 
advisory expert committee that the Commission proposed to set up attached to 
the agency. The issue of how to control the agency was clearly important. 
Commissioner Bangemann described the US Food and Drugs Administration 
DV³DEXUHDXFUDF\QRORQJHUVXEMHFWWRSROLWLFDOVXSHUYLVLRQ´DQGVWDWHGWKDWWKH
Commission did not want EMEA to be modelled on this agency (European 
Parliament 1991a: 66).   
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 The Commission proposed a budget made up of a subsidy of the 
CommuQLW\DQGIHHVSDLGE\XVHUVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VVHUYLFHV,WZDVVXJJHVWHG
that discharge ought to be granted to the Board. 
 
5.2.4 The European Parliament 
The European Parliament was consulted formally in December 1990. The 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection was 
given the role of committee responsible, and Mr Valverde López was assigned 
the role of rapporteur. The report was discussed and voted on in June 1991. 
The EP debates did not solely focus on the issue of EMEA creation, or indeed 
on regulation related to medicinal products. Critical voices were also heard 
about the EP working process, in particular the tabling of an unreasonable 
number of amendments. It is clear from the debates and the comments 
preceding the vote that some delegates even felt insecure as to what exactly 
they were voting on.  
In the EP debates, more attention was given to the adoption of 
procedures surrounding the scrutiny and approval of medicinal products to be 
sold all over the internal market than on the agency itself. Overall, the EP was 
favourable to a new system for the authorisation of medicines as this was 
believed to benefit patients as well as industry. However, some MEPs called 
for vigilance with regards to the practical arrangements of the agency (see 
European Parliament 1991a; European Parliament 1991b). Other MEPs 
UHJDUGHGWKHSURFHGXUHVDV³UDWKHUFXPEHUVRPH´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW
1991a: 7KH(3¶VDSSURYDORIWKHLGHDWRLQFUHDVHFRRSHUDWLRQDQGFRQFHUQ
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about the practical arrangements indicate that the need to solve a practical issue 
came before the idea of what particular institutional design to approve.   
7KH(3ZDVQRWVDWLVILHGZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH
DJHQF\¶VWDVNV7KHUDSSRUWHXUWKRXJKWWKDW(0($¶VGXWLHV³VKRXOGEHbetter 
GHILQHGDQGRXWOLQHG´DQGDVLJQLILFDQWQXPEHURIWKH(3DPHQGPHQWVFRQFHUQ
this aspect (European Parliament 1991a: 53). There were serious concerns 
about over-centralisation. For instance, one MEP explicitly stated that EMEA 
³PXVWQRWEHDSKDUPDFHXWLFDOµJRVSODQ¶QRU\HWDQRWKHU86)RRG
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWE 177). The rapporteur also 
WKRXJKWWKDW³FHQWUDOL]LQJPHFKDQLVPVPXVWEHUHGXFHGWRWKHDEVROXWH
PLQLPXP´DQGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQHYDOXDWLQJSURGXFWVVKRXOGEH³OLPited 
WRSURGXFWVRIJUHDWLPSRUWDQFHDQGREYLRXVFRPSOH[LW\´(European Parliament 
1991a: 53). The (3VWURQJO\HPSKDVLVHGWKHDJHQF\¶Vde facto regulatory 
IXQFWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKH(3WKHQRUPPXVWEHWKDW(0($¶VRSLQLRQVRQ
such products are respected by the Commission.30 The EP was strongly 
VXSSRUWLYHRIWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHDVDQDUELWHUZKLFKVXJJHVWVDZLVKWRHQVXUH
credible commitment to uniform standards (see European Parliament 
1991a: 53). Furthermore, the EP called for a more proactive role for the agency 
with regards to pharmacovigilance and information dissemination.  
With regards to the management of the agency, the EP put forward 
several amendments to enhance its own influence. First, the EP requested the 
ULJKWWRDSSURYHWKH%RDUG¶VFKRLFHRI'Lrector (European Parliament 
1991c: 172). Second, the EP suggested that it be given the right to appoint two 
                                                 
30
 Whilst the Commission and the EP ZHUHLQDJUHHPHQWWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ³H[SODLQLQGHWDLO
WKHUHDVRQVIRUDQ\GLIIHUHQFHV´EHWZHHQD&RPPLVVLRQGHFLVLRQDQGDQDJHQF\RSLQLRQWKH
EP amended the text to emphasise that it would be an exception if the Commission decided not 
to follow agency opinion (European Parliament 1991c: 151, amendment No 19). 
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UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVWRWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUG(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWF 173). 
Third, the EP approved an amendment stating that lists of potential expert 
mHPEHUVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VFRPPLWWHHVEHVXEMHFWWR(3DSSURYDO(XURSHDQ
Parliament 1991c: 170). However, some MEPs disagreed with the third point 
DQGDUJXHGWKDWH[SHUWDSSRLQWPHQWVPXVW³EHIUHHIURPSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFH´
(European Parliament 1991b: 177). The EP also proposed that two 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIFRQVXPHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVEHLQFOXGHGRQWKH(0($%RDUG
DQGHPSKDVLVHGLWVRSLQLRQWKDW%RDUGPHPEHUV³PD\QRWKDYHDQ\GLUHFWRU
indirect interests in the pharmaceutical industry which could affect their 
impaUWLDOLW\´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWF 173).  
 The financial arrangements and budget were not discussed at any length 
E\WKH(3+RZHYHUWKH(3UHVHQWHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKH
DJHQF\¶VIHHVZHUHWREHVHWE\WKH&RXQFLO,QVWHDGWKH(3ZDQWHd the fees to 
³EHHVWDEOLVKHGLQWKH&RPPXQLW\EXGJHW´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWF 173). 
 
5.2.5 Amendments from the Commission 
,QWKHOLJKWRIWKH(3¶VUHDGLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQGHFLGHGWRDPHQGLWVSURSRVDO
accepting 67 out of the 155 amendments that the EP had voted to adopt 
(European Commission 1991: 3).  
 The Commission approved several amendments, the purposes of which 
were to increase transparency in procedures, to emphasise consumer protection 
and to encourage cooperation with the World Health Organisation. Moreover, 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQDFFHSWHGWKH(3¶VVXJJHVWLRQWRFOHDUO\VWDWHWKDWWKH
Commission would only make decisions that contradicted agency opinions in 
exceptional cases (European Commission 1991: 8). As regards the 
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management of the agency, the CRPPLVVLRQDFFHSWHGWKH(3¶VDPHQGPHQWWR
grant the EP the right to nominate two representatives to the EMEA Board 
(European Commission 1991: 2).  
 
5.2.6 The Council 
The Council legislated on the establishment of EMEA in July 1993. A 
comparison between the final legislative text and the Commission proposal 
shows that, although many of the central aspects of the legislation are similar, 
the text appears to have been thoroughly reworked. There are also instances 
where the Council chose to retain the original text proposed by the 
Commission, ignoring EP amendments which the Commission had declared to 
accept.  
 Overall, the Council agreed with the rationale for increasingly 
harmonised procedures presented by the other institutions. In the articles 
directly concerned with the establishment of the agency, the Council made a 
link between the completion of the internal market and agency creation. At the 
same time, the Council toned down this link somewhat by removing a 
proposed recital that focused exclusively on the importance of the legislation 
for the completion of the internal market.   
 The Council regarded  WKHSURYLVLRQRI³VFLHQWLILFDGYLFHRIWKHKLJKHVW
SRVVLEOHTXDOLW\´WREH(0($¶VPRVWFHQWUDOWDVNDQGHPSKDVLVHGWKH
DJHQF\¶VUROHLQWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIDGYanced products as well as in arbitration in 
the event of disagreements between Member States (Council Regulation No 
2309/93, recital).  
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 $VWRWKHDJHQF\¶VPDQDJHPHQWDQGH[SHUWDSSRLQWPHQWVWKH&RXQFLO
decided in favour of the EP amendment to include two Board members 
DSSRLQWHGE\WKH(3&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQ1RDUWLFOH7KH(3¶V
request to influence the appointment of Director was turned down, however. 
Moreover, the Council stressed that Board members as well as experts working 
for the agency ought to be impartial, and that any indirect interests they may 
have in the pharmaceutical industry must be openly declared (Council 
Regulation No 2309/93, article 54). This can be seen as support for a concern 
about credible commitment. 
 7KHDJHQF\¶VIHHV are of central importance to the budget, and here, the 
&RXQFLOIROORZHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOWKDWWKHIHHVRXJKWWREHVHWE\
the Council on proposal from the Commission (Council Regulation No 
2309/93, article 58). As to budgetary discharge, the Council legislated that this 
should be granted to the EMEA Director by the Board. 
 
5.2.7 European Economic and Social Committee 
The EESC was consulted in December 1990. In July 1991, the committee 
unanimously adopted its opinion. 
 The EESC was positive to the establishment of the agency, which was 
GHVFULEHGDV³WKHFXOPLQDWLQJSRLQWLQWKHPDMRUSDFNDJHRIPHDVXUHVWR
KDUPRQL]HWKHPDUNHWLQPHGLFLQDOSURGXFWV´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO
Committee 1991: 84). Whilst the committee only briefly mentioned ³WKH
pRROLQJRIH[SHUWLVH´DVDFRQFHUQIRUWKHDJHQF\, considerable attention was 
GHYRWHGWRWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQHQVXULQJFUHGLEOHFRPPLWPHQW(European 
Economic and Social Committee 1991: 85). For instance, the EESC (1991: 84) 
120 
 
argued that differing interpretatLRQVEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV³would impede 
UHDOIUHHPRYHPHQWRIPHGLFLQDOSURGXFWVZLWKLQWKH&RPPXQLW\´. In addition, 
it was believed that DQXPEHURI³VDIHJXDUGFODXVHVSODFHGDWWKHdisposal of 
0HPEHU6WDWHV«could seriously encumber the procedures and delay real free 
PRYHPHQWRIPHGLFLQDOSURGXFWV´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO&RPPLWWHH
1991: 85). This indicates that the EESC did not think that the legislation went 
far enough to ensure credible commitment to common agreements. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on credible commitment is made apparent in 
VWDWHPHQWVSRLQWLQJWRWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQHQVXULQJWKDWSURGXFWVPHHWWKH
required standards throughout the Community and the importance of ensuring 
that the industry would know the rules of the game.  
 The EES&RSLQLRQLVDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHDJHQF\¶V
tasks, and other aspects of agency creation were not discussed at any length. 
However, the committee noted LWVVXSSRUWIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQWHQWLRQ³WR
ensure the scientific independence of the Agency and the impartiality of its 
experts, and to avoid interference from industry and intervention by the 
QDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHV´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO&RPPLWWHH 87). 
7KH((6&ZDVDOVRVXSSRUWLYHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOWKDWWKHDJHQF\
would rely mainly on national experts working at relevant institutions at 
national level. This serves as a further indication that the pooling of expertise 
to the agency itself was not a concern.  
 
5.2.8 EMEA today: wide support despite tensions 
Since the eVWDEOLVKPHQWRI(0($FKDQJHVKDYHEHHQPDGHWRWKH(8¶V
legislation on authorisations of medicinal products. The legislation was 
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substantially revised in the early 2000s. According to an official at the EP, this 
was done in order to bring legislation up to date, and there was a wish to 
conclude the matter before enlargement (Interview EP Official 2). The same 
official informed me that this was the result of a long process, and of pressure 
from authorities, pharmacopoeia and patient groups.  
 My documentary research suggests that EMEA may have more 
regulatory influence than what is stated in the legislation. Information gained in 
the interviews conducted for this research project confirmed that EMEA has a 
de facto regulatory role. Indeed, this idea was endorsed by representatives of 
EMEA, the EP and the Commission itself (Interview EMEA Official 1; 
Interview EMEA Official 2; Interview EP Official 2; Interview Commission 
Official 4). An official at EMEA remarked that the reason why EMEA cannot 
make legislative decisions is that the Treaties do not make such provisions 
(Interview EMEA Official 1).   
 As predicted in the discussions leading up to EMEA establishment, the 
agency has come to play an important role for public health as well as for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Whilst industry pays fees to the agency, an official at 
EMEA emphasised that the real EMEA customer is the patient and that the 
system is very strict for industry (Interview EMEA Official 1). At the same 
time, the official mentioned that there is considerable contact between 
companies and the agency during the application procedures, and that industry 
shows an interest in taking advantage of EMEA knowledge (Interview EMEA 
Official 1). It tends to be larger companies that file applications to EMEA 
(Interview EMEA Official 1).  
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The many contacts between EMEA and industry can call into question 
the independence of the agency. However, an official at the Commission 
argued that EMEA is carefully monitored (Interview Commission Official 4). 
An official at EMEA stated that enormous resources are spent on control, and 
that transparency is increasing (Interview EMEA Official 1). Commission 
official 4 agreed that the agency has become more open, but he also drew 
attention to the fact that some of the material handled by the agency is of a 
confidential nature. Moreover, secrecy laws differ between states and EMEA is 
in no position to change this (Interview Commission Official 4).  
Today, EMEA appears to enjoy widespread support. None of the people 
interviewed about EMEA could point to any major objections to the agency; its 
existence is not questioned. Instead, interviewees painted a picture of an 
agency that has built up a good reputation as a highly professional organisation 
(Interviews EMEA Official 2; EMEA Official 1; EP Official 2). To illustrate 
the respect enjoyed by EMEA, the agency has been allowed to have a 
representative present at Council meetings, and EMEA employees have taken 
part in staff selection committees for new agencies (Interview EMEA 
Official 2IILFLDOVDW(0($GHVFULEHGWKHDJHQF\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(3
as good (Interview EMEA Official 1; Interview EMEA Official 2), and EP 
Official 2 had a very favourable attitude towards the agency. EMEA Official 2 
mentioned that industry may have been a bit cautious initially, but today it is 
YHU\PXFKLQIDYRXURIWKHDJHQF\7KHNH\WR(0($¶VVXFFHVVDFFRUGLQJRQH
RILWVRIILFLDOVKDVEHHQWRNHHS³DORZSURILOH´,QWHUYLHZ(0($2IILFLDO 
Despite the overall support, there appear to be some tensions in the 
relationship between national authorities and EMEA. According to an EMEA 
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official, the system works well now, but that there has been some suspicion 
from national authorities (Interview EMEA Official 1). EMEA Official 1 
argued that, generally speaking, northern Member States tend to be more 
supportive than southern Member States. Another EMEA official explained 
that some national authorities are concerned about being suppressed by the 
European-level agency (Interview EMEA Official 2). As previously explained, 
evaluations of products are carried out by national authorities on behalf of 
EMEA. When EMEA needs to have an evaluation done, the job will be given 
to national authorities in one state. Thus, we can assume that some national 
authorities are concerned that they will not be called upon, with the risk of 
expertise slowly withering away. As an EMEA official explained, the national 
authorities can be seen to be in competition with each other (Interview EMEA 
Official 1). The Commission representative I interviewed about EMEA argued 
that we can see an increasing focus on centralisation, which may mean that 
national authorities will have to become more specialised than is currently the 
case (Interview Commission Official 4). An EMEA official went a step further, 
and argued that this development is necessary (Interview EMEA Official 1). 
The level of funding given to national authorities that perform evaluations is 
another somewhat problematic issue. According to Commission Official 4, 
who has experience from the Commission and Swedish authorities, the 
Swedish authorities, which are often called upon by EMEA, made a loss during 
the first ten years as a result of not receiving adequate funding for their work. 
Tensions appear to exist also in the relationship between EMEA and the 
Commission. One EMEA official said that the two institutions work together, 
disagreements, if any, are kept between the two institutions (Interview EMEA 
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Official 2). Another EMEA official described the relationship as somewhat 
unclear (Interview EMEA Official 1). EMEA Official 1 was of the opinion that 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQGRHVQRWLQWHUIHUHLQ(0($¶VVFLHQWLILFZRUNEXWLQRWKHU
areas the Commission wants greater influence. One source of irritation 
appeared to be that all agencies are expected to perform its administrative 
functions in similar ways, despite the fact that these prescribed methods may 
not be suitable for EMEA. EMEA Official 1 went on to describe the 
Commission as a conservative, hierarchical institution. To illustrate, he argued 
that agency personnel do not have the same rights as EU officials, and that 
junior people tend to be appointed to high posts at the agencies despite the fact 
that these posts require more senior people. This official also mentioned that 
there are civil servants in the Commission who do not support the existence of 
agencies.  
The role of the Board members appointed by the EP is another aspect of 
EMEA which is somewhat unclear. An official at the EP informed me that the 
role of these Board members is unclear and that there are no instructions 
(Interview EP Official 2). Nobody seems to know for sure whether these Board 
members are there to represent themselves as independent experts or whether 
they are there to voice the EP view. Furthermore, EP Official 2 implied that not 
many people seem to care either way. This is problematic as the agency Board 
adopts the EMEA budget, and the EP scrutinises it. For a control mechanism to 
be credible, it is essential that the controlling body and the controlled body are 
not the same, but currently two individuals may be present within the two 
ERGLHV7KLVSUREOHPLVDWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\DYRLGHGE\WKH(3¶VRIWHQDSSRLQWLQJ
ex-MEPs as Board members (Interview EP Official 2). These people, EP 
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Official 2 argued, possess the important ability to communicate with MEPs. 
Still, EP Official 2 continued, cultural clashes in terms of working methods can 
be a problem as the EP representatives tend to be politicians whereas the 
Member State representatives on the Board tend to be civil servants.  
Finally, in its preparatory work, the Commission predicted that 
budgeting may be difficult (see European Commission 1990a: 34-35). This was 
confirmed by an official at the Commission (Interview Commission Official 4). 
Personal budgetary discharge is given to the Director, and an official at EMEA 
hinted that there are worries that political concerns irrelevant to the issue at 
hand may play a part in this process (Interview EMEA Official 1). 
 
5.3 Discussion 
EMEA was the first agency to be giveQDUHJXODWRU\UROH7RGD\WKHDJHQF\¶V
role as a de facto regulator is widely accepted, and the agency has significant 
influence over which medicinal products will be sold on the EU market. Over 
the years, EMEA has built up a good reputation and enjoys support from 
European institutions and industry. Nevertheless, some tensions remain in the 
DJHQF\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHVDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ 
In this chapter, I have traced the process leading up to the establishment 
of EMEA and reflected RQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFHWRGD\,QWKH
following sections, I will discuss the findings in relation to the theoretical 
framework outlined in chapter 2. 
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5.3.1 Rational choice institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism suggests that EMEA was established to lower 
transaction costs. The agency could do this by becoming a centre of expertise 
where technical and scientific knowledge is gathered. Another hypothesis is 
that EMEA was created as a means to ensure credible commitment. Finally, the 
agency could lower transaction costs by increasing efficiency. Whilst my 
research has revealed some evidence to support each one of these hypotheses, I 
argue that EMEA establishment was driven primarily be credible commitment 
concerns and a wish to increase efficiency, in particular for industry.  
 E0($¶VILHOGRIDFWLYLW\LVFOHDUO\DVFLHQWLILFDOO\FRPSOLFDWHGRQHDQG
the evaluation of medicinal products requires a high degree of technical 
H[SHUWLVH7KHPHPEHUVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VFRPPLWWHHVDUHDSSRLQWHGRQWhe 
grounds of relevant experience and expertise. This can be seen as indications 
that EMEA was set up to be a centre of expertise. However, the fact that 
EMEA was built up around already existing expert committees calls this 
hypothesis into question. In order words, expertise was already pooled and the 
establishment of the agency was mainly a formalisation of already existing 
structures. Moreover, it must be recalled that the most central tasks, that is 
evaluations of products, are performed by national authorities, and not at 
EMEA itself. Thus, I argue that, whilst scientific expertise is crucial to 
(0($¶VZRUNWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHDJHQF\ZDVQRWSULPDULO\GULYHQE\D
wish to gather expertise within one body as predicted by rational choice 
institutionalist theory. 
 There is significant evidence in favour of the hypothesis that EMEA 
establishment can be explained by wishes to ensure credible commitment. 
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Information provided by the interviewees confirmed the impression gained 
throughout the documentary research that EMEA indeed has a de facto 
regulatory function. Throughout the legislative process, there are multiple 
direct references to the importance of upholding common standards. For 
instance, an MEP thought that ³KLJK-level inspection´VKRXOGEHXVHG³in the 
sense of monitoring compliance with Community rules in the measures 
DGRSWHGE\QDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHV´(uropean Parliament 1991a: 53). The EESC 
argued that authorisation of medicinal products with agency help would 
HQKDQFH³WKHVWDWXVRI&RPPXQLW\-prRGXFHGPHGLFLQHVRQH[SRUWPDUNHWV´
(European Economic and Social Committee 1991: 85). This suggests that the 
EESC thought that the agency would enhance the credibility of the Community 
more generally. The EESC also pointed to the importance of consistent 
information, including common guidelines and procedures for applications. 
Another piece of hard evidence in favour of the credible commitment 
hypothesis is that the agency has been assigned the role of arbiter in cases of 
conflict between Member State authorities concerning products subject to the 
decentralised authorisation procedure. Considerable emphasis was placed on 
this role of the agency throughout the process leading up to establishment.  
 As to the hypothesis that EMEA was created to increase efficiency, it is 
apparent that harmonised procedures for marketing authorisations allow 
products to reach the market faster. Prior to harmonisation, a company wanting 
to market a medicinal product in more than one Member State would have to 
file an application for evaluation in each state. The decentralised procedure, 
which builds on the principle of mutual recognition, increased efficiency by 
establishing that it was sufficient that a product be evaluated in one state. 
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However, pharmaceutical companies would still have to file applications in 
each state where they wished to market the product. The centralised 
authorisation procedure, which was introduced at the time of EMEA 
establishment, further increased the efficiency of authorisation. This procedure 
requires only one application (submitted to EMEA) and one product evaluation 
before an authorisation can be granted to market the product throughout the 
EU. This is an obvious direct efficiency gain for industry, which may also 
benefit patients who could have faster access to new products. Officials 
interviewed for this research on EMEA claimed that centralisation is 
increasing, and that national authorities may have to specialise in particular 
areas more in the future than what is now the case. This signals a concern about 
DYRLGLQJGXSOLFDWLRQRIZRUNHIIRUWVDQGLQGLFDWHVWKDW(0($¶VGHYHORSPHQW
may be driven by efficiency concerns.  
 
5.3.2 Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalist analysis focuses on the convergence of norms and 
ideas, and on institutional borrowing. Thus, this theory hypothesises that the 
establishment of EMEA was legitimised by the fact that similar organisations 
already existed. I argue that this theory can contribute to our understanding of 
why an agency was established in this particular policy field. However, 
evidence to suggest that EMEA was modelled on another organisation has not 
been found. 
 As explained in section 5.2.2, the Commission (1990a: 14) remarked 
that many Member States had already delegated responsibilities for evaluation 
of medicinal products to independent agencies. The arguments used to 
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motivate this action at national state levels could be used to motivate the 
establishment of an agency at Community level also, the Commission argued. 
This clearly suggests that the establishment of an agency in the field at 
European level was legitimised by the prior existence of such agencies at 
Member State level.  
 By contrast, there is significant evidence to disprove the hypothesis that 
EMEA was modelled on another body. I have not come across any statements 
to suggest that the national authorities served as a model for EMEA. The model 
provided by the US Food and Drugs Administration was outright rejected. In 
the EP debates, Commissioner Bangemann stated that ³>Z@HGRQot wish in 
SDUWLFXODUWRLPLWDWHWKHH[DPSOHRIWKH86)RRGDQG'UXJV$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ´
(European Parliament 1991a: 66). An MEP concerned that the EMEA 
establishment would lead to too much centralisation explicitly stated that 
EMEA ³PXVWQRWEHDSKDUPDFHXWLFDOµJRVSODQ¶QRU\HWDQRWKHU86)RRG
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ´(uropean Parliament 1991: 177). EMEA displays some 
similarities with already existing Community Agencies with regards to the role 
RIWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGDQG'LUHFWRUZKLFKOHQGVVRPHVXSSRUWIRUWKHLUserving 
DVPRGHOV+RZHYHU(0($¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGZRUNLQJSUDFWLFHVZKLFKDUHEXLOW
XSDURXQGWKHDJHQF\¶VVFLHQWLILFFRPPLWWHHVDUHYHU\GLIIHUHQW:HFDQDOVR
QRWHWKDWRQHRI(0($¶VFRPPLWWHHVZDVVHWXSEHIRUHWKHILUVWWZR
Community Agencies were set up in 1975.  
 
5.3.3 Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism suggests that explanations for the establishment of 
EMEA must be sought in the historical context in which it was created. The 
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theory also emphasises the importance of specific events serving as critical 
junctures that determine future development. My research suggests that there is 
a link between the increasing harmonisation of authorisation procedures for 
medicines and the development of the single market programme. 
The Commission clearly outlined the need for the free movement of 
medicinal products on the internal market, and that common authorisation 
procedures were needed for this purpose (see Commission 1990b: 1). 
Similarly, some MEPs believed that the industry would benefit from the 
internal market, particularly WKURXJKKDYLQJ³VWUXFWXUDOREVWDFOHV´UHPRYHG
(European Parliament 1991: 55). A harmonised procedure was also regarded to 
be efficient and beneficial to exports (see European Parliament 1991b). In its 
description of thHDJHQF\¶VWDVNVWKH&RXQFLODOVRPDGHH[SOLFLWWKHOLQNWRWKH
internal market. Nevertheless, the Council appeared to attribute somewhat less 
importance to the individual event of single market finalisation for agency 
establishment than the other institutions. Whereas the Commission and the EP 
emphasised the importance of this particular event by making explicit mention 
RILWLQWKHUHFLWDOVWR(0($¶VIRXQGLQJOHJLVODWLRQWKH&RXQFLOFKRVHQRWWR 
Whilst acknowledging that there clearly is a link between EMEA and 
the single market, I argue that that the actual completion of the single market 
was not a critical juncture in the development of harmonised procedures. In 
this chapter, it has been shown that efforts to harmonise legislation in the field 
began in the 1960s. Thus, harmonisation of authorisation procedures for 
medicines has occurred in tandem with market development; it is not tied 
solely to the individual event of single market completion. In important 
respects, the establishment of EMEA was a formalisation of practices and 
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structures that were already in place. Judging by the emphasis placed on the 
link between the single market and the founding legislation of EMEA, the 
completion of the single market may explain the precise timing of this 
formalisation, however. As explained in section 5.2.8, the update of the EMEA 
legislation in the early 2000s was preceded by a long process of consultation, 
but the timing could be linked with a wish to resolve the matter before 
enlargement. It is reasonable to assume that the finalisation of the internal 
market had a similar influence on the process leading up to the establishment 
of EMEA.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that none of the new institutionalist strands of theory is 
sufficient to explain on its own the establishment of this agency. Based on the 
ILQGLQJVRIP\UHVHDUFK,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQWKHPDUNHWLQJ
authorisation procedures for medicines are best explained by credible 
commitment concerns and wishes to increase the efficiency of procedures. In 
WKHGHFHQWUDOLVHGSURFHGXUHWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLVPDLQO\WRHQVXUHFUHGLEOH
commitment by serving as a neutral arbiter in the event of conflict. The 
centralised procedure is clearly more efficient for pharmaceutical companies. 
(0($¶s field of activity clearly requires advanced technical and scientific 
knowledge, and the founding legislation specifies demands on members of the 
DJHQF\¶VFRPPLWWHHV$WWKHVDPHWLPHZHPXVWQRWHWKDW(0($ZDVEXLOWRQ
an existing committee structure, where expertise was already gathered. The fact 
that the establishment of EMEA was a formalisation of already existing 
structures suggests that gathering of expertise was not the driving factor behind 
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the decision to establish an agency. My research has indicated that the 
establishment of an agency to evaluate medicinal products may have been 
legitimised by the existence of agencies in the field at national levels, but I 
have not found evidence to suggest that EMEA was modelled on another body. 
Thus, in the case of EMEA, sociological institutionalism can explain the 
DJHQF\¶VSROLF\DUHDEXWQRWLWVLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQ)LQDOO\WKHKDUPRQLVDWLRQ
of authorisation procedures for medicines has developed in tandem with the 
building of the single market, and the precise timing of agency establishment 
may be linked to single market finalisation.  
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Tracing the establishment of the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
6.1 Introduction 
The European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, was established during what 
can be referred to as the second large wave of agencification at the EU level by 
Regulation No 1592/2002. EASA, together with the European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA) and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA), were the first 
Community Agencies to be established by the codecision procedure (European 
Parliament 2001a: 42). In 2008, tKHDJHQF\¶VPDQGDWHZDVHQKDQFHGE\
Regulation No 216/2008, which repealed the founding legislation.31 As a de 
jure regulator, EASA is the most powerful of the case study agencies discussed 
in this thesis, and its mandate to charge fees gives it a significant degree of 
independence. It is also one of the largest Community Agencies.  
In this chapter, I will trace and analyse the process leading up to the 
establishment of EASA, and reflect on WKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFHWRGD\
Following the framework set out in chapter 2, the focus will be on timing of 
establishment, tasks, governance structures and financial arrangements. 
 Rational choice institutionalist theory holds that delegation takes place 
in order to lower political transaction costs (see Pollack 2003). The first 
hypothesis derived from this theory is that EASA was created because 
informed policy-making in the air safety field required advanced technical or 
scientific expertise, which could not be obtained within the Commission. The 
                                                 
31
 As the focus is on the initial establishment of the agency, the 2002 legislation is the one to be 
considered in this chapter. 
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second rational choice institutionalist hypothesis to be explored is that EASA 
was created to ensure credible commitment to commonly agreed policies. The 
third hypothesis from this perspective is that EASA was established to increase 
efficiency. Throughout my research, I have found evidence to support each one 
of these hypotheses. Addressing first the technical expertise hypothesis, it is 
apparent that the agency is operating in a distinctly technical field. In addition, 
I argue that EASA deals with issues about which most EU decision-makers 
cannot be expected to have sophisticated knowledge, and people with the very 
specific technical knowledge needed cannot be recruited to the Commission. In 
the chapter, I argue that credible commitment concerns were important as 
GHPDQGVZHUHSXWIRUZDUGWRLQFUHDVHWKHDJHQF\¶VDELOLW\WRDFWZLWKRXWGLUHFW
political interference. The fact that regulatory tasks were delegated to the 
agency is further important evidence supporting this hypothesis. Finally, by 
making the agency responsible for decisions on technical details, time is freed 
up for the Commission, which leads to more efficiency. The analysis also 
shows that the previous arrangement for cooperation in the field was criticised 
precisely due to its lack of efficiency, and the establishment of EASA clearly 
addressed perceived short-comings of the previous system. 
 Sociological institutionalism puts its emphasis on the power and 
diffusion of ideas (McNamara 2002). According to this theory, delegation takes 
place when the ideas of decision-makers have converged around the ideal that 
delegation is the best solution to a problem, and it is often a result of 
institutional borrowing. At the time of EASA establishment, the Community 
Agency model was already in place. In this chapter I will provide evidence to 
suggest that EASA was modelled on previous agencies, and that its governance 
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structures were legitimised through harmonisation with other agencies. A 
model in the form an aviation safety agency also existed in the American 
Federal Aviation Authority, and I argue that this agency served as a model for 
EASA. 
 Historical institutionalism explains delegation through the analysis of 
critical junctures and path dependency. This theory puts significant emphasis 
on the specific context in which institutions are created and develop (see 
Thelen 1999). In European integration history it is an undisputed fact that the 
creation of the single market was a major event. Based on findings from 
documentary research in particular, I argue that the creation of EASA must be 
seen in connection to this event. By lessening the impact of national regulation 
in the civil aviation field through liberalisation of the sector, European leaders 
opened up for demands to re-regulate the sector at the EU level. This is not 
sufficient to state that the finalisation of the single market was a critical 
juncture in the historical institutionalist sense, however. Industry pressure was 
an important factor behind EASA establishment, and I argue that the fact that it 
would be more efficient for industry to deal with one European agency rather 
than several national agencies would remain regardless of the existence of the 
single market. 
 In this chapter, I will show that the establishment of EASA was a 
complex process which can be thoroughly explained only by a combination of 
the three theoretical approaches. The rational choice institutionalist hypotheses 
can explain the delegation of particular functions. The choice of institutional 
design is better explained by the sociological institutionalist hypothesis. 
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Finally, historical institutionalism can contribute to our understanding of the 
timing of EASA establishment.   
 
6.2 Background and the establishment process 
6.2.1 EASA Ȃ a brief presentation 
In terms of direct policy influence, EASA is clearly the most powerful agency 
of the four case studies in this thesis. A core role of the agency is to implement 
common rules on civil aviation set out in the founding legislation. Other central 
tasks are to issue opinions and to draft legislation to be passed on to the 
Commission. Crucially, the Commission cannot change the content of certain 
technical rules without prior coordination with EASA. The agency also 
develops certification rules on airworthiness and environmental concerns, and 
is in charge of issuing and revoking such certifications. Although these rules 
are not mandatory, compliance is monitored by EASA or other entities that 
have been approved for this purpose and non-compliance could result in 
FHUWLILFDWHV¶EHLQJUHYRNHG. Other tasks of the agency are to assist the 
Community and Member States in third country relations and to help Member 
States to fulfil their international obligations. Furthermore, EASA plays a role 
in aviation safety research and develops and finances its own studies. Any 
person (natural or legal) may appeal against decisions made by the agency; in 
ILUVWLQVWDQFHDSSHDOVDUHSUHVHQWHGWRWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGRI$SSHDODQGWKHQWR
the Court of Justice. 
 The Management Board of EASA consists of one representative per 
Member State and one Commission representative. They serve for a renewable 
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term of five years. The Board appoints the Director, over whom they exercise 
disciplinary authority, on proposal from the Commission, and they appoint the 
members of the Board of Appeal, who ought to be independent.  The founding 
legislation states clearly that members of the Board of Appeal must not take 
part in appeal proceedings if they have personal interest in them (Regulation 
No 1592/2002, article 34). The Board adopts WKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNSURJUDPPH
after considering the opinion of the Commission and forwards it to the EP, the 
Member States, the Council and the Commission. The Board must also adopt 
an annual report on agency activity, which, following an amendment by 
Regulation No 1643/2003 must be forwarded to the EP, the Council, the 
Member States, the Commission and the Court of Auditors. 
The agency has been growing in size. In August 2007, the agency 
employed around 300 staff (EASA 2007b), but in February 2009, this number 
had grown to some 400 staff (EASA 2009). The budget for 2007 was ¼ 70.5 
PLOOLRQRIZKLFK¼PLOOLRQZDVLQFRPHIURPIHHVDQGFKDUJHVDQG
¼ 24 million was a subsidy from the European Community (EASA 2007c). 
Other income included third country contributions and income from 
administrative operations. Fees and charges are paid by those who use the 
DJHQF\¶VVHUYLFHVDQGFRYHUWKHFRVWVRILVVXLQJFHUWLILFDWLRQVDQGVLPLODU The 
public money given to the agency pays for the employment of technical 
experts. These two lines are separated in the budget (Interview Commission 
Official 1).  
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6.2.2 Setting the context: importance of the single market and 
intergovernmental failure 
International cooperation regarding minimum safety standards in civil aviation 
is not new. The Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the 
Chicago Convention, to which EU states have agreed to adhere, dates back to 
1944. Cooperation at the European level, however, began in earnest in the early 
1990s when discussions on air safety and how a stringent European-level 
certification system could be achieved were held. Initially, the idea was to set 
XS³DQDLUVDIHW\DXWKRULW\ZKLFKZRXOGWDNHWKHIRUPRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ´&RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ 65). In 1990, a number of 
aviation authorities of European states formed an informal organisation called 
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), and the year after, the Community agreed on 
some harmonisation in the civil aviation field.32 Eight years later, the Council 
PDGHDGHFLVLRQZKLFKDXWKRULVHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ³WRRSHQQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK
the JAA States that are not members of the EU with a view to establishing an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQ´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVion 2002: 3). According to the 
&RPPLVVLRQ³QXPHURXVGLIILFXOWLHVZHUHHQFRXQWHUHGLQSXUVXLQJWKLV
LQLWLDWLYH´DQGDVDUHVXOWRIWKLVWKH&RPPLVVLRQSUHSDUHGWKHSURSRVDOWR
establish EASA after having been invited to do so by the Council (European 
Commission 2002: 3).  
The perceived problems with the JAA arrangements are outlined in the 
explanatory memorandum to the Commission proposal on EASA 
establishment. One problem was that transparency and democratic control 
could not be ensured through this intergovernmental cooperation. A second 
                                                 
32
 The relevant regulation is Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. 
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related problem was that the rules worked out through JAA were not always 
compatible with Community law. Due to these issues, rules worked out by the 
JAA needed to be processed again through the Community legislative process 
and this was deemed too inefficient. According to the Commission, these 
problems persisted despite JAA efforts to make their working methods more 
efficient (European Commission 2000: 3). Thus, we can conclude that a wish 
to increase efficiency was a driving factor behind the establishment of EASA. 
Similarly, the Council (2001) drew attention to issues concerning the adoption 
of binding rules for affected parties, and argued that discussions had 
KLJKOLJKWHGWKHSUREOHPRI³OHQJWK\UDWLILFDWLRQSURFHGXUHV´ZKLFK³ZHUHQRW
FDOFXODWHGWRPHHWGHPDQGVIURPWKHLQGXVWU\´&RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
2002: 65). There was a belief amongst decision-makers that a single body 
would be useful for harmonisation, and, according to a Commission official, 
agencies wHUH³IDVKLRQDEOH´DWWKHWLPHInterview Commission Official 1). 
The fact that industry was in favour of EASA establishment was confirmed in 
interviews with representatives of the Commission, the EP and EASA itself 
(Interviews MEP 2; EASA Official; Commission Official 1).  
 My research provides ample evidence to suggest that the establishment 
of EASA must be linked to a perceived need for uniform rules in the air safety 
field and that this need can be linked to the finalisation of the internal market 
(see European Commission 2000: 3; European Parliament 2001a: 61). This link 
LVPDGHDSSDUHQWLQWKHILUVWUHFLWDOWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOWRHVWDEOLVK
($6$ZKHUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQHPSKDVLVHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI³>D@KLJKXQLIRUP
OHYHO´RIFLWL]HQDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQDQGLWVFRQWULEXWLRQ³WR
facilitating the free movement of goods, persons and organisations in the 
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LQWHUQDOPDUNHW´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ 1). These ideas also recur in the 
EP Debates of 4 September 2001 (European Parliament 2001b), and in the 
&RXQFLO¶VFRPPRQSRVLWLRQ&RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ0RUHRYHU
the EP rapporteur argued that a liberalised market for air traffic, with the 
competitive pressures associated with this, may lead to compromises on safety, 
which would then need to be regulated at the Community level (European 
Parliament 2001b).  
My research also shows that pressure to establish the agency came from 
outside, from the American aviation industry. In the EP report, it is stated that 
³>L@WLVZHOONQRZQWKDWWKH8QLted States, among others, is very eager for an 
independent European body to be set up which could be an interlocutor for the 
)HGHUDO$YLDWLRQ$JHQF\)$$´(European Parliament 2001a: 61). When 
interviewed for this research project, an MEP who has carried out a substantial 
amount of work on EASA confirmed that the American air industry indeed had 
an interest in EASA creation (Interview MEP 2). There is also evidence to 
suggest that the sociological institutionalist hypothesis that agency creation 
often is a result institutional borrowing holds true with regards to the FAA and 
EASA. For instance, the Commission (2000: ZURWHWKDW³LWZDVIHOWWKDWD
body comparable to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United 
6WDWHVVKRXOGEHFUHDWHG´7KDW)$A served as a model for EASA was 
confirmed by an official at EASA (Interview EASA Official). 
 To sum up, the single market demanded common rules in the European 
civil aviation sector, national authorities were deemed not adequate to deal 
with the new situation, and the aviation industries of Europe and America were 
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in favour of a European aviation safety agency. Agencies were fashionable and 
the FAA provided a model to emulate.  
   
6.2.3 The proposal from the Commission 
The Commission submitted its proposal in December 2000, and it was 
published in the Official Journal in May 2001.  
The proposal indicates that the Commission was of the opinion that a 
high uniform aviation safety and environmental standard as well as common 
interpretation of the Chicago convention were of crucial importance to the 
single market. According to the Commission (2001), Member States were not 
in a position to achieve this to a satisfactory level, and, for this reason, 
Community action was motivated in the field. In line with the prediction of 
rational choice institutionalist theory, the Commission (2001, recitals 8 and 11) 
FDOOHGIRUWKHFUHDWLRQRI³DVSHFLDOLVHGH[SHUWERG\´DQGFODLPHGWKDW³>S@XEOLF
interest requires the Agency to base its safety-related action solely on 
independHQWH[SHUWLVH´ 
 The Commission suggested that the agency be given the tasks to assist 
the Commission in preparation of rule proposals, to issue and revoke 
certifications, to monitor rules, to carry out research and to assist the 
Commission and Member States in relevant international relations. The 
proposed working methods, which ought to be characterised by transparency, 
are outlined in quite some detail. The fact that the Commission proposed 
highly technical regulatory tasks including the drafting of specific legislation 
supports the rational choice institutionalist hypotheses that EASA was created 
to lower transaction costs. 
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 With regards to the governance structures of EASA, the Commission 
proposed an Administrative Board composed of one representative from the 
Commission, one representative from the European Parliament and one 
representative from each Member State. It appears that the Commission was 
concerned to secure influence over the Board. For instance, the Commission 
suggested that the Board be resSRQVLEOHIRUWKHDGRSWLRQRI($6$¶VZRUN
programme but only after the programme had been approved by the 
Commission. It was also suggested that the Board would be in charge of 
appointing the Director on proposal from the Commission and the members of 
the Board of Appeal from a list of suitable candidates drawn up by the 
Commission.  
 7KH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVHGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VEXGJHWEHFRPSRVHGRI
contributions from the Community and third European countries, income from 
fees paid by those who use the agency¶VFHUWLILFDWLRQVHUYLFHVDQGFKDUJHVIRU
services provided by the agency in the fields of training, publications and 
similar. In the recitals, the Commission indicated that any subsidies coming 
from the Community budget would have to go through the usual Community 
budgetary procedure. However, in article 50 of the proposal the Commission 
wrote that the Board would be responsible for granting the Director budgetary 
GLVFKDUJHRQWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV 
   
6.2.4 The European Parliament Ȃ the first reading 
In December 2000, the Commission submitted its proposal to the European 
Parliament. The Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism was 
assigned the role of committee responsible, and Ingo Schmitt of the EPP-ED 
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group served as rapporteur. A number of other committees were also asked to 
deliver their opinions. After having been considered at several meetings in 
committee, the EP report was discussed and adopted in plenum in September 
2001. 33 
 Documentation and debates from the European Parliament suggest that 
in principle most MEPs were in favour of further integration in the civil 
aviation sector.34 Indeed, the EP report stated that the creation of EASA was 
FRPSOLDQWZLWK³DZLVKILUVWH[SUHVVHGE\WKH(3VHYHUDO\HDUVDJR´(XURSHDQ
Parliament 2001a: 36). As the EP shared the opinion of the Commission and 
the Council that the JAA arrangements were inefficient, it is hardly surprising 
that the EP adopted an amendment stressing the need to avoid duplication and 
emphasised the need to clearly outline the scope of agency activity (European 
Parliament 2001a: 9). This suggests that a wish to increase efficiency was an 
important factor behind EP support for the agency. There is, however, also 
evidence of institutional borrowing playing an important part. In the debates of 
4 September 2001, several speakers made reference to the American FAA and 
the possibility that EASA would become a similar body.   
 The European Commission is frequently cited as a driver of integration. 
In the case of EASA, however, it is evident that the EP proposed to take 
integration further than the Commission. The EP rapporteur stated that most of 
WKHPHPEHUVLQKLV(3FRPPLWWHHZHUH³LQIDYRXURIH[WHQGLQJWKH$JHQF\¶V
DUHDVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD: 38). For instance, the EP 
suggested that EASA take on a more prominent role in assisting Member States 
                                                 
33
 1RWDOORI6FKPLWW¶VSURSRVHGDPHQGPHQWVZHUHDGRSWHGEXWDVWKHIDOOHQDPHQGPHQWVZHUH
not of direct relevance to the analysis conducted in this thesis detailed information about these 
have been omitted. 
34
 It must, however, be noted that everybody was not happy with the proposal.  
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and the Community in relations with third countries. More significantly, the EP 
YRWHGWRH[WHQGWKHDJHQF\¶VPDQGDWHWRLQFOXGHWKHGUDZLQJXSRIQHFHVsary 
measures to implement the regulation where the Commission originally 
proposed that the agency was to assist the Commission (European Parliament 
2001a: 15). Recalling that my theoretical framework stipulates that delegation 
of the task to draft specific legislation is evidence in favour of the rational 
choice institutionalist efficiency hypothesis, I argue that this is yet another 
H[DPSOHRIWKH(3¶VFRQFHUQZLWKHIILFLHQF\,QFRQWUDVWWRWKHFUHGLEOH
commitment hypothesis, the EP did not appear to be having any strong desire 
to insulate decisions from political opinion. Instead, we can note that the EP 
deemed it necessary that the agency be obliged to consult widely, which would 
include sampling the opinions of employee and user organisations (European 
Parliament 2001a: :KLOVWWKH(3ZLVKHGWRH[WHQGWKHDJHQF\¶VPDQGDWH
LWDOVRVKRZHGDZDUHQHVVRIWKH(&-UXOLQJWKDW³DGHOHJDWLQJDXWKRULW\PD\QRW
confer upon the authority receiving the delegation powers different from those 
which it has itself UHFHLYHGXQGHUWKH7UHDW\´Meroni/High Authority, Case 
9/56 ECR [1957-58] p. 133, see European Parliament 2001b). 
 As to the governance structure of the agency, the European Parliament 
(2001a: 21) wished to see a Board made up of one representative per Member 
State and one member from the Commission (2001a: 21). The EP wanted to 
grant the agency more independence than did the Commission (see European 
Parliament 2001a: 38; European Parliament 2001b). For instance, Schmitt 
FDOOHGIRU³DVWURQJHUUHPLW´IRUWhe Board (European Parliament 2001b), and it 
ZDVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVHGULJKWWRSURSRVHPHPEHUVWR
($6$¶V%RDUGVRI$SSHDOEHGURSSHGLQRUGHUWRUHLQIRUFHWKHLQGHSHQGHQFH
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of the agency (European Parliament 2001a: 24). Voices were also heard 
arguing for the importance of expertise as the grounds for appointment, which 
supports the rational choice institutionalist idea that agency creation is 
supported as a means to ensure technical expertise (European Parliament 
2001b). Here it is also interesting to note that the EP gave up its own right to 
DSSRLQWD%RDUGPHPEHUZLWKWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQWKDWLWZRXOGEH³LQOLQHZLWKWKH
GLYLVLRQRISRZHUV´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 22). Overall, it would appear 
that the EP was more concerned about securing its supervisory powers than 
having a role in the governance of the agency.35 Another point to note about 
WKH(3¶VYLHZVRQWKHVWUXFWXUHRI($6$LVWKDWWKH(3HPSKDVLVHGWKH
importance of agency structure being transparent to the public, and argued that 
a harmonisation of agency structures would be needed to ensure this (European 
Parliament 2001a: 64; see European Parliament 2001b, statement by 
Muermeling). This, I argue, is evidence that there was a concern with 
institutional borrowing in the sense that the EP wanted European agencies to 
display similar structures regardless of their field of activity. 
 7KH(3¶VGLVFXVVLRQVRQWKHDJHQF\¶VILQDQFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVIRFXVHG
on the issue of control. The EP was careful to ensure some control over the 
budget DQGDUJXHGWKDWGHFHQWUDOLVHGDJHQFLHVPXVWIROORZ³the general 
budgetary procedures´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 7). The fact that a part of 
WKHDJHQF\¶VEXGJHWZRXOGFRPHIURPDQ(&VXEVLG\ZDVVHHQDVDPHDQVWR
achieve political control. Moreover, the EP stated that it must be beyond doubt 
                                                 
35
 Evidence to support this can be found in amendments proposing that the EP should have the 
right to hear the Director and the emphasis on a right of the EP to be kept informed about the 
effectiveness of civil aviation regulation (see European Parliament 2001a: 17; 23). Following 
on from this, the EP also wished to see clearer provisions to ensure transparency, insisting that 
($6$UHVHDUFKEHSXEOLVKHGDQGWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNSURJUDPPHEHDYDLODEOHLQDOORIILFLDO
languages (European Parliament 2001a: 17; 19).  
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that EASA and its staff could be subjected to OLAF checks, something which 
was not made explicit in the proposal from the Commission. 
 
6.2.5 The Councilǯcommon position  
In December 2001, the Council adopted a common position on the EASA 
establishment legislation. Whilst agreeing with the objectives of the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOWKH&RXQFLOUHZRUNHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VWH[WWRTXLWH
some extent.36  When drafting its common position, the Council claimed to 
have considered the EP amendments from the first reading as well as the 
opinion of the EESC (see Council of the European Union 2001: 66).37  
The Council wished to entrust more tasks and powers to the agency 
than originally proposed by the Commission. For instance, the Council went 
further in its emphasis on environmental concerns, and gave the agency a 
larger role to play in assisting Member States with their international 
obligations (Council of the European Union 2001: 46; 52). In agreement with 
the EP, the Council was also in favour of giving the agency the right to issue 
certificates, which shows that, in this instance, it was the co-legislators which 
made decisions to make EASA a de jure UHJXODWRU\DJHQF\7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
statement was much more vague on this issue.  
The Council wanted to see a Board consisting of representatives from 
the Commission and from Member States (Council of the European Union 
2001: 54). The Council suggestion was that the Board would be in charge of 
                                                 
36
 When comparing the two documents it becomes apparent that the Council common position 
LVPXFKPRUHGHWDLOHGLQSDUWLFXODUZLWKUHJDUGVWRGHILQLWLRQVWKDQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRULJLQDO
proposal. 
37
 It was also noted that the Committee of the Regions had been consulted but that it did not 
deliver an opinion (Council of the European Union 2001: 65).  
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appointing the Director from a list of candidates drawn up by the Commission, 
not on proposal from the Commission as the Commission suggested (Council 
of the European Union 2001: 55). Furthermore, the Council suggested that 
³PHULWDQGGRFXPHQWHGFRPSHWHQFHDQGH[SHULHQFHUHOHYDQWIRUFLYLODYLDWLRQ´
ZHUHWREHJURXQGVIRUWKH'LUHFWRU¶VDSSRLQWPHQW&RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ
Union 2001: ZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH&RXQFLOZHUHHQYLVDJLQJWKHDJHQF\¶V
becoming a centre of expertise as suggested by rational choice institutionalist 
theory. 
The Council aJUHHGZLWKWKHRWKHULQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWWKHDJHQF\¶VEXGJHW
ought to consist of fees paid by users, by a subsidy from the Community 
budget and contributions from third countries (Council of the European Union 
2001: 58). The Council held the opinion that budgetary discharge should be 
granted to the Director by the EP (Council of the European Union 2001: 58). 
With regards to combating fraud, the Council was in agreement with the EP. 
 
6.2.6 The European Parliament Ȃ the second reading 
7KH&RXQFLO¶VFRPPRQSRVLWion was received by the EP in January 2002, and 
after discussions and debates in committee, the amended common position was 
adopted in April the same year (European Parliament 2002a).  
 Throughout the second reading proceedings, the key objective of 
ensuring a high, uniform level of safety in civil aviation was emphasised, 
which could be seen as evidence in support of a credible commitment concern 
being an important motive behind agency establishment. For instance, the EP 
rapporteur claimed that uniform staQGDUGVZRXOG³SURPRW>H@DQGHQKDQF>H@WKH
&RPPXQLW\¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOGWKDWLVZLWKHVSHFLDOUHIHUHQFHWRWKH
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$PHULFDQVLWXDWLRQ´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD6WDWHPHQWVPDGHLQWKH
debates also pointed to the benefit of EASA establishment on the aviation 
industry (European Parliament 2002b). A point which makes EASA stand out 
from the majority of Community Agencies is that the Commission, which 
otherwise holds the sole right of legislative initiative, cannot change technical 
UXOHVLQWKHDJHQF\¶VILeld of expertise without coordinating with the agency 
ILUVW7KLVDVSHFWRI($6$ZDVGHWHUPLQHGGXULQJWKH(3¶VVHFRQGUHDGLQJ
(European Parliament 2002a: 10). 
 In its discussions on the governance structure of the agency, the EP 
focused on the level of agency independence, in particular from the 
Commission; several speakers in the debates emphasised this point. Moreover, 
it was suggested that the position of the Director be strengthened and that s/he 
would be given the task of proposing the other Directors, who would then be 
appointed by the Board (European Parliament 2002b: 11). It was also 
suggested that the Board be given the power to dismiss the Director (European 
Parliament 2002b: 12). 
 7KHLVVXHVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VILQDQFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGEXGJHWGLGQot 
attract much attention. However, the Committee on Budgetary Control was 
GLVDSSRLQWHGWKDWLWVLGHDVRQKRZWREXGJHW($6$¶VLQFRPHZHUHQRW
approved (European Parliament 2002a). 
 
6.2.7 The opinion of the Commission and Council approval 
The Commission agUHHGWRDOOWKHDPHQGPHQWVIURPWKH(3¶VVHFRQGUHDGLQJ
(see European Commission 2002: 3). All changes related to the authority of the 
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Director were readily accepted.38 Whilst eventually agreeing to amendments 
strengthening agency autonomy and increasing thHDJHQF\¶VLQIOXHQFHRYHU
regulation, the Commission made references to its right of initiative guaranteed 
by the Treaties. In the EP Debates of 9 April 2002, the Commission 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH'H3DODFLRH[SODLQHGWKDWKLVLQVWLWXWLRQKDG³VHYHUDO
reservations with regard to any wording that could interfere with its right of 
LQLWLDWLYH´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD7KLVJLYHVVXSSRUWWRWKHZLGHO\
accepted statement that the Commission guard this right with jealousy. The 
Transport/Telecommunications constellation of the Council of Ministers 
DSSURYHGWKH(3¶VDPHQGPHQWVWRWKHFRPPRQSRVLWLRQDWDPHHWLQJLQ-XQH
2002.39 
 
6.2.8 The European Economic and Social Committee 
The EESC was consulted in December 2000 and adopted its opinion in May 
2001. 
 Overall, the EESC was positive to EASA establishment. The committee 
agreed with the underlying principles and the idea that collective action would 
be beneficial. The EESC also had a number of reservations, however. 
 Most notably, the EESC wanted to give the agency more independence 
ZLWKUHJDUGVWRLWV³VSHFLILFWHFKQLFDOUXOHPDNLQJSRZHUV´DQG³WHFKQLFDO
LPSOHPHQWLQJSRZHUV´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO&RPPLWWHH 44). 
In the proposal, the EESC argued, EASA was given a role in preparing 
legislation but it would be in accordance with Commission recommendations. 
                                                 
38
 $OUHDG\LQWKHGHEDWHVDWWKHWLPHRIWKH(3¶VILUVWUHDGLQJ'H3DODFLRRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
declared that his institution would agree to amendments on this issue (see European Parliament 
2001b). 
39
 7KHLWHPZDVOLVWHGDVDQµ$¶LWHP 
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According to the EESC, the agency ought to be given the right to refuse to 
prepare legislation that it regarded as unsound from an aviation safety point of 
YLHZ2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKH((6&EHOLHYHGWKDW($6$¶Vrole in international 
relations should be simply to assist the Commission. Overall, this suggests that 
the EESC wanted the agency to focus on key technical tasks, and that it ought 
to have independence from political actors in doing so.   
In terms of management, the committee thought that whilst the proposal 
VWUHVVHGWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHDJHQF\¶V'LUHFWRUIURPJRYHUQPHQWVWKH
implications of the proposal would be a Director rather heavily dependent on 
the Commission. Furthermore, the EESC thought that aviation safety expertise 
should be more clearly emphasised as a criterion for employment. This is an 
indication that the committee envisaged EASA as a centre of expertise as 
hypothesised by rational choice institutionalist theory. At the same time, 
however, the EESC thought that increased involvement of stakeholders in 
DVSHFWVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNZRXOGEHEHQHILFLDO 
7KH((6&GLGQRWFRPPHQWRQWKHDJHQF\¶VEXGJHWDQGILQDQFLDO
arrangements. 
 
6.2.9 EASA today: finding its role in governance 
The study of documents and debates surrounding EASA establishment 
indicated that there were ideas of extending the scope of EASA activity at a 
later stage. This happened in 2008, when the founding legislation was repealed 
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and replaced by Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. The agency is now responsible 
for certification in a wider range of fields than was initially the case.40 
 Safety is the prime concern of the agency (see Interview Commission 
2IILFLDO7KHDJHQF\¶VWDVNVDUHRIDKLJKO\WHFKQLFDOQDWXUHZKLFKUHTXLUHV 
specialist knowledge. According to an official at EASA, these tasks cannot be 
done by generalists in Brussels, and the Commission is not in a position to 
change this by recruiting personnel with the technical knowledge required 
(Interview EASA Official). As reJDUGVWKHDJHQF\¶VWDVNVLQWHUYLHZVZLWK
people in possession of expert knowledge of EASA clarified significant 
GLIIHUHQFHVDVWRWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQGUDIWLQJOHJLVODWLRQYHUVXVWKHDJHQF\¶V
role in certification. A Commission official I interviewed about EASA 
maintained that although the agency drafts regulations, the right of legislative 
initiative is still with the Commission (Interview Commission Official 1). 
Having said that, the same official also mentioned that, in most instances, the 
Commission foOORZV($6$¶VLGHDV7KLVZDVFRQILUPHGE\DQRIILFLDODW
EASA and an MEP with significant insight into the workings of the agency 
(Interviews EASA Official; MEP 2). As regards certification on the other hand, 
the Commission has never had such a role, Commission Official 1 explained. 
Prior to EASA establishment, the responsibility for certification rested with 
Member State authorities. These still have some responsibilities and carry out 
tasks in situations where proximity and knowledge of the local language are 
LPSRUWDQW7KHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQLVVXLQJVDQFWLRQVDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIQRQ-
compliance follows the same logic. The agency carries out inspections in 
Member States to verify if laws are followed. If not, the agency reports to the 
                                                 
40
 Initially the agency was responsible for the certification of aeronautical products. The 
mandate to issue certifications has since been extended to include pilots and their training (see 
Regulation No 1592/2002; Regulation No 216/2008) 
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Commission which can then decide to take the Member State to the Court of 
Justice. In case of non-compliance with certificates, on the other hand, the 
agency has freedom to act on its own, for instance by withdrawing the 
certificate.  
 There appear to be some differences in opinion between the 
Commission and EASA as regards how much the agency should do. According 
to Commission Official 1, EASA is a proactive agency with committed staff, 
but, as a consequence, the agency has a tendency to plan too many tasks. 
Agencies wish to grow and do things even better, Commission Official 1 
continued. An official from EASA mentioned that EASA wants a larger role 
but thought that maybe the Commission has other considerations (Interview 
EASA Official).   
 My study of the process leading up to establishment shows that the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VOHYHORILQIOXHQFHRYHUWKHDJHQF\ZDVVXEMHFWWRGHEDWH$Q
official at EASA believed that the Commission takes a strong role, whereas an 
MEP interviewed for this project seemed to be of the opinion that the 
relationship is rather balanced (Interviews EASA Official; MEP 2). The 
&RPPLVVLRQZRXOGOLNHWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGWREHPRUHDFWLYHDWWLPHV
(Interview Commission Official 1). In an interview, Commission Official 1 
indicated that that some Member State representatives, usually those from 
states with large aviation industries, tend to be more active than others. 
 The budget has been a somewhat problematic issue for the agency. The 
reason for this is that it has been difficult to find the right level for the fees and 
charges. Initially, the fees and charges were set too low (Interview Commission 
Official 1). As a result, the subsidy from the EC had to be used to cover agency 
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tasks it was not meant to cover, and then there was not enough money to cover 
the core tasks that ought to have been covered by the EC subsidy. This 
VLWXDWLRQKDVVLQFHEHHQUHPHGLHG$WWKHPRPHQWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZLV
that the agency enjoys no budgetary luxury, but the resources should be 
sufficient to cover the core safety tasks (Interview Commission Official 1). At 
the moment, the agency receives less money than it requests. There are MEPs 
who wish to see a larger budget for EASA as it is believed that it would 
improve the situation for small aviation companies (see Interview MEP 2). It is 
believed that interaction with EASA is easier for larger companies, in terms of 
coping with fees but also because of language issues. An EASA official 
mentioned that large industry is happy with EASA whereas small industry is 
less contented (Interview EASA Official). 
 Control over EASA is a delicate matter. The agency is subjected to the 
same type of official control mechanisms as other Community Agencies. 
However, an official at the Commission thought that daily contact was the best 
control mechanism (Interview Commission Official 1). The wider public is 
DEOHWRIROORZPDQ\RI($6$¶VDFWLYLWLHVYLDWKHDJHQF\¶VH[WHQVLYHZHEVLWH
The MEP I interview about EASA said that EASA is more transparent than the 
Council, and it is difficult to argue with that (Interview MEP 2). As stressed 
WKURXJKRXWWKLVSDSHUDVLJQLILFDQWSDUWRI($6$¶VZRUNFRQFHUQVWKH
certification of components manufactured by aviation industry. There are, 
therefore, instances where information must be kept confidential (Interview 
Commission Official 1). Industry espionage and related activities could be 
reasons for this. As is the case with other Community Agencies, the extensive 
regulation around financial matters that must be followed is regarded as a 
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problem. An EASA official described the UXOHVDVD³QLJKWPDUH´,QWHUYLHZ
EASA Official). The Commission is sympathetic to this view, and a 
representative confirmed that the rules are widely regarded as heavy (Interview 
Commission Official 1).  
 
6.3 Discussion 
EASA, the prime concern of which is to ensure a high level of safety in the 
civil aviation field, is the most powerful of the Community Agencies included 
in this study. Its responsibility for certification gives the agency crucial 
influence over the aviation market, and its right to draft legislation places it in a 
unique position to influence Community policy. EASA is also one of the first 
Community Agencies to have been established by the codecision procedure. 
Established in 2002, its founding legislation has already been repealed and its 
mandate extended. For each set of changes there is, and will be, another 
motivation. The focus of this discussion, as of the whole thesis, is on the initial 
establishment of the agency, however.  
In this chapter, I have traced the process leading up to the establishment 
RI($6$DQGUHIOHFWHGRQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFHWRGD\,QWKH
following sections, I will discuss the findings in relation to the theoretical 
framework outlined in chapter 2. 
 
6.3.1 Rational choice institutionalist theory 
Rational choice institutionalist theory is frequently used to explain the 
establishment of regulatory agencies. This theory would suggest that EASA 
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was created to lower political transaction costs, which could be done in three 
ways. First, the agency could serve as a centre of expertise. Second, the agency 
could be a means to ensure credible commitment. Third, the agency could have 
been established as a means to increase efficiency. Throughout my research on 
EASA, I have found ample evidence to support each one of these three 
hypotheses, and no evidence to contradict them. 
 Aviation safety is a highly technical field, in which advanced technical 
and scientific knowledge is essential for informed decision-making. When 
reading the founding legislation of EASA, the techniFDOQDWXUHRIWKHDJHQF\¶V
field of operation becomes even more apparent. The tasks delegated to the 
agency, which include drawing up certification rules on airworthiness and 
drafting technical legislation, are of a highly technical nature. Moreover, the 
legislation contains a large number of references to technical details. Given the 
generalist nature of the Commission, it is clear that the Commission cannot 
recruit and retain the level of expertise required for these tasks within its 
administration. As mentioned in section 6.2.9, this point was emphasised by an 
official at EASA, and a representative of the Commission stated that the 
Commission had never had certification tasks. 7KH&RXQFLO¶VVXJJHVWLRQWR
include more precise requirements for the post of Director also serves as 
evidence in favour of this hypothesis. Previously, and to an extent nowadays, 
expertise can be found at Member State level. After EASA establishment, 
however, advanced specialist technical expertise was gathered within one body 
for the entire EU. This creates synergies and provides a critical mass of 
expertise that could not be replicated by an individual Member State. The 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOUHIHUVVSHFLILFDOO\to the agency as a specialist body, 
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DQGWKHDJHQF\¶VXQLTXHUROHDVDFentre of expertise is further demonstrated by 
the fact that the Commission cannot change details of technical regulations in 
the field without prior coordination with EASA. 
 Strong support for the credible commitment hypothesis can also be 
found within my study. The fact that regulatory tasks have been delegated to 
the agency is the most notable hard evidence in favour of this hypothesis. 
Throughout the establishment process, the EP, the Council and the EESC also 
emphasised the importance of agency independence from the Commission. For 
instance, we can recall the EESC calls for increased agency independence with 
UHJDUGVWRLWV³VSHFLILFWHFKQLFDOUXOHPDNLQJSRZHUV´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG
Social Committee 2001: 44). The EESC also TXHVWLRQHGZKHWKHU³WKHFXUUHnt 
institutional framework could not accommodate a more independent position 
IRU($6$´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO&RPPLWWHH 40-41). The idea 
WKDW($6$FRXOGEHSOD\DUROHLQSURPRWLQJWKH(8¶VFUHGLELOLW\
internationally became apparent in the EP debates at the time of its second 
reading when the EP rapporteur stated that uniform standards would 
³SURPRW>H@DQGHQKDQF>H@WKH&RPPXQLW\¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOGWKDWLVZLWK
HVSHFLDOUHIHUHQFHWRWKH$PHULFDQVLWXDWLRQ´(uropean Parliament 2002a). 
 The fact that EASA has been given the task of drafting specific 
legislation serves as hard evidence in favour of the efficiency hypothesis. As 
EASA drafts the technical details of regulations, the Commission could focus 
its work elsewhere. Moreover, as EASA has the expertise in house, the agency 
needs to spend fewer resources gathering the required information than the 
Commission would need to do. As to certification, it is easy to see why a 
central European agency would be more efficient. Aviation companies, which 
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were some of the actors pushing hard for EASA establishment, can now turn to 
one body rather than twenty-seven different ones, which is clearly more 
efficient from their point of view. The fact that EASA establishment would be 
in the interest of industry was alluded to in the EP debates in April 2002. 
Further support for efficiency as a driver towards EASA creation can be found 
in the fact that the previous JAA arrangements were widely criticised precisely 
for their lack of efficiency.  
 
6.3.2 Sociological institutionalist theory 
)URPVRFLRORJLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP,GHGXFHGWKHK\SRWKHVLVWKDW($6$¶V
establishment was a result of institutional borrowing, which resulted from 
social processes legitimising the creation of this type of body. My research 
suggests that this hypothesis can explain the institutional design of the agency.   
At first, European level cooperation in the air safety field was of an 
intergovernmental nature, but this institutional form was found wanting. At the 
time of EASA establishment there were already a significant number of 
Community Agencies in place on which the new agency could be modelled. In 
the process leading up to EASA establishment, the EP argued that a 
harmonisation of agency structures would make them more transparent to the 
public (European Parliament 2001a: 64). This argument points to a vision that 
the choice of a particular institutional form is legitimised if it is a replication of 
an already existing form. The governance structures of EASA are indeed very 
similar, and often even identical to other Community Agencies established 
around the same time. In addition, a representative of the Commission 
PHQWLRQHGWKDWDJHQFLHVZHUH³IDVKLRQDEOH´DWWKLVWLPH,QWHUYLHZ
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Commission Official 1). The influence of the American FAA must also be 
taken into account, and references to this agency were made throughout the 
EASA establishment process. The aviation industry in particular was keen to 
see a European authority operating along similar lines as the American 
authority. Thus, I argue that the idea of having a regulatory agency in the civil 
aviation field was borrowed from America, and the Community Agency model, 
developed within the EC/EU provided a model for a specific European body. 
 
6.3.3 Historical institutionalist theory 
Historical institutionalism leads to the hypothesis that the establishment of 
EASA can be explained through careful consideration of the historical context 
in which it was created. My research provides some support for this. 
 First we can note that European-level cooperation on air safety began in 
the early 1990s, which coincides with the final steps towards single market 
creation. The link between the establishment of EASA and the finalisation of 
the single market is then made explicit on several occasions throughout the 
establishment process. For instance, as mentioned in section 6.2.2, the 
Commission (2001: FOHDUO\VSHOWRXWWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ³>D@KLJK
XQLIRUPOHYHO´RIFLWL]HQDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHFWLRQZKLFK($6$ZDV
created to achieve in WKHDLUVDIHW\ILHOGDQGWKHIDFLOLWDWLRQRI³WKHIUHH
PRYHPHQWRIJRRGVSHUVRQVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHW´7KH
VDPHLGHDZDVH[SUHVVHGLQWKH&RXQFLO¶VFRPPRQSRVLWLRQ)XUWKHUPRUHDQ
important aspect of the single market programme was to remove barriers to 
WUDGHLQFOXGLQJ³QDWLRQDOUXOHVWKDWLPSHGHHFRQRPLFH[FKDQJH´Young 
2005: 102). In short, the finalisation of the single market led to de-regulation. 
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There is evidence to suggest that de-regulation of the air traffic market raised 
concerns about potential compromises on safety. To prevent this from 
happening, the EP rapporteur called for re-regulation at the European level in 
the EP debates at the time of the first reading. At the same time, we must not 
underestimate the importance of industry pressure as an explanatory factor 
behind EASA. The reason industry pushed for the establishment of a European 
agency was that there are obvious efficiency gains from having to engage with 
one European level agency rather than several national agencies. This benefit 
would remain regardless of the existence of the internal market; for this reason 
we can assume that industry could have influenced EU decision-makers to 
establish the agency even without the single market. However, as industry most 
likely was instrumental in lobbying for the creation of the single market itself, 
it is not straightforward to disentangle the various arguments.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The establishment of EASA has proved to be a complex process where each of 
the new institutionalist strands of theory can contribute to our understanding by 
explaining different aspects of agency establishment.  
To explain the tasks delegated to the agency, my research has clearly 
pointed to the importance of functional needs as emphasised by rational choice 
institutionalist theory. Due to the highly specialist knowledge required, there 
was no, or at least very little, opportunity for the Commission to perform the 
tasks the agency was set up to do. Throughout the establishment process, there 
was a clear emphasis on the need for agency independence. The Council, the 
(3DQGWKH((6&DOOYRWHGWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHDVDQLQGHSHQGHQW
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regulator, which indicates a wish to insulate regulatory decisions from direct 
political pressure. The previously tried intergovernmental cooperation was 
found inefficient, and one reason for this was that there was no straightforward 
procedure to create binding rules.  
Sociological institutionalism is better suited to explaining the choice of 
the agency form. I have argued that previous Community Agencies served as a 
model for a European level body and that the idea to create an agency in the air 
safety field can be traced to the US.  
Finally, the contribution of historical institutionalism can help us 
explain the timing of agency establishment. De-regulation at national levels 
associated with the internal market made some actors call for re-regulation at 
the European level. At the same time, it must be noted that industry, due to the 
expected efficiency gains of having to engage with one agency rather than 
several, most likely would have pushed for the establishment of the agency 
regardless of the existence of the single market. 
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Tracing the establishment of the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX)  
7.1 Introduction 
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders (FRONTEX) was created in 2004 via the consultation 
procedure. The founding legislation is Council Regulation No 2007/2004. 
FRONTEX is an advisory agency, but its area of activity makes it stand out 
from the other advisory agencies. As issues related to border control are not 
only strongly associated with the nation state but also politically very sensitive, 
the fact that the EU has created an agency in the field is a significant milestone 
in the development of European governance. The speed at which border 
management cooperation was institutionalised is equally remarkable. The EU 
took a decision to institutionalise cooperation on border management through 
the establishment of FRONTEX merely a few years after immigration and 
asylum issues were transferred to the first pillar in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and became subject to the Community method. Despite the close association 
between border management issues and the nation state, and the highly 
contentious nature of the policy area, the legislative process was speedy. It took 
less than a year from the presentation of the Commission proposal to the 
production of the final legislative text. 
 In this chapter, I will trace and analyse the process leading up to the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWRI)5217(;DQGUHIOHFWRQWKHDJHQF\¶VFXUUHQWUROHLQ
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governance.  Following the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2, the 
focus will be on timing of establishment, tasks, governance structures and 
resources, all of which are factors new public management literature has 
LGHQWLILHGDVVLJQLILFDQWIRUDQDJHQF\¶VUROHLQSROLF\IRUPDWLRQ 
 From rational choice institutionalism I deduced the hypotheses that 
FRONTEX was established in order to lower political transaction costs by 
serving as a centre of expertise, ensuring credible commitment and 
contributing to increased efficiency (see (SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ3ROODFN
2003). Out of these three hypotheses, I argue that the hypothesis pointing to 
efficiency concerns holds the most significant explanatory value with regards 
to FRONTEX.  My research shows that dissatisfaction with the previous 
system for cooperation in the border management field (SCIFA+), and its 
perceived inefficiency was an important source of motivation for the creation 
of an agency in the field. There is significantly less support for the other 
rational choice institutionalist hypotheses, i.e. that FRONTEX was created to 
gather technical expertise or to ensure credible commitment. Importantly, 
FRONTEX does not operate in a technical policy area. Whilst there are no 
doubt technical issues related to border control, decisions on who may cross a 
border and how are normative. The current mandate of FRONTEX puts 
HPSKDVLVRQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQFRRUGLQDWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHDFWLYLWLHVZKLFK
indicates that the role of the agency is not to become a centre where all relevant 
expertise is gathered. The agency is also dependent on Member States to 
FRQWULEXWHUHVRXUFHVWRWKHDJHQF\¶VRSHUDWLRQVZKLFKPHDQVWKDWWKHDJHQF\
has no, or very limited means, of upholding credible commitment to any 
commonly agreed policies.  
163 
 
The sociological institutionalist idea that agency establishment can be 
explained by institutional borrowing, which occurs as a result of the formation 
of a normative consensus about the desirability of this particular institutional 
form, has explanatory value for the establishment of FRONTEX. By the time 
FRONTEX was established, Community Agencies had become established as 
an institutional form, and my research revealed hard evidence in the form of 
direct references to previous agencies serving as models. 
 Historical institutionalism seeks explanations for the establishment and 
development of institutions in the historical context. As regards FRONTEX, 
this chapter shows that the historical context plays a crucial role in explaining 
the establishment of the agency. Based on available sources, I argue that the 
planned EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe led to widespread 
FRQFHUQDERXWWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKH(8¶VQHZH[WHUQDOERUGHUVZKLFKZDV
further fuelled by tragic incidents involving refugees seeking to reach the 
southern coasts of Europe. The transfer of immigration and asylum to the first 
pillar opened up the possibility to establish a Community Agency in the field. 
 In the chapter, I show that the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, 
and that several explanations are appropriate. Whereas the rational choice 
institXWLRQDOLVWHIILFLHQF\K\SRWKHVLVFRXOGH[SODLQWKHDJHQF\¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ
function, the sociological institutionalist hypothesis can explain the choice of 
the Community Agency form, and historical institutionalism can explain the 
timing of agency establishment.  
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7.2 Background and the establishment process 
7.2.1 FRONTEX Ȃ a brief presentation 
7KHFRQWURORIWKH(8¶VH[WHUQDOERUGHUVKDVDOZD\VEHHQWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI
Member States, and the establishment of FRONTEX does not change this; the 
DJHQF\¶VUROHLs to ensure that present and future management of the external 
ERUGHUVUXQVDVVPRRWKO\DVSRVVLEOHE\FRRUGLQDWLQJWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
implementation of Community law on border management. The agency may 
cooperate with Europol, international organisations and third country 
authorities with responsibility in the relevant field. Risk analysis is at heart of 
WKHDJHQF\¶VDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKHWDVNRIIROORZLQJXSUHOHYDQW
research. Importantly, the agency also plays a role in assisting Member States 
in a number of ways. For instance, the agency may help Member States with 
coordination of operational cooperation (including cooperation with third 
countries) and with training of border guards. In particular, the agency is to 
³DVVLVW0HPEHU6WDWHVLQFLUFXmstances requiring increased technical and 
RSHUDWLRQDODVVLVWDQFHDWH[WHUQDOERUGHUV´(Council Regulation No 2007/2004, 
article 2). Member States can propose joint operations and pilot projects, but it 
LV)5217(;¶VWDVNWRHYDOXDWHDSSURYHDQGFRRUGLQDWH such endeavours. 
What has proved to be more controversial is that FRONTEX has also been 
JLYHQWKHWDVNWR³SURYLGH0HPEHU6WDWHVZLWKWKHQHFHVVDU\VXSSRUWLQ
RUJDQLVLQJMRLQWUHWXUQRSHUDWLRQV´&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQDUWLFOH
which includes a UROHLQLGHQWLI\LQJ³EHVWSUDFWLFHVRQWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIWUDYHO
documents and the removal of illegally present third-FRXQWU\QDWLRQDOV´
(Council Regulation 2007/2004, article 9). 
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 The Management Board of FRONTEX is composed of two 
Commission representatives, and one representative per Member State 
excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland, which only have observer status 
due to their not taking part in the Schengen agreement (EC No 2007/2004, 
article 21). The founding legislation also makes some provisions for the 
inclusion of representatives from non-EU countries involved with the 
Schengen agreement. Board members serve for a term of four years, which is 
once renewable. It is notable that the founding legislation does not specify on 
what grounds these Board members are selected. The Board appoints the 
Director based on a list of candidates drawn up by the Commission following 
advertising of the post in the Official Journal amongst other places. Article 26 
of the founding legislation specifies that the Director is to be appointed on the 
basis of merit, documented experience of management and administration, and 
UHOHYDQWH[SHULHQFHIRUWKHDJHQF\¶VILHOGRIDFWLYLW\7KH%RDUGKROGV
disciplinary authority over the Director (Council Regulation No 2007/2004, 
artiFOH$QRWKHURIWKH%RDUG¶VGXWLHVLVWRSURGXFHDJHQHUDOUHSRUWRQWKH
DJHQF\¶VDFWLYLWLHVHDFK\HDUDQGIRUZDUGLWWRWKH(3WKH&RXQFLOWKH
Commission, the Court of Auditors and the European Economic and Social 
Committee. It must also be made public.  
 In August 2007, FRONTEX had 78 employees but there were plans to 
increase the number of staff to around 140 people by the end of the year 
(FRONTEX 2007a). Initially, the agency experienced problems with 
recruitment, which were attributed to the lower wages offered in Poland and 
the unclear legal status of agency staff (Easton 2007). However, the agency has 
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PDQDJHGWRJURZVXEVWDQWLDOO\$FFRUGLQJWRWKHDJHQF\¶VZHEVLWHWKHDJHQF\
now employs 203 people (FRONTEX 2009). 
Originally, the budget for 2ZDVDERXW¼ 22 million (FRONTEX 
2007b). However, following amendments increasing the subsidy from the 
(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\WKHDJHQF\KDGDEXGJHWRIDERXW¼ 42 million in 2007. 
7KHVXEVLG\IURPWKH&RPPXQLW\ZDVLQFUHDVHGWRDERXW¼ 41 million (to be 
coPSDUHGZLWKDERXW¼ 21 million, which was the original subsidy). The other 
sources of revenue (contributions from the Schengen associated countries 
¼ 400 FRQWULEXWLRQVIURPWKH8.DQG,UHODQG¼ 400 000 and voluntary 
contributions from Member States and Schengen associated countries 
¼ 200 000) have remained the same. 
  
7.2.2 Setting the context: EU enlargement and migration 
concerns 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced formalised intergovernmental cooperation on 
justice and home affairs issues. When visa, asylum and immigration issues 
were transferred to the first pillar and came under the Community method at 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the scope for cooperation changed fundamentally. 
Changing institutional conditions for cooperation coincided with Justice and 
Home Affairs issues, particularly irregular immigration, becoming hot topics of 
debate at EU-level. The planned enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 
Malta and Cyprus naturally played a crucial role in raising the profile of these 
issues as enlargemenWZDVZLGHO\SHUFHLYHGWRUHVXOWLQWKH(8¶VKDYLQJPRUH
³YXOQHUDEOH´H[WHUQDOERUGHUV7KHIDFWWKDWPDQ\RIWKHVHQHZ0HPEHU6WDWHV
also had lower institutional capacity than existing Member States raised further 
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concerns about what is often referred to DV³LOOHJDO´RU³LUUHJXODU´LPPLJUDWLRQ
,QWKLVFRQWH[W³LOOHJDO´´LUUHJXODU´LPPLJUDWLRQLVWREHXQGHUVWRRGDVWKH
migration to the EU of non-EU citizens who do not fulfil legally stipulated 
criteria for entry, who do not cross the border at established points of crossing, 
and who often lack identification documents.41  
Malta, which was one of the states to join the EU in 2004, had seen the 
arrival of significant numbers of irregular immigrants for some time. In an 
interview a Maltese official informed me that the country began to see even 
larger numbers of so-FDOOHG³ERDWSHRSOH´LQWKHHDUO\VDQGDVWKLV
LQHYLWDEO\SXWVWUDLQVRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VUHVRXUFHVLWZDVIHOWWKDWDTXLFN
solution was needed (Interview EP Official 1). However, it must be 
rHPHPEHUHGWKDW³ROG´0HPEHU6WDWHVVXFKDV,WDO\DQG6SDLQDOVR
experienced irregular immigration, and that authorities even here perceived this 
to be problematic (see Smith 2003; Hughes 2002). Around the same time, the 
wider public all over Europe became increasingly aware of irregular 
immigration and the suffering of the refugees involved due to incidents such as 
The Monica where nearly 1000 refugees had to be rescued off the ship and 
taken to Sicily (BBC News Online 2002). It is thus not surprising that 
immigration was top of the agenda for the 1999 Tampere Council as well as the 
2002 Seville Council.  
The explanatory memorandum to the Commission (2003a) proposal on 
FRONTEX establishment confirms that the idea of coordinating Member State 
activity in the field of border control was not new. In the previous year, the 
Commission presented a Communication in which it argued in favour of the 
                                                 
41
 ,QWKLVWKHVLVWKHOHVVORDGHGWHUPVµLUUHJXODULPPLJUDWLRQ¶DQGµLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ZLOOEH
used. 
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VHWWLQJXSRIDQ³([WHUQDOERUGHUVSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶FRPPRQXQLW´WKH&RPPRQ
Unit) to the Council and the EP. This idea was quickly taken up by the 
Council, which agreed to set up the Common Unit within the framework of the 
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA). Soon 
also national heads of border control were included and the SCIFA+ working 
group was created. The Common Unit was to take the lead in common policy 
and the co-ordination and control of operational projects.  
However, there appears to have been some dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of the Common Unit, a major shortcoming of which arguably was 
³WKHODFNRIHIIHFWLYHRSHUDWLRQDOFR-RUGLQDWLRQ´European Commission 
2003a: 38). The arrangements at the time were also criticised for their lack of 
³DQDGHTXDWHOHJDOIUDPHZRUN´JXLGHOLQHVIRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQHYDOXDWLRQDQG
monitoring mechanisms and clearly defined objective targets (European 
Commission 2003a: 38). An additional problem with the SCIFA+ arrangement 
was the reliance on project funding (Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; 
FRONTEX Official 2; Commission Official 3). Having to acquire funding 
separately for each initiative made it difficult to plan ahead, and cooperation 
was more of an ad hoc business than a planned strategy. At times, a 
Commission official said, projects that could have reinforced each other 
instead competed for the same funding (Interview Commission Official 3). The 
view that cooperation on irregular immigration between Member States was 
(and is) needed was endorsed by all those I interviewed about FRONTEX, and, 
although it was acknowledged that there still is no absolute consensus as to 
what this cooperation should look like, the interviewees gave me the 
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impression that there was widespread awareness of the problems with the pre-
FRONTEX arrangements. 
In June 2003, the Commission presented a communication to the 
Council DQGWKH(3³RQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDFRPPRQSROLF\RQLOOHJDO
immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, external borders and 
WKHUHWXUQRILOOHJDOUHVLGHQWV´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQE,QWKLV
communication, the Commission argued that limitations of the Common Unit 
with regards to the co-ordination and management of joint operations had been 
GHPRQVWUDWHGDQGWKDW³WKHPRUHRSHUDWLRQDOWDVNVFRXOGEHHQWUXVWHGWRDQHZ
SHUPDQHQW&RPPXQLW\VWUXFWXUH´European Commission 2003b: 7-8). The 
Council Presidency, which at the time was held by Greece, had a similar view 
and pleaded IRUDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHQHHGIRUDQHZ³LQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH´
(European Commission 2003a: 2). More specifically, the representatives of the 
Greek Presidency drew attention to what they perceived to be an evident 
DEVHQFHRI³DPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVPDQGRIDPHWKRGIRULQGHSHQGHQWDQG
WKRURXJKHYDOXDWLRQDVZHOODVIRUWKHSURFHVVLQJDQGXWLOL]DWLRQRIUHVXOWV´
with regards to joint operations and pilot projects (European Commission 
2003a: 2). The European Council endorsed these views to some extent. In June 
LWDGYRFDWHGD³UHLQIRUFHPHQWRIWKH&RPPRQ8QLW´DQGFDOOHGIRUWKH
Commission to perform examinations of the need to establish new institutional 
structures and mechanisms to improve cooperation in operational matters 
related to border management (European Commission 2003a: 3). It appears 
that the Commission began work on a proposal to create an agency at about 
this time, because in the explanatory memorandum to the proposal on 
FRONTEX establishment it is stated that the European Council at its meeting 
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on 16th-17th of October 2003 welcomed the intention by the Commission to put 
forward a proposal on the establishment of an agency. Indeed, several of the 
people interviewed about FRONTEX confirmed that the initiative for the 
agency came from Member States as well as from the Commission (Interviews 
Commission Official 3; FRONTEX Official 1; FRONTEX Official 2). 
 
7.2.3 The proposal from the Commission 
In November 2003, the Commission tabled its proposal for the establishment of 
FRONTEX. The proposal was prepared by the Directorate General for Justice, 
Freedom and SHFXULW\DQGWKHLQWHQWLRQZDV³to meet [the] invitation of the 
(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO´ (European Commission 2003a: 3).  
 In the proposal the Commission stated WKDW³>W@KHPDLQREMHFWLYHRI
Community policy in the field of the EU external borders is to create an 
integrated border management, which would ensure a high and uniform level 
of control and surveillance, an essential prerequisite for an area of freedom, 
VHFXULW\DQGMXVWLFH´European Commission 2003a: 4). 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
LGHDZDVWKDW)5217(;ILWVLQWRWKLVE\ZRUNLQJ³WRLPSURYHWKHoperational 
co-operation between Member States at the external borders and to promote 
solidarity in this field and equivalent level of protection of all the external 
ERUGHUVRIWKH(8´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQD 36). It was also believed 
WKDWWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQDJHQF\ZRXOG³OHDGWRLQFUHDVHGYLVLELOLW\IRUWKH
management RIH[WHUQDOERUGHUVLQWKHSXEOLF´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
2003a: 7). There is a clear emphasis on the agency as a means to increased 
efficiency, which supports the rational choice institutionalist hypothesis that 
agencies are created to lower transaction costs. 
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 The proposed tasks further support the rational choice institutionalist 
idea of agency creation as a response to a need or wish to increase efficiency. 
For instance, the Commission (2003a: 19) proposed that the agency be given 
the tasks of coordinatiQJRSHUDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV³in 
WKHILHOGRIFRQWURODQGVXUYHLOODQFHRIWKHH[WHUQDOERUGHUV´DQG³LQWKHILHOGRI
removal of third-FRXQWU\QDWLRQDOVLOOHJDOO\UHVLGLQJLQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV´,Q
addition to this, the Commission proposed the tasks of carrying out risk 
DQDO\VLVIROORZLQJXSUHOHYDQWUHVHDUFKDQGDVVLVWLQJ³0HPEHU6WDWHVRQ
WUDLQLQJRIQDWLRQDOERUGHUJXDUGV´DVZHOODV³LQFLUFXPVWDQFHVUHTXLULQJ
LQFUHDVHGWHFKQLFDODQGRSHUDWLRQDODVVLVWDQFHDWWKHH[WHUQDOERUGHUV´
(European Commission 2003a: 19). According to the Commission 
(2003a: 7; 37), the coordination of resources was likely to lead to enhanced 
Member State capacity and the establishment of an agency would be a cost 
saving measure. Although the emphasis was on efficiency gains, the 
Commission (2003a: 7) also pointed to a potential role as a centre of expertise 
DUJXLQJWKDW³WKH$JHQF\ZLOOEHLQDEHWWHUSRVLWLRQWKDQHYHQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
itself to accumulate the highly technical know-how on control and surveillance 
RIWKHH[WHUQDOERUGHUV´7KH&RPPLVVLRQD 5) declared itself to be in 
IDYRXURIDODWHUH[WHQVLRQRIWKHDJHQF\¶VWDVNVDUJXLQJWKDWWKHFUHDWLRQRI
)5217(;³FRQVWLWXWHVDFRQFUHWHDQGLPSRUWDQWVWHSWRZDUGVDFKLHYLQJ
solidarity between Member StDWHV´7KHODWWHUVWDWHPHQWFRXOGEHYLHZHGDV
evidence in favour of credible commitment concerns.  
 $VWRWKHDJHQF\¶VJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVHGD
Board with twelve members representing Member States and two 
representatives of the Commission (European Commission 2003a: 24). Due to 
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the link between FRONTEX establishment and the Schengen acquis, the 
Commission (2003a: 8-9) acknowledged that special considerations would 
have to apply to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHSURSRVDOWKHDJHQF\¶VRSHUDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHZRXOGEHGHFLGHG
by the Board, which would also adopt and forward to the EU institutions the 
DJHQF\¶VZRUNSURJUDPPHDQGDQQXDOJHQHUDOUHSRUW(XURSHDQ
Commission 2003a: 24). The Commission (2003a: 24) also proposed that the 
%RDUGEHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIWKHDJHQF\¶V'LUHFWRURQSURSRVDO
from the Commission.    
 As regards the financial arrangements of FRONTEX, the Commission 
(2003a: 16) suggested that the prime source of revenue of the agency ought to 
consist of a subsidy from the Community budget, and that this should be 
subjected to the Community budgetary procedure. Other proposed sources 
were third country contributions, voluntary contributions by Member States 
and fees for services (European Commission 2003a: 28). The Commission 
(2003a: 29-30) proposed that the budget be adopted by the Board and 
implemented by the Director, who would be granted discharge by the EP upon 
a Council recommendation. 
 
7.2.4 The European Parliament 
Although the EP only had consultation rights with regards to FRONTEX, it 
took a keen interest in the establishment of the agency. The EP was officially 
consulted on the proposal in December 2003 (European Parliament 2004a). 
7KH&RPPLWWHHRQ&LWL]HQV¶)Ueedoms and Rights was assigned the role of 
committee responsible, and Christian Ulrik von Boetticher of the PPE-DE 
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group was appointed as rapporteur.42 However, a group of MEPs had already 
put forward a motion for an EP resolution on the proposal to create Dµ%RUGHU
0DQDJHPHQW$JHQF\¶SULRUWRWKHRIILFLDOFRQVXOWDWLRQ(Bigliardo et. al. 2003). 
The report from the committee responsible was discussed and voted on by the 
EP in March 2004 (European Parliament 2004b; 2004c; 2004d). 
 The majority of MEPs were positive to the establishment of 
FRONTEX. It was widely believed that previous arrangements for the 
management of external borders were unsatisfactory, and that the agency 
would contribute to more effective controls (European Parliament 
2004a; 2004b). That efficiency concerns were important is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the EP opposed the idea of allowing the agency to 
set up specialist branches on the grounds that it would not be cost-effective 
(European Parliament 2004a: 16). In line with historical institutionalism, I 
argue that the perceived need for more effective controls must be seen in its 
historical context. The EP report points to instances when the EP has called for 
DQLQWHJUDWHGPDQDJHPHQWRIWKH(8¶VERUGHUVDQGIRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIan 
independent agency as a response to challenges resulting from the enlargement 
of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe (see European Parliament 2004a: 28-
6RPHVWDWHPHQWVPDGHLQWKHGHEDWHVSRLQWHGWRWKHDJHQF\¶VSRWHQWLDOUROH
in fostering trust between Member States and to the importance of common 
policies on border control as a symbol of unity (European Parliament 2004b). 
This suggests that some MEPs saw the agency as a means to ensuring credible 
commitment.   
                                                 
42
 The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy 
and the Committee on Budgets were also asked to deliver opinions. 
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 My study of EP documentation and debates reveals that FRONTEX 
establishment was surrounded by controversy, however. First, we must note 
that support for FRONTEX was not universal. Severe criticism was voiced by 
members of the GUE/NGL JURXSZKRGUHZRQWKHQRWLRQRI³)RUWUHVV
(XURSH´DQGUeferred to FRONTEX as ³DQRWKHUUHSUHVVLYHLQVWUXPHQWLQWKH
so-FDOOHGµILJKWDJDLQVWLOOHJDOLPPLJUDWLRQ¶´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 32). 
7KHVH0(3VIXUWKHUUHJDUGHG)5217(;DV³WKHQXFOHXVRID(XURSHDQERUGHU
police force which will add to the suffering of refugees and migrants at the 
(8¶VH[WHUQDOERUGHUVDQGZLWKLQWKH(8´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 32). 
We can also note scepticism of agencies in general. Whilst the EP rapporteur 
ZDVLQIDYRXURI)5217(;KHGHFODUHGWKH(3WREH³UHJXODUO\
underwhelPHGE\SURSRVDOVIRUWKHVHWWLQJXSRI(8DJHQFLHV´ZKLFKLQGLFDWHV
that there was an element of agency fascination amongst decision-makers 
(European Parliament 2004b). Finally, it was apparent that many MEPs felt 
that their views were not taken into account to a sufficient extent (European 
Parliament 2004a: 29; 2004c; Interview MEP 1).   
 $PDMRUFULWLFLVPIURPWKH(3FRQFHUQHGWKHDJHQF\¶VSURSRVHGWDVNRI
organising joint return operations. There are two key arguments behind the 
opposition to this task (see European Parliament 2004a; 2004b). First, many 
MEPs thought that the EU would first have to agree on common policies on 
YLVDDQGDV\OXPDQGWKDW³LWLVSUHPDWXUHWRVHWXSVXFKDQRSHUDWLRQDO
structure without harmonised standards on for example the definition of a 
UHIXJHH´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 31). Second, there was concern that the 
LQFOXVLRQRIWKLVWDVNZRXOGJLYH)5217(;³WKHFKDUDFWHURIDQµH[SXOVLRQ
175 
 
DJHQF\¶´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 12).43 Following on from this, the EP 
wished to emphaVLVHWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQWKHSUHYHQWLRQRIWUDIILFNLQJZKLFK
ZDVH[SHFWHGWRVKRZWKDWWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHDJHQF\ZRXOGQRW³VLPSO\
represent an umpteenth measure clamping down on asylum-seekers from 
RXWVLGH(XURSH´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWD 6). According to the EP, it ought 
to have been made clearer that border management is a matter for Member 
States and that the focus of the agency ought to be on ensuring common 
standards, for instance through ensuring compatibility of technical equipment 
and leading training sessions with border guards (European Parliament 
2004a: 9, 11-12, 28). 
 As to the management of the agency, opinions diverged on the issue of 
Board composition. The majority view reflected efficiency concerns, holding 
that the composition suggested by the Commission was to be preferred and that 
having each Member State represented would make the Board too unwieldy 
(European Parliament 2004a; 2004b; Interview MEP 1). However, some MEPs 
argued that each Member State ought to be represented on the Board (European 
Parliament 2004a: 40; 2004b). Other opinions on the governance of the agency 
include wishes to increase the influence and control power of the EP and the 
Commission (European Parliament 2004a: 30-31; European Parliament 2004b). 
For instance, the EP suggested that the Commission could be more involved in 
WKHUHFUXLWPHQWRIVHQLRURIILFLDOVDQGWKDWQRZLGHQLQJRIWKHDJHQF\¶V
mandate ought to take place without EP involvement. The EP also wanted to 
                                                 
43
 The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy 
did not disapprove of this task in their opinion. However, it made the amendment that the 
DJHQF\³shall verify that return operations are conducted with respect for the dignity and 
fundamental rights of the individual´ZKLFKLQGLFDWHVFRQFHUQDERXWWKHDJHQF\¶VUHSXWDWLRQ
(European Parliament 2004: 40). 
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make relevant expertise a clearly spelt out condition for Board membership 
(European Parliament 2004a: 18-19).  
The EP called for more information and control powers to the EP over 
the budget and financial arrangements of the agency. It was concerned that the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOGLGQRWRXWOLQe in sufficient detail the financial 
implications of the proposal (European Parliament 2004a).  
 
7.2.5 The Council 
The proposal for the establishment of FRONTEX was first debated in the 
Justice and Home Affairs constellation of the Council in November 2003. As 
the proposal was linked to the Schengen acquis, it was also discussed in several 
Mixed Committee meetings, i.e. meetings between EU states plus Iceland and 
Norway (Council of the European Union 2003; 2004a). In October 2004, the 
establishment of FRONT(;ZDVOLVWHGDVDQ³$´LWHPDQGSDVVHGZLWKRXW
debate (Council of the European Union 2004b).44 
 At its meeting in November 2003, the Council welcomed the proposal 
from the Commission to establish a border management agency. The Council 
concluded that Member States have the responsibility for the management of 
WKH(8¶VH[WHUQDOERUGHUVEXWWKDWWKHUHZDVDQHHGIRURSHUDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ
between Member States and also with third countries. Supposedly, increased 
cooperation would lead to more efficient border controls. According to the 
&RXQFLOWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQDJHQF\ZDV³WKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHZD\WR
organise and develop the indispensable coordination of operational cooperation 
                                                 
44
 However, the United Kingdom made unilateral statement in which it claims to have been 
denied the right to take part in the adoption of the measure in question despite having that right 
under the Protocols on the position of the UK and Ireland and on the integration of the 
Schengen acquis into the EU framework. 
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DWWKHH[WHUQDOERUGHUV´(Council of the European Union 2003). At the same 
time, the Council clearly wanted to draw on previous experience gained 
through earlier arrangements by granting the agency the right to set up 
specialist branches throughout the EU for this purpose. Thus, whilst the 
Council documents indicate a need for more efficient controls, which supports 
the rational choice institutionalist efficiency hypothesis, lesson-drawing was at 
the heart of the arrangements, which shows that sociological institutionalism 
contributes to our understanding of FRONTEX establishment. 
 Sociological institutionalism holds significant explanatory value to our 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHDJHQF\¶VJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUH2QWKLVLVVXHWKH&RXQFLO
VWDWHGWKDW³WKHSURYLVLRQVRQWKH$JHQF\VKRXOGFRQVLGHUWKHSUHFHGHQWV
offered by other Community aJHQFLHV´Council of the European Union 
2003: 11). The Council disagreed with the Commission and the EP on the issue 
RI%RDUGVWUXFWXUH$WLWV1RYHPEHUPHHWLQJWKH&RXQFLODUJXHGWKDW³HDFK
Member State should have a representative in the Management Board of the 
Agency, which should consist of the operational heads of the national law 
HQIRUFHPHQWDXWKRULWLHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUERUGHUPDQDJHPHQW´(Council of the 
European Union 2003: 11). However, it was also noted that as the creation of 
FRONTEX builds on the Schengen acquis, the Schengen members Iceland and 
Norway ought to participate in FRONTEX and special provisions were needed 
for Denmark, Ireland, the UK and Gibraltar.  
Finally, when the proposal was first discussed by the Council in 
November 2003, the Council stated that it thought that the suggested budget 
required more analysis (Council of the European Union 2003). 
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7.2.6 The opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee 
After having been consulted by the Council in December 2003, the EESC 
adopted its opinion in January 2004 (European Economic and Social 
Committee 2004). The opinion was adopted by seventy-five to one (three 
delegates abstained). 
 The main reason why the EESC welcomed the establishment of 
FRONTEX was that the committee believed that national authorities were not 
in the position to effectively check that all people who enter the Schengen area 
do so in a manner compliant with legislated procedures (European Economic 
and Social Committee 2004: 98-99). In line with rational choice institutionalist 
ideas of agency establishment as a means to increasing efficiency, the EESC 
believed that cooperation facilitated by FRONTEX would make border 
controls more efficient. The EESC also claimed to have urged the Council to 
speed up the work towards common EU policy and legislation on immigration 
DQGDV\OXPRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQVDQGVWDWHGWKDW³WKH&RXQFLOKDVQRWWDNHQ
SURSHUDFFRXQW´RILWVview (European Economic and Social Committee 
2004: 98). 
 $VUHJDUGVWKHDJHQF\¶VIXQFWLRQVWKH((6&ZLVKHG to see not only 
coordination to make controls more efficient but also coordination of rescue 
services, particularly at sea. The EESC also insisted that FRONTEX be 
assigned the task of ensuring WKDW³SHRSOHDUHWUHDWHGPRUHKXPDQHO\´, which 
indicates dissatisfaction with the current situation (European Economic and 
Social Committee 2004: 99). Following on from this, the EESC emphasised its 
RSLQLRQWKDWPRUHHIILFLHQWFRQWUROV³PXVWQRWMHRSDUGLVHWKHULJKWWRDV\OXP´
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making note of the facts that many asylum seekers use illegal channels in order 
to arrive at EU borders and that criminal networks engaged in human 
trafficking exploit the perceived current lack of effective border controls with 
serious human suffering as a result (European Economic and Social Committee 
2004: 98). Moreover, the EESC drew attention to links between irregular 
immigration, exploitation in the labour market and social exclusion.  
 7KH((6&VWDWHGWKDWDJHQF\%RDUGPHPEHUVRXJKWWR³DFW
LQGHSHQGHQWO\RI*RYHUQPHQWV´(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF and Social Committee 
2004: 100), which indicates a wish to ensure credible commitment for common 
policies by isolating agency operations from government pressures. The 
opinion did not include any comments on the budget and financial 
arrangements of the agency.  
 
7.2.7 FRONTEX today: between the Council and the Commission 
In important respects, FRONTEX is a sui generis phenomenon amongst the 
Community Agencies (Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; FRONTEX Official 
)LUVW)5217(;¶VWDVNRIFRRUGLQDWLQJZRUNIRr which Member States are 
responsible used to be Council work (Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; 
FRONTEX Official 2). Furthermore, rather than operating within a policy field 
where competencies clearly belong to the Community, the agency has to 
negotiate its role within an area where some competencies belong to the 
Community and others to Member States. For instance, the Commission has 
the right of initiative within the immigration policy field at the same time as 
visas for third country nationals is a matter for Member States (Interviews 
FRONTEX Official 1; FRONTEX Official 2). Moreover, rules concerning 
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border control are passed at Community level whereas implementation is done 
by Member States (Interview Commission Official 3). In terms of targets for 
the agHQF\¶VZRUNWKHDJHQF\GUDIWVLWVRZQZRUNSURJUDPPHRQZKLFKWKH
Commission is consulted, but officials at FRONTEX stated that if the Council 
calls on the agency to engage in particular activities, these are included in the 
work programme (Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; FRONTEX Official 2). 
Similarly, an official at the Commission said that the agency gets its political 
direction from the Council, and that practical management is handled by the 
Board (Interview Commission Official 3). The Commission cannot instruct the 
agency, Commission Official 3 continued.45 As to )5217(;¶VLQIOXHQFHLQ
EU policy-making, officials at FRONTEX implied that in the official story 
input is not acknowledged in legislation, but in reality proposals for legislation 
are preceded by informal contacts. Overall, governance in the field of border 
management control is characterised by complexity, and it is not surprising that 
FRONTEX officials thought that it is possible that FRONTEX work could be 
facilitated by increased harmonisation (Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; 
FRONTEX Official 2). 
 Information provided by the interviewees strengthened the impression 
gained through the documentary research that FRONTEX is dependent on the 
Council and on Member States in many respects. To carry out its operations, 
including the central task of risk analysis, FRONTEX is completely reliant on 
0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ZLOOWRFRRSHUDWHE\FRQWULEXWLQJUHVRXUFHVDQGE\IRUZDUGLQJ
information via networks. This is so because the agency does not have 
sufficient assets within its own organisation. According to officials at 
                                                 
45
 According Commission Official 3, the Commission negotiated with the Polish authorities 
DERXWSUDFWLFDOLVVXHVFRQFHUQLQJWKHDJHQF\¶VORFDWLRQLQ:DUVDZ 
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FRONTEX, the agency has no means of forcing Member States to cooperate, 
and cooperation depends on trust (Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; 
FRONTEX Official 2). The same officials thought that cooperation between 
the agency and Member States is good, but they also indicated that this is 
something that has improved over time and that Member States previously had 
less trust in the agency. They also pointed to the fact that cooperation is 
influenced by the number of authorities involved. Since the establishment of 
FRONTEX, Member States have had one point of contact at the European 
level, but some Member States have more than one authority dealing with 
border control issues. A Commission official with good insight into the work 
of FRONTEX confirmed that Member State authorities tend to be satisfied 
with the agency, and said that he thought things work fairly well (Interview 
Commission Official 3).  
Having said that, the Commission official also pointed out that Member 
States that experience problems with irregular immigration may want 
FRONTEX to do more (Interview Commission Official 3). An interview with a 
Maltese official confirmed this. His view was that states in southern Europe are 
more concerned and WKDW)5217(;KDVEHHQDELW³VOHHS\´ZKHQLWFRPHVWR
joint return operations (Interview EP Official 1). He also wished to see more 
attention and activity during the main immigration season, and more permanent 
patrols to deter irregular immigration. From this interview it became clear that 
Maltese representatives are of the opinion that other Member States do not 
deliver as promised, and, when push comes to shove, other states have not 
shown solidarity towards Malta.46  
                                                 
46
 7KH0DOWHVHRIILFLDOJDYHDIDLUO\GHWDLOHGDFFRXQWRI0DOWD¶VSUREOems with on the one hand 
large-scale irregular immigration organised by criminal networks and on the other Libyan 
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The documentary analysis showed that the issue of joint return 
operations was controversial. Judging by statements from officials at 
FRONTEX and the Commission, the concern that FRONTEX would be an 
expulsion agency are unfounded (Interviews Commission Official 3; 
FRONTEX Official 1; FRONTEX Official 2). They all stressed that migrants 
sent back should have had their legal remedies exhausted at Member State 
level, indicating that FRONTEX does not make decisions on individual cases. 
This is not to say that elements of FRONTEX cannot be interpreted as being 
repressive towards refugees, however. There may be individuals with 
substantial grounds for asylum which will be kept away by FRONTEX patrols, 
but no substantial conclusions on the extent of this potential issue can be drawn 
from my material.    
Informal contacts are important in the relationship between FRONTEX 
and the Commission. A Commission official described the relationship 
between the two bodies as good, but pointed out that the Commission at times 
has to remind FRONTEX associates of their mandate (Interview Commission 
Official 3). Whilst FRONTEX can contribute to security, its role must not be 
confused with the role of Europol and the distinction is not always clear cut for 
the border guards on the ground, the official explained. Officials at FRONTEX 
said that more discussions with the Commission could be beneficial, which 
suggests that FRONTEX staff also value the cooperation with the Commission 
(Interviews FRONTEX Official 1; FRONTEX Official 2). 
                                                                                                                                 
authorities, which do not fulfil their obligations under international law to rescue people within 
WKHLU³UHVFXHDQGVHDUFK´]RQHRIWKH0HGLWerranean. As a consequence of this Libyan 
negligence, Maltese authorities have had to deal with migrants for whom Libya ought to have 
taken responsibility, the official claimed. When the Maltese called on other states to share 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHVH³/LE\DQ]RQH´PLJUDQWVWKH\ZHUHPHWZLWKVLOHQFHWKHRIILFLDOVDLG
with noticeable indignation. 
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Debates on the state of the art of EU democracy often centre on the 
GLUHFWO\HOHFWHG(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQIOXHQFH$VUHJDUGV)5217(;WKH
(3¶VPDMRULQVWUXPHQWRIFRQWUROLVWKHEXGJHW,QWKH(3GHFLGHGWR
WHPSRUDULO\IUHH]HVRPHRIWKHDJHQF\¶VEXGJHWXQWLOFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQVZHUH
met but how effective this is as a control instrument is debatable. Both 
FRONTEX officials and the Maltese official agreed that the EP uses the budget 
to control the agency, but according to the Maltese official the freezing of the 
budget was mainly a political signal from the EP, as FRONTEX could work 
around it. At the end of a budgetary year, the EP exercises control through 
scrutiny by the Budgetary Control committee and the regular budgetary 
discharge procedure. A serving MEP stated that agency Directors sometimes 
have to appear formally in front of relevant EP committees to explain their 
activities (Interview MEP 1). The EP is given general reports on FRONTEX 
and there is also informal cooperation (including confidential meetings), but 
interviewees indicated that the EP still wants to know more (Interviews 
Commission Official 3; Interview EP Official 1). At times there are strong, 
valid reasons for confidentiality, though. As a Commission official pointed out, 
if it were to be made public when and where patrol boats would operate, the 
boats carrying irregular immigrants would just pick another route (Interview 
Commission Official 3).  
 :KHQTXHVWLRQHGDERXWKRZWKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNLVFRQWUROOHG
FRONTEX officials stated that internal checks are made by an internal 
FRQWUROOHUDQGDQLQWHUQDODXGLWRUZKRUHSRUWGLUHFWO\WRWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUG
and external checks are done by the internal audit of the Commission and the 
Court of Auditors. As regards finance, there is some room for flexibility as the 
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responsibility for smaller amounts can be delegated within the agency. The 
FRONTEX officials also stated that each individual project has targets and is 
HYDOXDWHG7KHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGFDQTXHVWLRQWKH'LUHFWRUDQGDFFRUGLQJWRWKH
FRONTEX officials I spoke to, the Board tends to ask many questions. They 
also said that the chair of the Board enjoys a powerful position as a link 
between the Board and the Director, and as a representative for the agency. The 
Commission recently issued a report with an evaluation of FRONTEX as 
requested by the European Council in the Hague programme from 2004 
(Commission 2008b). 
 
7.3 Discussion 
FRONTEX is the most recent Community Agency to be included as a case 
study. This agency may belong to the most common type of agencies, i.e. 
advisory agencies, but, due to its field of activity, it is truly unique. 
Immigration issues have only recently been formally integrated, and 
governance of the border management field is complex. FRONTEX needs to 
negotiate its role in a policy field where competencies and responsibilities are 
shared between several institutions at different levels.  As a Community 
Agency financed mainly by a subsidy from the EC budget, FRONTEX is 
steered by the Commission and the EP. At the same time, much of the work the 
agency does was previously done by the Council. Border management is 
traditionally closely associated with the nation state, and immigration is a 
politically sensitive topic where decisions are often strongly influenced by 
normative concerns. It is thus not surprising that FRONTEX establishment was 
surrounded by some controversy. In this chapter, I have traced the process 
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OHDGLQJXSWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI)5217(;DQGUHIOHFWHGRQWKHDJHQF\¶V
role in governance today. In the following sections, I will discuss the findings 
in relation to the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2. 
 
7.3.1 Rational choice institutionalist theory 
Rational choice institutionalist theory predicts that agencies are created to 
lower political transaction costs. This overarching hypothesis can then be 
disentangled into three separate hypotheses about the creation of agencies. 
First, agencies are created to gather and take advantage of technical expertise. 
Second, agencies are created to ensure credible commitment. Third, agencies 
are created to increase efficiency.  
 Although my research provides some evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that FRONTEX was established to gather and take advantage of 
technical expertise, it suggests that this was not the prime motive behind the 
establishment of the agency. Apart from a statement from the Commission that 
the agency would be in a better position than the Commission itself to develop 
know-how, I have not come across any statements clearly specifying a unique 
role for the agency as a centre of expertise. Neither was the role of the agency 
in providing expertise emphasised as a prime motive in documents or 
interviews. The field in which the agency operates cannot be described as 
highly technical or scientific in the traditional sense, and there is very little 
established science within the field of border control. Hence, it is hardly 
surprising that technical or scientific tasks have not been delegated to the 
agency. There is, however, some support for this hypothesis in the form of 
demands placed on staff and people involved in the governance of the agency. 
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As previously mentioned, the EP report suggested that relevant expertise be 
written into the legislation as a condition for Board membership. This 
condition is indeed included in the founding legislation (Council Regulation 
No 2007/2004, article 21). Similarly, the founding legislation states that the 
DJHQF\¶V'LUHFWRUVKRXOGEHDSSRLQWHGRQWKHJURXQGVRI³UHOHYDQWH[SHULHQFH´
(Council Regulation No 2007/2004, article 26). 
 As to the hypothesis of the agency as a means to ensuring credible 
commitment, I argue that whilst the there was an element of people involved in 
FRONTEX establishment paying lip service to this idea, wishes to ensure 
credible commitment did not drive the process leading to the establishment of 
FRONTEX. Considering first the evidence in favour of the agency¶V playing a 
role in ensuring credible commitment, we can note that the Commission 
claimed that an independent body in the form of an agency would lead to 
strengthened credibility of Community activities in the border control field (see 
European Commission 2003a: 37). A couple of MEPs voiced similar ideas in 
the EP debates. For instance, Coelho of the PPE-DE group claimed to be 
FRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI)5217(;ZRXOG³be a positive step 
WRZDUGVLQFUHDVLQJPXWXDOWUXVWEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV´ (European Parliament 
2004b). The EESC wished to see Board members acting independently. The 
founding legislation makes reference to independence, stating that the Director, 
DOEHLW³>w]ithout prejudice to the respective competencies of the Commission, 
WKH0DQDJHPHQW%RDUGDQGWKH([HFXWLYH%XUHDX´³VKDOOQHLWKHUVHHNQRUWDNH
LQVWUXFWLRQVIURPDQ\JRYHUQPHQWRUIURPDQ\RWKHUERG\´Council 
Regulation No 2007/2004, article 25).  
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However, the evidence against FRONTEX being established to ensure 
credible commitment is stronger. The idea behind agencies to ensure credible 
commitment is that the activities carried out by the agencies should be isolated 
from political influence. This is clearly not the case here. The Commission is 
FRQVXOWHGRQWKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNSURJUDPPHDQGPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\
interviewees at FRONTEX and the Commission declared that FRONTEX 
takes instructions from the Council. To pursue its tasks the agency is also 
dependent on Member States to contribute resources and information. As 
pointed out by officials at FRONTEX, the agency has no means of forcing 
Member States to cooperate, and cooperation is built on trust. The FRONTEX 
officials indicated that trust has been built over time, but information gained 
from my interview with the Maltese official demonstrates that not all Member 
States have experienced the solidarity some decision-makers implied would be 
the result of FRONTEX establishment. Of course, FRONTEX has only been in 
operation a few years. It is still early days and things may change over time. 
We can also note that FRONTEX lacks regulatory and arbitration tasks, the 
delegation of which are hard evidence in favour of credible commitment 
concerns driving agency creation.  
The rational choice institutionalist hypothesis to find the most support 
throughout my research is the hypothesis that FRONTEX was established to 
increase efficiency. All sources consulted indicate that there was a wish for 
more effective border control and that there was dissatisfaction with the 
previous arrangements, which were deemed inefficient due to their ad hoc 
nature. In particular, interviewees pointed to the lack of a single European-
level point of contact for Member State authorities and to problems as a result 
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of the reliance on project funding. It was believed that the establishment of 
FRONTEX could remedy this situation, playing a crucial role in coordinating 
Member State activities in particular. As previously explained, the Commission 
thought that coordination could lead to enhanced capacity, and that the 
establishment of an agency in the field could save costs. The EP was also 
concerned about efficiency and cost-effectiveness as demonstrated by its 
opposition to an agency Board with representatives from each Member State. 
Moreover, in an ex ante evaluation of arrangements for increased cooperation 
in the field of border control, the Commission concluded that an agency would 
EH³DEHWWHUDQGPRUHFRVW-HIIHFWLYHFKRLFH´WKDQWKHDOWHUQDWLves considered, 
which were reinforcement of the already existing Common Unit and the 
Commission (2003a: 38).  
 
7.3.2 Sociological institutionalist theory 
Sociological institutionalist theory emphasises the role of ideas, and 
hypothesises that institutional borrowing plays a key role in the establishment 
of institutions. My research provides solid evidence that institutional borrowing 
was at work in the case of FRONTEX. Most notably, the Council stated that 
³WKHSURYLVLRQVRQWKH$JHQF\VKRXOGFRQVLGHUWKHSrecedents offered by other 
&RPPXQLW\DJHQFLHV´Council of the European Union 2003: 11). This 
statement is an explicit reference to other bodies serving as models, and as such 
it serves as hard evidence in favour of institutional isomorphism, i.e. a process 
where an institutional structure developed in one context is transferred to 
another context (see Di Maggio and Powell 1991). In short, the fact that 
agencies already existed legitimised the creation of yet another agency. The 
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Council also pointed to the importance of previous experience in connection to 
its idea that the agency ought to have the right to establish specialist 
branches.47 Further evidence that lesson-drawing was important is provided by 
the fact that the Commission considered its White Paper on Governance from 
2001 and a number of other reports related to the Community Agencies in 
general when drafting the proposal to establish FRONTEX.48 Interestingly, my 
research also shows that there appears to have been an element of agency 
fascination amongst decision-makers at the time, and that agency establishment 
was not universally applauded within the EU institutions. As mentioned in the 
VHFWLRQRQWKH(3WKH(3UDSSRUWHXUFODLPHGWREH³XQGHUZKHOPHGE\
SURSRVDOVIRUWKHVHWWLQJXSRI(8DJHQFLHV´In the EP debates, he continued 
E\VWDWLQJWKDW³DQLPPHQVHQXPEHURIQHZRQHVLVFXUUHQWO\VSURXWLQJOLNH
ZHHGVDOORYHU(XURSHIUDJPHQWLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQFHVDQG
VFDUFHO\XQGHUFRQWURO´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWE 
 
7.3.3 Historical institutionalist theory 
Historical institutionalist theory holds that the establishment and development 
of institutions must be seen in their particular historical context, and that 
specific events serve as critical junctures, which lead development down a 
particular path. There is significant evidence that this was indeed the case with 
regards to FRONTEX establishment. As explained in chapter 3, Community 
                                                 
47
 Here we can recall that the EP was against this idea on the grounds that it would not be cost-
effective.  
48
 The documents in question, which are listed in the proposal, are: the Meta-Evaluation on the 
Community Agency System, the Communication form the Commission on the operating 
framework for the European Regulatory Agencies and the Commission Regulation of 23 
December 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 
185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities. 
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Agencies operate in the first pillar of the EU. Border management is 
traditionally closely associated with the nation state, and it would not have 
been possible to create a Community Agency in this field had it not first been 
integrated. Thus, the decision to transfer immigration and asylum issues to the 
first pillar and subjecting them to the community method was a critical juncture 
for EU cooperation on border management. The speed at which first integration 
and then agency establishment took place is fascinating. Some of the work 
FRONTEX does today was until recently carried out by the Council, showing 
that an agency was established before cooperation on border management had 
truly become a Community matter.  
To understand this rapid development, it is necessary to look at the 
wider political context. Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus 
and Malta was clearly an important event in the history of European 
integration, and it was crucial to the establishment of FRONTEX. As a result 
of enlargement, the EU would have longer external land borders and include 
two Mediterranean island states, which could be deemed to have vulnerable sea 
borders. There is clear evidence that enlargement was believed to cause 
challenges to the management of the external borders, and that these ideas were 
linked to the creation of the agency. The EP report contains an explicit 
reference to agency establishment as a response to challenges of enlargement 
and makes reference to previous instances in which the EP has called on 
increased cooperation in the light of enlargement. For instance, in 1998, the EP 
adopted a resolution on the implications of enlargement of the European Union 
for cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, and in a resolution on 
the proposal for a Council decision adopting an action programme for 
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administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and 
LPPLJUDWLRQ$5*2WKH(3DUJXHGWKDW³>F@ommunitarisation of EU 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFRQWUROVDWWKH(8¶VH[WHUQDOERUGHUVZLOOEHFRPHDOOWKH
more important now that a significant enlargement of the Union is scheduled to 
take place´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW European Parliament 2003: 143). At 
the Seville summit in 2002, immigration and enlargement were important 
topics of discussion, although the link between them is not made explicit in the 
Council conclusions (Council of the European Union 2002). 
Whilst enlargement played a crucial role in bringing border 
management cooperation onto the agenda, it must also be noted that existing 
Member States, perhaps in particular Italy and Spain, were already 
experiencing the arrival of irregular migrants by sea, and it is clear that 
authorities in these countries perceived this to be problematic. Several reports 
from around this time speak of the arrival of large numbers of migrants to 
particularly the Canary Islands, the Italian island of Lampedusa and the 
Spanish enclave of Ceuta (see for example Human Rights Watch 2002; Hughes 
2002; Smith 2002). At the same time, the wider public became increasingly 
aware of irregular immigration and the suffering of the people involved 
through media coverage of tragic events such as the The Monica tragedy.  
 
7.4 Conclusion  
My research has shown that one strand of new institutionalist theory is not 
sufficient to explain the establishment of FRONTEX. The hypotheses derived 
from each of the theories are not mutually exclusive, and they can all 
contribute to explaining the establishment of FRONTEX. They are useful for 
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explaining different aspects, however. The decision to establish an agency to 
coordinate Member State activities can be explained by a functional logic, 
following rational choice institutionalism. The choice of the Community 
Agency form, however, is better explained by sociological institutionalism. 
Previous agencies provided a model and legitimised the creation of yet another 
agency. Finally, historical institutionalism explains well the timing aspect of 
FRONTEX creation. Enlargement caused concerns about the vulnerability of 
the external borders, and tragic incidents involving irregular migrants raised 
public awareness.  
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Conclusion: How can we explain the 
establishment of European Community Agencies? 
8.1 Introduction  
In this thesis, I have investigated the establishment of European Community 
Agencies, with a particular focus on four case studies: Cedefop, EMEA, EASA 
and FRONTEX. The driving motivation of this investigation was a concern 
about the rapid establishment of European-level agencies, seemingly without 
thorough consideration of the implications for bureaucratic control, and, 
ultimately, the legitimacy of the European political system. Since this research 
project began, the EU institutions, in particular the Commission (2008a: 2), 
DSSHDUWRKDYHUHDOLVHGWKDWWKHODFNRID³FRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´RIWKHUROHV
and purposes of agencies is indeed a problem, and the future use of agencies in 
governance is currently a hot topic of debate within the EU institutions as well 
as in academic circles.  
The increased use of agencies performing a range of public 
management tasks constitutes a major shift in governance patterns, and it is an 
important aspect of the regulatory state. Delegation to agencies can have 
important benefits, for instance concentration of technical expertise, facilitation 
of credible commitment, and efficiency gains. However, there are also risks, 
such as bureaucratic drift and agency capture. The rise of the regulatory state 
and the establishment of numerous specialist agencies could be viewed as a 
move towards an increasingly technocratic society; as the influence of 
technocrats increases, the influence of elected politicians decreases. This raises 
a number of questions about bureaucratic control, accountability and 
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legitimacy. Discussions on the establishment, use and design of agencies are 
not limited to the European Union; these topics are also subjects of 
investigation for scholars of new public management more widely as well as 
for policy-makers at national level, where agencies have become more frequent 
in recent decades. In the introduction, I argued that the implications of agency 
establishment are especially important for the EU due to frequent criticisms of 
its unclear lines of accountability and institutions that are not sufficiently 
³SDUWLFLSDWRU\DQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´Schmidt 2006: 21). I also questioned 
whether or not the establishment of agencies is counterproductive to attempts 
at addressing the alleged democratic deficit, and argued that this is dependent 
on whether legitimacy is sought through participation or through efficiency in 
terms of results. I will return to this discussion towards the end of this 
concluding chapter.  
This thesis has sought to contribute to the discussions and debates on 
agencies at four different levels. In section 8.2, the main findings of the 
research are summarised. The summary begins with the findings on the 
µ&RPPXQLW\$JHQF\¶DVDFRQFHSWDnd variation within this group of agencies, 
covering the contribution of the thesis at the conceptual level and the first step 
of the empirical research. This is followed by the findings from the second 
empirical step of the research, i.e. the case studies. The theoretical contribution 
of the thesis is considered further in chapter 8.3, in which I compare the 
findings of the case studies. Finally, in section 8.4, the findings are discussed in 
relation to the wider debates on regulatory states, with a particular focus on the 
EU as a regulatory state.  
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8.2 Summary of results 
8.2.1 Concepts and classifications 
Due to differences in public law amongst political systems, it is not possible to 
ILQGRQHXQLYHUVDOGHILQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPµDJHQF\¶VHHFKDSWHU+Rwever, 
WKHUHDUHIRXUZLGHO\DJUHHGFRUHHOHPHQWVRIWKHµDJHQF\¶FRQFHSWWKDWPDNH
comparative discussion possible. For a body to be considered an agency it 
RXJKWWREH³DWDUP¶VOHQJWK´IURPFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW7DOERW 5), has its 
powers outlined in D³IUDPHZRUNGRFXPHQW´7DOERW 8), be staffed by 
unelected public servants (Talbot 2004: 5; Thatcher 2002b: 956), and be 
subjected to performance contracting (James 2001; Talbot 2004). Community 
Agencies fulfil all of these criteria (see chapter 3).   
There is significant variation amongst bodies that are considered 
agencies according to the above criteria. Agencies are of different sizes, and 
they are set up at different times and in different locations. A review of 
academic literature seeking to explain variation in practice also pointed to 
differences with regards to functions, legal status, governance structures and 
financial arrangements (see chapter 2). This research has confirmed that 
Community Agencies are a heterogeneous group of bodies; whilst they are 
united by their common legal status, they differ in the other dimensions. 
Whereas the first European-level agencies were established in 1975, the 
major waves of agencification in Europe occurred in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Most Community Agencies are classified as small or medium-sized, and they 
are spread out across the EU territory. The main variation in the governance 
VWUXFWXUHVGLPHQVLRQFRQFHUQVWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHDJHQFLHV¶%RDUGVEXW
there are also some differences in appointment procedures of Directors. 
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Financially, most of them are reliant on subsidies from the EC budget, but 
three agencies are self-financed, and two receive their revenue from a 
combination of subsidies and fees.  
The most striking variation, however, is found in the tasks the agencies 
are set up to perform. A classification according to functions of the Community 
Agencies established between 1975 and 2006 revealed four types of agencies: 
de jure regulatory agencies, de facto regulatory agencies, implementation 
agencies and advisory agencies. To achieve the stated aim of investigating if 
there are different driving factors behind the establishment of different types of 
agencies, the main emphasis was placed on functions when selecting the case 
studies.  
 
8.2.2 Case study 1: Cedefop 
Cedefop, an advisory agency, was the first Community Agency to be 
established in 1975. Historical institutionalism, which holds that the context in 
which institutions are established is essential for understanding the 
establishment of institutions, has significant explanatory value as regards the 
timing of the creation of Cedefop. Based on the empirical findings of my 
research, I argue that an understanding of the political climate at the time of 
creation is crucial to explain the establishment and institutional design of 
Cedefop. The establishment of Cedefop must be seen against a backdrop of 
economic crisis accompanied by rising unemployment and social unrest, as 
exemplified by the student revolts of 1968. The imminent enlargement of the 
Community to include United Kingdom and Ireland, which were affected by 
industrial decline, was also an influential factor behind the placement of social 
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policy, in particular vocational training, on the European political agenda. The 
economic and political situatLRQZDVFRQGXFLYHWRWUDGHXQLRQV¶HQMR\LQJ
widespread influence throughout Europe. Through the formation of the 
European Trade Union Congress (ETUC), which is to be regarded as a critical 
juncture in the development of European social policy, trade unions established 
their position as a force to be taken into account in European level negotiations. 
Within the European institutional architecture, the social partners were already 
represented within the EESC, and, at the Hague Summit, and within the 
Werner Plan, emphasis was placed on social dialogue. This legitimised the 
LQFOXVLRQRIWKHVRFLDOSDUWQHUVRQWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGDQGmeant that there 
was a good chance that ideas coming from the trade union ranks would attract 
significant attention, especially if there were a committed and driving figure to 
push for them. Maria Weber, a German trade union representative and member 
of the EESC, was such a person, and she came to play a crucial role in the 
establishment of Cedefop.  
Weber wished to see the establishment of a European level vocational 
training institute, had the support of the EESC, and, drawing on her experience 
from the recent establishment of a German vocational training institute, she 
drew up the report that suggested the establishment of Cedefop. :HEHU¶V
involvement in the setting up of the German institute, and the evidence that she 
was drawing on this experience, support the sociological institutionalist idea of 
institutional borrowing. We could also note that vocational training institutes 
had been set up in a number of European countries, not only Germany.  
A key feature of the institutional design chosen for Cedefop was to 
include social partner representatives on the DJHQF\¶V%RDUGZKLFK:HEHUVDZ
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as a measure to secure credible commitment for the maintenance of the social 
dialogue. This suggests that the credible commitment hypothesis derived from 
rational choice institutionalism could explain the management structure of 
Cedefop. With hindsight, we can conclude that the commitment to an active 
social dialogue was not honoured. My research reveals that, although the social 
SDUWQHUVDUHJXDUDQWHHGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRQWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUGWKHVRFLDO
dialogue is no longer as active as it once was. If securing credible commitment 
to the social dialogue had been the key factor for EC decision-makers they 
would, most likely, have made an even firmer commitment, for instance by 
putting into formal legislation the so-FDOOHGJHQWOHPHQ¶VDJUHHPHQWabout the 
appointment of Director to which one of my interviewees referred. This did not 
happen, and we can thus conclude that the influence of Weber, which in itself 
was made possible by the political and economic climate of the time, was the 
key explanatory factor rather than credible commitment concerns.  
 As to WKHDJHQF\¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFHWRGD\WKHIRFXVRIWKHDJHQF\¶V
tasks is on networking and information gathering. The fact that there is very 
little undisputed science in the vocational training field, as illustrated by the 
prevalence of different traditions and practices in different Member States, 
weakens the  rational choice institutionalist hypothesis that the agency¶V role 
would be that of being a place where all scientific expertise is gathered. Having 
said that, agency staff are, of course, very knowledgeable in the field. There is 
evidence that work done by Cedefop, such as the European CV, is indeed taken 
up by the Commission and the other European institutions. This shows that the 
agency can play a part in norm diffusion across the EU, which lends support to 
sociological institutionalist ideas about the functioning of institutions. One 
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could of course argue that increased harmonisation would bring efficiency 
gains, but, throughout my research, I have not found evidence for this being an 
important argument for decision-makers. 
The autonomy of the agency can be called into question on a number of 
accounts. Most significantly, the agency is reliant on the EC budget for its 
finances. It is clear that the EP has used its budgetary powers to secure control 
over Cedefop, as well as to secure influence for itself in European governance 
more widely. Following on from this, my research revealed that the 
relationship between the EP and Cedefop is somewhat contradictory. On the 
one hand, at the time of establishment the EP seemed to want a more 
independent agency than what the Commission originally did, but, on the other 
hand, it has also been argued by Varsori (2004) that the EP was sceptical about 
the creation of a body over which it would only have limited control. Similarly, 
the relationship between the agency and the Commission is not free from 
SRZHUVWUXJJOH,VVXHVKHUHFRQFHUQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRZHURYHUWKH
DSSRLQWPHQWRIVHQLRUSHUVRQQHODQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRSD\KLJKHU
salaries, which may have the effect that most qualified people would rather 
work for the Commission than Cedefop. My interviewees indicated that 
Cedefop tends to have good relationships with Member State authorities. There 
is, however, also an element of competition as it occurs that Member State 
authorities are reluctant to send their top people as seconded experts to 
Cedefop. This could be interpreted as a means for Member State authorities to 
protect their own standing, and it also further weakens the hypothesis of 
decision-makers wanting to make Cedefop the single centre for expertise. Here 
ZHFRXOGDOVRUHFDOOWKH&RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQWRJLYH0HPEHU6WDWHVWKHPDMRULW\
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RQWKHDJHQF\¶V%RDUG, which shows that Member State actors wished to 
maintain an intergovernmental structure. 
 
8.2.3 Case study 2 EMEA 
EMEA, established in the early 1990s, was included as one of case studies for 
this thesis because of its being the first Community Agency to be given a de 
facto regulatory role. The establishment of EMEA was preceded by a series of 
activities to harmonise pharmaceutical legislation throughout Europe. The first 
efforts to harmonise came in the 1960s. A committee to be concerned with 
human medicines was set up in the 1970s, and a committee to be concerned 
with veterinary medicines was set up in the 1980s. When EMEA was created, a 
decentralised procedure for the authorisation of medicinal products had already 
been put in place, and provisions had been made for making EMEA the arbiter 
in the event of disputes between Member State authorities. The finalisation of 
the single market may have sped up the development in the early 1990s, and it 
may very well explain the precise timing of EMEA establishment. However, 
due to the long process of harmonisation preceding EMEA establishment and 
the fact that some of the core committees and tasks were already provided for, I 
argue that the finalisation of the single market was not a critical juncture for the 
development of institutions to regulate medicines in the EU.  
The argument on EMEA creation put forward in this thesis is instead 
that the key objective behind the establishment of EMEA was a wish to ensure 
credible commitment for the common policies agreed. My research has 
revealed a number of references to the need of the agency to ensure that the 
agreed policies are followed. One could argue that the fact that the 
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Commission is the institution that takes the final decision on authorisation 
VRPHZKDWZHDNHQV(0($¶VDELOLW\WRHQVXUHFUHGLEOHFRPPLWPHQW+RZHYHU
during the interviews, it was confirmed that agency opinion is nearly always 
followed by the Commission. EMEA sees itself as working in the interest of 
patients. A crucial task in this regard is to ensure the safety of medicinal 
products that reach the market, and to maintain consumer confidence that 
standards are maintained. Similarly, the research has shown that industrial 
concerns, in particular the need to ensure fairness to companies, was a driving 
IDFWRU7KHDJHQF\¶VUROHDVDQDUELWHULQWKHHYHQWRIFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQMember 
State authorities further supports the credible commitment hypothesis. 
From rational choice institutionalist theory I have also generated the 
hypothesis that the agency was created as a response to a need for technical 
expertise. It goes without saying that EMEA operates in a highly technical 
ILHOG$VWXG\RIWKHDJHQF\¶VVWUXFWXUHKRZHYHUUHYHDOVWKDWproduct 
evaluations are not carried out by staff at EMEA. Responsibility for performing 
this scientific work lies with relevant authorities in the Member States, which 
refutes the idea that EMEA was created in order to assemble the highest 
SRVVLEOHWHFKQLFDOH[SHUWLVHZLWKLQWKHDJHQF\LWVHOI(0($¶VUROHLVWR
coordinate and delegate these tasks. At the same time, the research indicates 
that there is an ongoing trend towards greater centralisation, and that 
authorities in Member States may have to specialise more, as the same level of 
expertise in all fields of medicine cannot realistically be maintained within all 
Member State authorities. Arguably, this implies a development towards 
centres of concentrated expertise, but my research of the process leading up to 
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EMEA establishment does not lend support for this being a planned course of 
action. 
Turning to the issue of efficiency, it is apparent that the establishment 
of EMEA has led to more efficient procedures for market authorisation of 
medicinal products. This obviously benefits the pharmaceutical industry, and it 
can also benefit patients as medicines can reach the market faster. The link 
between EMEA creation and efficiency gains for industry was made explicit; 
for instance in the EP debates in which WKHLGHDUHPRYLQJ³VWUXFWXUDOREVWDFOHV´
were mentioned (European Parliament 1991a: 55). This could, as suggested by 
Abraham and Lewis (2000), imply that establishment of EMEA is linked to a 
neo-liberal political agenda and a situation where decision-makers find 
themselves under pressure to respond from industry demands at the same time 
as costs need to be kept down.  
The institutional design of EMEA, where the various committees play a 
crucial role, makes it stand out from other agencies, and suggests that 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOERUURZLQJZDVQRWDFUXFLDOIDFWRUIRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHDJHQF\¶V
design. Indeed, the debates even included statements which actively refuted 
such claims, stating that EMEA was not to be modelled on a comparable 
American institution. There are, however, some similarities between EMEA 
and the previously established Community Agencies in terms of management 
structure, and we could assume that there was an element of borrowing here.  
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the establishment of an agency in 
the medicines field was legitimised by the existence of agencies in the same 
policy field at Member State level.  
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8.2.4 Case study 3: EASA 
The European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, was established in 2002. It is 
one of the most powerful Community Agencies in that it can make decisions 
that are binding, and in that it has the power to draft legislation in the aviation 
safety field which the Commission cannot change without prior consultation 
with the agency. This makes EASA a de jure regulatory agency.  
When EASA was established, the idea of international cooperation in 
the aviation safety field was not new, and attempts to establish some common 
European standards had already taken place. The research has shown that there 
is a link between the wish to regulate on safety in civil aviation in Europe and 
the liberalisation of the civil aviation market. For instance, in the EP debates, 
the argument that companies may compromise on safety in order to survive on 
the free market was voiced. One could thus argue that the creation of the single 
market, to which the liberalisation of air traffic can be linked, was a significant 
event in the process towards increased harmonisation of European air safety. 
Was it a critical juncture in the historical institutionalist sense? Based on the 
findings of my research I argue that it was not. An important argument in 
favour of this view is that pressure for harmonisation and the creation of EASA 
did not solely come from within Europe and those who took the formal 
initiative to the internal market. The chapter on EASA shows that there was 
heavy pressure from industry, especially from the very powerful American 
aviation industry, to set up a single body to regulate the European civil aviation 
sector. The fact that it would be easier for industry to deal with a single 
European regulator rather than one regulator for each Member State would 
remain regardless of the existence of the single market. It is thus reasonable to 
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assume that this pressure could have influenced EU decision-makers to set up 
EASA whether the single market had been created or not. It is, however, 
somewhat difficult to disentangle various arguments here, as industry pressure 
may also have played a significant role in the establishment of the internal 
market in the first place. A further argument downplaying the importance of 
the creation of the single market for the creation of a Community Agency in 
the air safety field is that another form of cooperation, an intergovernmental 
cooperation in the form of the JAA, was tried first. This argument does not 
dispute the importance of the single market for the increased cooperation in the 
field. It does, however, claim that the choice of a Community Agency as an 
institutional form cannot be linked to the finalisation of the single market. 
To understand why a Community Agency was the preferred option over 
an intergovernmental organisation we must look to other hypotheses. Rational 
choice institutionalist theory holds that delegation takes place in order to lower 
political transaction costs by taking advantage of technical expertise, increasing 
efficiency and ensuring credible commitment to common policies. It does not 
take an in depth study to confirm that the tasks EASA deals with require 
specialist technical expertise, and that expertise is gathered within the agency 
itself.49 There is considerable technical expertise at Member State level, at least 
within some Member States, but my research shows that the idea was to gather 
the top level expertise within EASA, and not at Member State level. Here we 
must also consider the fact that not all Member States have a significant 
aviation industry, and, without a thriving industry, there are fewer possibilities 
and less need for authorities within Member States to develop the level of 
                                                 
49
 This can be compared with EMEA where the expertise required to carry out the evaluations 
is retained within the Member States. 
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expertise and capacity required to deal with safety specifications and their 
equal application throughout the territory. In the interest of safety, it would 
thus make sense to pool the expertise that is available across the territory, with 
regards to making the most suitable technical solutions as well ensuring that 
they are applied equally. The fact that EASA was compared to the American 
FAA, which gathers the expertise from within US territory within one body, 
supports this. To gather the required technical expertise within the Commission 
was not a viable alternative. The Commission does not have the resources to 
maintain that level of technical expertise as the nature of the organisation 
requires its personnel to be generalists rather than specialists. Furthermore, by 
delegating specific tasks, including the drafting of technical legislation, the 
Commission frees up time to work on other things, which leads to increased 
efficiency. For these reasons, I argue that when deciding to harmonise 
European civil aviation safety standards, there was a functional need for EU 
decision-makers to create a single European body to perform these tasks. 
To seek an explanation for the choice of the Community Agency form, 
let us turn to the sociological institutionalist hypothesis that institutional 
borrowing plays an important role for the determination of institutional design. 
There are a number of arguments in favour of this hypothesis. First, prior to 
EASA establishment, a more intergovernmental form of cooperation was tried 
and deemed unsatisfactory. Amongst the reasons were lengthy procedures and 
problems with creating binding measures. It is reasonable to assume that, as 
one model proved not to work according to plan, decision-makers would be 
inclined to look to functioning institutions already in place. By the time EASA 
was created, the Community Agency form had had time to become more 
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established within the EU institutional framework, and it had become a popular 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOIRUP$VRQHLQWHUYLHZHHUHPDUNHGDJHQFLHVZHUH³IDVKLRQDEOH´
However, perhaps even more significantly, the research has shown that the 
American FAA served as a model for EASA. Several references to this agency 
were found throughout the legislative process, and an interviewee at EASA 
confirmed that the American agency did serve as a model. 
 
8.2.5 Case study 4: FRONTEX 
FRONTEX, established in 2004, is the most recently established Community 
Agency to be included as a case study in this thesis. What makes this agency 
particularly interesting is that it operates within a policy field that traditionally 
has been within the exclusive competence of Member States, and which can 
often also be politically sensitive. The most important functions of this agency 
are to conduct risk analysis and to disseminate the findings, which makes this 
an advisory agency.  
 The historical institutionalist idea that the context in which institutions 
are created and develop must be taken into account is useful to explain why 
Member States agreed to create an agency in a policy area traditionally 
associated with state sovereignty. Arguably, the completion of the single 
market and the application of the four freedoms, the free movement of people 
in particular, necessitated some cooperation on border management. 
Cooperation, although on a humble scale, was initiated by the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Recalling that Community Agencies work within the Community 
pillar, we must conclude, however, that the transfer of immigration and asylum 
policy to the first pillar in the Treaty of Amsterdam was crucial for the creation 
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of a Community Agency for border management. In historical institutionalist 
terms, the transfer of migration and asylum policy was a critical juncture. To 
fully understand the creation of FRONTEX, we must look at the political 
situation in more depth and explore why immigration became a much debated 
topic within the EU from the mid-1990s. The planned enlargement to include 
eight Central and Eastern European states, Cyprus and Malta, which many 
SHRSOHIHOWZRXOGUHVXOWLQWKH(8¶VKDYLQJPRUHYXOQHUDEOHERUGHUVSOD\HGD
very important role in bringing these issues up on the agenda, and, I argue, was 
another critical juncture determining the future path of European cooperation in 
the field. Member States, current and future, were concerned about how to 
control the borders, and in particular those Member States which were affected 
by large-scale migration applied considerable pressure on other Member States 
to take action. Tragic incidents involving refugees attempting to reach Europe 
in the early 2000s, as well as increased security concerns, further raised public 
awareness of the situation. Together these events explain why immigration and 
border management became important topics of discussion at the European 
summits at Tampere and Seville.  
 At first cooperation was organised within the framework of the 
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA). This was 
a rather informal model of cooperation, and initiatives were taken at an ad hoc 
basis. This model of cooperation was deemed unsatisfactory due to the lack of 
a consistent strategy; my research revealed that there was a widespread view 
that more formalised cooperation, in particular on coordination of activities, 
ZRXOGEHPRUHHIIHFWLYHDQGHIILFLHQW7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDORQWKH
establishment of FRONTEX included comments of this nature, the EP made 
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comments that pointed in this direction, and some states, for instance Greece 
and Malta, were of this opinion. This supports the rational choice 
institutionalist hypothesis that delegation takes place to increase efficiency. My 
research indicates that, although everything has not always run smoothly, there 
has at least been a perceived increase in efficiency. Interviewees remarked that 
now Member State authorities have one body to contact, rather than several, 
which was previously the case. As FRONTEX is a relatively new agency, and 
as it is still trying to find its role in governance, more research is needed to 
determine to what extent there really have been concrete efficiency gains.  
An important point to note about FRONTEX is that its independence is 
very limited. The agency drafts its work programme in consultation with the 
Commission, but the Council still calls on the agency to perform various 
activities, which the agency would then be required to do. Furthermore, the 
agency is dependent on Member States for resources for its operations, and it 
has no power WRIRUFH0HPEHU6WDWHVWRFRRSHUDWH7KHDJHQF\¶VWDVNVDQG
priorities seem to be under development, and the findings of the research imply 
WKDWWKHUHLVQRHVWDEOLVKHGFRQVHQVXVRYHUZKDWWKH(8¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHILHOG
should be. At the moment, FRONTEX¶VWDVNVFRQFHUQFRRUGLQDWLRQRI
activities performed by Member State authorities, which means that, although 
there is a lot of knowledge and expertise at FRONTEX, the agency does not 
function as a centre where all the top expertise is gathered. For these reasons, I 
argue that neither a wish to ensure credible commitment nor a need to gather 
expertise within one agency were key reasons for the establishment of 
FRONTEX.  
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 Sociological institutionalism and the concept of institutional 
isomorphism can help us understand why the Community Agency form was 
selected after EU decision-makers had found the previous model lacking. At 
the time of FRONTEX establishment, the Community Agency form had 
become increasingly common. The Council, which took the initiative for 
FRONTEX, stated in the preparation stages that precedents set by other 
agencies were to be taken into account when designing FRONTEX.  As 
previously mentioned in connection to the summary of the findings for EASA, 
agencies were also considered somewhat fashionable as an institutional form at 
the time. Comments made in the EP debates on the establishment of 
FRONTEX, revealed that some MEPs were concerned about the rapid creation 
of numerous agencies, which indicates that there was an element of agency 
fascination amongst decision-makers. For these reasons, I argue that 
institutional isomorphism was at work; an institutional form developed in a 
different policy field had come to be viewed in a favourable light by decision-
makers and was thus transferred into the common border management field.     
 
8.3 Comparative discussion  
Agency creation at the European level and national level differ because agency 
creation at the European level requires an active decision to integrate, or at 
least harmonise, the policies between different states. Whereas the 
establishment or change in institutional design of an agency at national level is 
primarily a matter of public management organisation, the establishment of an 
agency at European level is equally a matter of integration. The case studies 
have thus been able to shed light not only on the decision to create agencies but 
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also on integration at large. An important finding here is that integration, in the 
shape of agency creation, has been driven by different actors at different times. 
In the case of Cedefop, the driving force was the trade union movement. As 
regards EMEA and EASA, we must note a more significant pressure applied 
by large industry, which could see considerable efficiency gains by the 
integration of policy and the creation of a central agency. In the case of 
FRONTEX, Member States played an essential part, and, through the European 
Council, they took the initiative.  
The case studies also shed light on the development of the EP. Studies 
of EP documentation related to the four case studies show how the institution 
appears to have got more confidence, but also perhaps developed a more 
³PDWXUH´ZRUNLQJFXOWXUH7KH(3KDGDIDLUO\ORZNH\UROHLQWKH
establishment of Cedefop, which followed the consultation procedure. During 
the process leading up to EMEA creation, the EP was criticised for being 
irresponsible by tabling an unreasonable number of amendments to the 
legislation. By the time EASA was established, working practises appeared to 
have been normalised and cooperation between the EU institutions appeared 
more cordial. FRONTEX was established by the consultation procedure, which 
QDWXUDOO\ZHDNHQHGWKH(3¶VLQIOXHQFHEXWE\WKLVWLPHZHFDQVWLOOQRWLFHWKDW
the EP was using a more assertive tone than was the case at the time of the 
establishment of agencies in 1975 and in the 1990s. 
Historical institutionalism supports the notion that, to explain the 
creation and development of institutions, account must be taken of the specific 
context in which political institutions are created and develop. In terms of the 
importance of the political situation at large for agency establishment, this 
211 
 
research has shown that a distinction can be drawn between the two regulatory 
agencies, i.e. EMEA and EASA, and the two advisory agencies, i.e. Cedefop 
and FRONTEX. The case studies of Cedefop and FRONTEX revealed that the 
political situation had a fundamental impact on the decision to establish 
agencies. In the 1970s, economic crisis and industrial decline paved the way 
for significant trade union support, which rendered the EESC fairly influential, 
and the establishment of ETUC meant that trade unions got yet another voice 
in European level discussions. In the early 2000s, the EU was about to 
undertake the largest enlargement to date, which created considerable concern 
about the management of the external borders. Tragic incidents involving 
refugees drew widespread attention to problems of human smuggling and 
WUDIILFNLQJDQGFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHVHLVVXHV¶EHLQJEURXJKWXSRQWKH(uropean 
Council agenda. The research could not prove that the political context was of 
equal importance for the creation of EMEA and EASA. In both of these cases, 
it is tempting to link their creation to the single market. It is indeed plausible 
that the completion of the single market led to the need for the EU to perform 
more tasks, which could be delegated to agencies, and it may have sped up 
decisions to create EMEA and EASA. However, this does not make it a critical 
juncture in the historical institutionalist sense. In the case of European policy 
on medicinal products, harmonisation had been ongoing since the 1960s, which 
refutes that the creation of the single market was a critical juncture. In several 
respects, EMEA creation was a matter of formalising structures that were 
already in place. As regards EASA strong pressure to establish the agency 
came from the aviation industry, in particular the powerful American aviation 
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industry, which most likely would favour a single European agency regardless 
of the existence of the single market.  
Another distinction between the advisory agencies (Cedefop and 
FRONTEX) and the regulatory agencies (EMEA and EASA) is that the latter 
operate in highly technical fields, whereas there is little undisputed science in 
the vocational training and border management fields. A reasonable hypothesis 
would thus be that the rational choice institutionalist idea that delegation takes 
place in order to concentrate technical expertise would have better explanatory 
value for EMEA and EASA than for Cedefop and FRONTEX. This proved to 
be only partially true. Whilst obviously demanding relevant knowledge and 
expertise from their staff, Cedefop and FRONTEX were not created to be 
centres of expertise, the work of which were deemed essential for informed 
policy-making. They were created to coordinate, and are reliant on cooperation 
with relevant authorities in the Member States. The research has shown that the 
expertise hypothesis holds significant explanatory value for EASA, which is an 
agency that seeks to employ the top experts from within the European Union. 
As EMEA is reliant on authorities within the Member States to carry out the 
evaluations of medicinal products, this hypothesis does not hold for EMEA, 
however. An interesting point to note is that interviewees indicated that the 
prevalence of centralisation has increased over time, and that authorities within 
different Member States may have to specialise more. This suggests that, 
although EMEA itself will not become an agency that seeks to employ all of 
(XURSH¶VWRSH[SHUWVWKHUDWLRQDOFKRLFHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWLGHDRIH[SHUWLVH
concentration may have gained acceptance. Here we can recall that European 
213 
 
cooperation on the whole was much more intergovernmental in nature when 
the first cooperation in the medicinal products field was initiated.  
Rational choice institutionalist theory could, however, contribute 
significantly to our understanding of EMEA establishment. There was 
considerable evidence, for instance the recurring emphasis on upholding 
FRPPRQVWDQGDUGVDQGRQWKHDJHQF\¶VUROHDVDQDUELWHUWRVXSSRUWWKH
rational choice institutionalist hypothesis that delegation takes place to ensure 
credible commitment for policies. Support for the credible commitment 
hypothesis could be found also in the EASA case study, where the importance 
of agency independence was particularly emphasised. The findings concerning 
Cedefop are interesting in that some evidence for a wish for credible 
commitment was found in relation to the management of the agency. My 
research indicated a wish from decision-makers to institutionalise, and hence 
make their commitment credible, to the social dialogue. This shows that the 
rational choice institutionalist argument about credible commitment need not 
concern only functions delegated to agencies. It is also applicable to working 
practices and issues of participation. With hindsight, however, we know the 
commitment to an active social dialogue has not been completely honoured. 
Credible commitment was not a driving factor behind the establishment of 
FRONTEX. The agency is heavily dependent on Member State cooperation, 
and the agency has no option other than trust to encourage cooperation. If 
credible commitment had been a concern, we would have expected to see a 
stronger and more independent mandate for the agency. 
Let us turn to the hypothesis that the four case study agencies could 
have been created in order to lower political transaction costs by increasing 
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efficiency. Naturally, it would be highly unlikely that agencies would have 
been created if decision-makers seriously thought that they would lead to less 
efficiency. Unsurprisingly, the research does not include any strong evidence 
that efficiency concerns can be completely ruled out. Having said that, the lack 
of references to efficiency gain as a rationale for agency creation in the case 
studies of Cedefop was striking, and this leads me to conclude that efficiency 
gain was not an important motive behind the creation of this agency. There is 
more evidence in favour of the efficiency hypothesis in the other case studies.  
As regards EMEA and EASA, references were found to efficiency gains for 
industry. In addition, the creation of EASA, which drafts highly technical 
legislation, frees up time for the Commission to work on other things. In the 
case of FRONTEX, the creation of a single formal border management agency 
rather than remaining with several more informal units, which sometimes may 
compete for the same funding, bears witness to a desire to streamline 
cooperation, thereby making cooperation more efficient. For the two agencies 
established in the 2000s, i.e. EASA and FRONTEX, I argue, however, that the 
wish to increase efficiency was secondary to other motives. As to the division 
of labour between EASA and the Commission, we can conclude that the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVWULYLQJWRDWWUDFWWRLWVHOIWKHQXPEHURIH[SHUWVQHHGHGWR
SHUIRUP($6$¶VWDVNVLVQRWDYLDEOHRSWLRQ7KXVWKHQHHGWRDFTXLUHZLWKLQ
EASA the level of technical expertise needed takes priority over efficiency 
concerns. Cooperation in the area of border management would not have 
become reality were it not for enlargement and the transfer of asylum and 
migration issues to the first pillar. Without these critical events, an issue of 
increasing efficiency of cooperation would not have arisen.   
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At the beginning of this research, my expectation was that sociological 
institutionalist theory would be useful to explain questions of institutional 
design of agencies. This proved to be correct in three case studies of four. 
There is evidence that a German vocational training institute provided 
inspiration for Cedefop. The American FAA was mentioned as a model in the 
process leading up to EASA creation, and an interviewee also remarked that 
agencies were fashionable at the time of EASA establishment. In the process 
leading up to the establishment of FRONTEX, there were calls to draw on the 
experience gained from other agencies in Europe. Institutional borrowing 
cannot explain the institutional design of EMEA, however. On the contrary, the 
research showed that a similar American agency was ruled out as a model in 
the process leading up to EMEA establishment. There is, nevertheless, 
HYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDWWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQDJHQF\LQ(0($¶VILHOGRI
operation was legitimised by the existence of agencies with the task of 
evaluating medicinal products at national levels. As illustrated by these case 
studies, the EU has drawn lessons from a variety of political settings; bodies at 
Member State level, previous Community Agencies and American models 
have been considered. 
An important conclusion from the case studies is that the hypotheses 
derived from the three strands of new institutionalism are not mutually 
exclusive; in each of the four cases, support could be found for more than one 
hypothesis, showing that several explanations are at work simultaneously. The 
three strands of new institutionalism have proved to capture different aspects of 
agency creation. Whereas rational choice institutionalism holds significant 
explanatory value for the functions of agencies, sociological institutionalism 
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tends to explain better questions of institutional design, and historical 
institutionalism is particularly useful for explaining questions of timing. 
 
8.4 Wider outlook 
The establishment of agencies at the EU-level is widely regarded as one of the 
most significant developments in EU governance in recent years. This research 
has confirmed that only a minority of Community Agencies hold regulatory 
powers in the strict sense of the word. This is not to say, however, that the 
advisory agencies do not have influence in European policy-making. As shown 
in the case of Cedefop, whose role in norm diffusion is demonstrated by the 
spread of the European CV, there is evidence that advisory agencies can also 
have influence in the policy-making process. This means that, to fully 
comprehend European governance today, one must account for the role of 
Community Agencies, and the fact that most agencies do not hold regulatory 
powers is not sufficient to disregard the idea of the EU as a regulatory state. 
 Discussions about agencies tend to concern issues of control and 
accountability. Given criticism raised against the EU on issues such as lack of 
transparency, which, at least in part, is due to the complicated nature of its 
decision-making processes, I argue that the establishment of agencies, which 
further complicates the picture, is a counterintuitive choice for decision-makers 
who wish to improve the public perception of their activities. To address this 
puzzle, this research has dealt with uncovering the rationales behind agency 
establishment, and reflecting on their role in governance today. In the 
remaining part of this chapter, I will discuss the findings of my research in 
relation to the wider academic debate on regulatory states. 
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 As explained in chapter 2, the rise of the regulatory state is to be 
understood as market regulation gaining prominence at the expense of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and income redistribution. This development, 
which took off in Europe in the 1980s, is accompanied by privatisation and 
H[WHQVLYHGHOHJDWLRQWRDJHQFLHVUHVXOWLQJLQD³GLIIXVLRQRISRZHU´DQG
H[WHQGHGLQIOXHQFHRI³WHFKQRFUDWLFH[SHUWV´0DMRQH 159). Rule by 
experts has since spread beyond the area of market regulation; specialist 
agencies have been set up also in other policy areas, such as social regulation 
(see Moran 2002: 394). The prominent role of experts in governance means 
that the regulatory state will suffer from a democratic deficit if democratic 
legitimacy is defined as ³GLUHFWUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRWKHYRWHUVRUWRWKH
JRYHUQPHQWH[SUHVVLQJWKHFXUUHQWSDUOLDPHQWDU\PDMRULW\´ (Majone 
1997: 159). However, the emphasis of the new public management (NPM) 
trend, of which agencification and the regulatory state are part, tends to be on 
what public administration can deliver rather than how it is delivered. In other 
words, the focus is more on output-oriented legitimacy than on input-oriented 
legitimacy. There is also often an emphasis on procedural legitimacy, i.e. that 
institutions follow correct procedures when carrying out their activities. 
 The findings of this research supports conclusions drawn in previous 
research that have pointed to a link between the increased use of regulatory 
agencies and a move towards more neo-liberal solutions. In the cases of the 
regulatory agencies EMEA and EASA, there are clear linkages between agency 
establishment and functional needs that have arisen as a result of market 
liberalisation related to the creation of the single market in particular. With the 
exception of the first two agencies, Community Agencies have been set up 
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after the macroeconomic paradigm shift in the 1980s (see 0ĦOOHUDQG:ULJKW
1994: 2). At the same time, it is noteworthy that the history of agencification at 
the EU level began before the 1980s, and it did not begin with the 
establishment of agencies to regulate market activities; the first two agencies 
were set up in the social policy field. In addition, only a minority of the current 
agencies are actively involved in market regulation. This leads me to suggest 
that although the essentially neo-liberal project of the single market is at the 
heart of EU activities, agencification at the European level has not been driven 
only by wishes to prevent market failure; the argument that the complexity of 
modern economies calls for increased use of experts in general appears to be 
equally important (see Braithwaite 2000: 231). This is puzzling as this 
argument, with its emphasis on the virtue of more technocratic expert 
governance, contradicts the rhetoric that the EU seeks to become more 
representative.   
 Rather than embracing either the concept of input-oriented legitimacy, 
which emphasises participation, or the concept of output-oriented legitimacy, 
which emphasises what the political system can deliver, the EU appears to be 
attempting to pursue both at the same time. This, I argue, is a problem, which 
not only hinders agencies from fulfilling their potential, it also hinders the EU 
from increasing its level of legitimacy in the eyes of the wider public. At the 
moment, the EU is being criticised for being unrepresentative and inefficient 
(as a result of overly bureaucratic procedures), at the same time. Starting from 
the assumption that increased legitimacy is desirable, I argue that the EU could 
reduce criticism by focusing first on either increasing participation or 
increasing efficiency in terms of what the system can deliver.  
219 
 
 At the moment, there appears to be a near obsession with procedural 
legitimacy; the agencies are expected to follow financial and procurement 
regulations that were set up for the larger EU institutions, and there are 
numerous control mechanisms to ensure compliance. Whilst this may serve a 
purpose in terms of holding agencies to account, it is widely regarded to come 
at the expense of efficiency. My research also suggests that the importance 
DWWULEXWHGWRDJHQFLHV¶EHLQJHVWDEOLVKHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKFRUUHFWSURFHGXUHV
has increased over time. The preparatory documents for the later agencies were 
generally longer, and, where the documents on Cedefop and EMEA focused on 
a few key reasons for the agencies, the documents on EASA and FRONTEX 
included longer discussions on the advantages that an agency would bring. A 
cynical interpretation of this would be that decision-PDNHUVKDYH³OHDUQW´WKH
agency literature, and know what type of arguments need to be mentioned in 
order to raise support. A more generous interpretation could be that 
transparency and accountability have been increasingly emphasised. Perhaps 
decision-makers today feel a greater need and/or are under greater pressure to 
provide motives for decisions that a wider public could appreciate should they 
decide to look into it in more detail.  
 At the same time, it is apparent that EU decision-makers are not 
satisfied with procedural legitimacy only, and attempts are made to add a 
³SDUWLFLSDWRU\HOHPHQW´WRWKHVSHFLDOLVWDJHQFLHV7KHLQFOXVLRQRI
VWDNHKROGHUVLQFOXGLQJWKHVRFLDOSDUWQHUVRQWKHDJHQFLHV¶%RDUGVFRXOGEH 
seen as an example to broaden participation beyond the technical experts. 
Another example is the frequent use of networks to provide the agencies with 
information. However, neither of these strategies is sufficient to change 
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drastically the perception that the establishment of agencies leads to more 
technocratic governance; they tend to open up for participation of certain actors 
only and not the wider public at large. In addition, as illustrated in particular by 
the case of Cedefop, not all invited participants can participate on equal terms; 
current language practices affect negatively the ability to participate of 
VSHDNHUVRI³VPDOOODQJXDJHV´DQGWKRVHZKRDUHQRWIDPLOLDUZLWKVSHFLDOLVW
terms. 
 Whilst EU decision-PDNHUV¶DWWHPSWVDWPDNLQJWKHDJHQFLHs appear 
more participatory can be criticised on several accounts, the findings of my 
research on EMEA suggest that efforts to achieve output-oriented legitimacy 
may be more fruitful. Throughout this research, everybody I consulted about 
EMEA made referencHVWRWKHDJHQF\¶VJRRGUHSXWDWLRQDQGRUFODLPHGWKDW
WKHUHLVZLGHDSSURYDORIWKLVDJHQF\¶VH[LVWHQFH(0($2IILFLDODWWULEXWHG
WKLVWRWKHDJHQF\¶VNHHSLQJ³DORZSURILOH´IRFXVLQJRQSHUIRUPLQJLWVGXWLHV
This, I argue, is a deliberate strategy to emphasise what Hood (1995: 94) has 
UHIHUUHGWRDV³DFFRXQWDELOLW\LQWHUPVRIUHVXOWV´LWGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWDJHQFLHV
may achieve a high degree of legitimacy and that this legitimacy is easier to 
achieve if the focus is on output, for instance in the form of efficient delivery 
RIUHVXOWVUDWKHUWKDQLQSXWLQWKHIRUPZLGHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHDJHQF\¶V
decision-making processes. A comparison with the establishment of 
FRONTEX illustrates further the point about the importance of output-oriented 
legitimacy; the establishment of this agency was surrounded by more 
controversy and, to a significant extent, this was due to disagreements about 
ZKDWWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNZRXOGEH 
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 In the chapter 2, I referred to the idea of legitimising increased 
technocratic agency governance by the Madisonian model of democracy, and 
argued that this could be difficult given traditional European ideas of the 
importance of public organisation¶V being accountable to parliament. I also 
DJUHHGZLWK0DMRQH¶VYLHZWKDWGHOHJation to agencies is likely to be regarded 
ZLWKVXVSLFLRQLQWKH(8GXHWRWKHH[LVWLQJQRUPRI³LQVWLWXWLRQDOEDODQFH´
(Majone 2002: 327), which means that delegation to bodies not mentioned in 
the Treaties FRXOGEHSHUFHLYHGDVDYLRODWLRQRI³IXQGDPHQWDl, and presumably 
LPPXWDEOHSULQFLSOHVRIWKHFRPPXQLWDULDQV\VWHP´0DMRQH 321). 
These arguments have been supported by this research on the establishment of 
Community Agencies. 
The Madisonian model of democracy requires a clear separation of powers, 
and I argue that this neither exists in the EU, nor is there currently any 
ZLOOLQJQHVVWRPRYHLQWKDWGLUHFWLRQ7KHLGHDRIDQ³LQVWLWXWLRQDOEDODQFH´
permeates the agencies themselves; all Community Agencies have Boards 
including Commission and Member State (i.e. Council) representatives and six 
Boards even include EP appointees. At the same time, as explained in section 
3.3.5, all but two agencies need to receive budgetary discharge from the EP on 
recommendation from the Council.50 This illustrates that the idea of public 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VEHLQJDFFRXQWDEOHWRSDUOLDPHQWVZKLFKKDVEHHQGRPLQDQWLQ
many national systems in Europe, has been recreated at the European level.  
 Returning to the starting point of this thesis, the role of agencies is 
currently VXEMHFWWRGHEDWHZLWKLQWKH(8,QLWVFRPPXQLFDWLRQµ(XURSHDQ
agencies ± WKHZD\IRUZDUG¶WKH&RPPLVVLRQ DUJXHGWKDW³DJHQFLHV
                                                 
50
 The exceptions are OHIM and CPVO, see section 3.3.5 for details. 
222 
 
FDQEULQJUHDODGGHGYDOXHWRWKH8QLRQ¶VJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUHV´EXW³WKLV
potential is being held back by the lack of a common vision about the role and 
IXQFWLRQVRIUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHV´:LWKWKLVGRFXPHQWWKH&RPPLVVLRQDLPHG
to promote dialogue between the different institutions about the role of 
agencies, and about the crucial questions of accountability and control. This, I 
argue, certainly is a discussion that needs to take place. This thesis has pointed 
to problems with the current situation and shown that, whilst the relationships 
between the agencies covered in this study and other EU institutions often are 
fairly good, there are also points of disagreement. The financial regulations that 
the agencies must follow are widely regarded as inappropriate and over-
complicated, which leads to inefficiency, thus limiting the ability to achieve 
output-oriented legitimacy in terms of efficient delivery of results. Often, the 
agencies wish to receive more funding than the other institutions are willing to 
grant them. Other questions concern the status and rewards of agency staff, 
which several interviewees perceived to be lower than for Commission staff 
and not competitive with the private sector, making it difficult for the agencies 
to truly become centres of expertise. The research also made apparent that the 
supranational ± intergovernmental debate is very much alive in the debate on 
the role of agencies. There are sometimes conflicts of interest between agencies 
and national authorities, where national authorities are sometimes scared of 
losing out to the European agency. If these problems could be resolved, it 
would clearly have a positive impact on governance in Europe. 
This thesis has shown that rational choice institutionalist arguments 
with their focus on functional needs appear to have more explanatory value in 
cases where industry was instrumental in pushing for agency creation, as in the 
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cases of EMEA and EASA. The research suggests that in policy areas where 
there is less commercial interest, other logics than a functional logic focusing 
on transaction costs have more explanatory value, and the establishment of 
advisory agencies working in policy fields where science is not undisputed, 
such as Cedefop and FRONTEX, is best explained through analysis of the 
political situation in which they are created. It has also shown that institutional 
borrowing takes place; in WKUHHFDVHVLWKDGH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHIRULQVWLWXWLRQV¶
design and in one case for the area of activity. Whatever the explanation behind 
the establishment of Community Agencies, they are now part of the European 
governance structure, and the issues pointed to in the previous paragraph need 
WREHDGGUHVVHGLIDJHQFLHVDUHWRSOD\DQHIILFLHQWUROH,Qµ(XURSHDQDJHQFLHV
± WKHZD\IRUZDUG¶WKH&RPPLVVLRQDQQRXQFHGLWVLQWHQWLRQWRHYDOXDWHWKH
current agencies. The findings of this evaluation will, no doubt, give rise to 
further questions for policy-makers considering agencies as an institutional 
solution as well as for academics concerned with the emergence and 
development of institutions.  
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Appendix 1: Founding Legislation of Community 
Agencies established 1975-2006 
 
Cedefop: Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/75 
EUROFOUND: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1365/75 
EEA: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1210/90 
ETF: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1360/90 
EMCDDA: Council Regulation (EEC) No 302/93 
EMEA: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 
OHIM: Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 
EU-OSHA: Council Regulation (EC) No 2062/94 
CPVO: Council regulation (EC) No 2100/94 
CdT: Council Regulation (EC) No 2965/94 
EUMC: Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 
EAR: Council Regulation (EC) No 2667/2000 
EFSA: Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
EMSA: Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
EASA: Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
ENISA: Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
ECDC: Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
ERA: Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
GSA: Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 
FRONTEX: Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
CFCA: Council Regulation (EC) No 768/2005 
ECHA: Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
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Appendix 2: Interviews 
 
Commission: 
 
Commission Official 1, Brussels, 2.6.2008 
 
Commission Official 2, Brussels, 2.6.2008 
 
Commission Official 3, Brussels, 3.6.2008 
 
Commission Official 4, Brussels, 4.6.2008 
 
 
European Parliament: 
 
EP Official 1, Brussels, 3.6.2008 
 
EP Official 2, Brussels, 5.6.2008 
 
MEP 1, Brussels, 4.6.2008 
 
MEP 2, Brussels, 4.6.2008 
 
 
Cedefop: 
 
Cedefop Official 1, Thessaloniki, 31.3.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 2, Thessaloniki, 31.3.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 3, Thessaloniki, 1.4.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 4, Thessaloniki, 3.4.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 5, Thessaloniki, 3.4.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 6, Thessaloniki, 3.4.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 7, Thessaloniki, 3.4.2008 
 
Cedefop Official 8, 7.4.2008 (phone interview)  
 
 
EMEA: 
 
EMEA Official 1, London, 18.8.2008 
 
EMEA Official 2, London, 18.8.2008 
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EASA: 
 
EASA Official, Cologne, 10.6.2008 
 
 
FRONTEX: 
 
FRONTEX Official 1, Warsaw, 11.4.2008 
 
FRONTEX Official 2, Warsaw, 11.4.2008  
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